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
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
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
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
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# THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION.

VOL. LIV.

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*[Authors alone are responsible for the contents of their respective Papers.]*

## SECRETARY'S NOTES.

### I. PATRON.

His Majesty King George V. has graciously intimated that he is pleased to become the Patron of the Institution.

### II. NEW MEMBERS.

The following officers became members of the Institution during the month of July :—

Lieutenant J. D. D. Brancker, R.G.A.  
Commander G. N. Tomlin, R.N.  
Lieut.-Colonel L. G. Watkins, R.A.  
Lieutenant T. H. Carlisle, R.H.A.  
Captain G. A. Jamieson, 16th Cavalry, I.A.  
Captain J. C. D. Holland, 7th Dragoon Guards.  
Lieutenant H. J. D. Kerans, R.F.A.  
Second-Lieutenant F. W. Des Voeux, Grenadier Guards.  
Captain L. Rottenburg, R.G.A. (T.F.).  
Second-Lieutenant A. W. Forbes, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.  
Captain J. S. Cawley, 20th Hussars.  
Captain G. E. Hawes, Royal Fusiliers.  
Lieutenant A. A. Fenn, Royal Fusiliers.  
Lieutenant M. A. Anderson, R.N.  
Lieutenant E. R. Macpherson, Highland Light Infantry.  
Lieutenant W. B. Curell, Lancashire Fusiliers.  
Captain R. J. B. Keyes, M.V.O., R.N.  
Captain D. R. L. Nicholson, R.N.  
Captain C. F. Dampier, R.N.  
Captain B. M. Chambers, R.N.  
Lieutenant H. D. Gill, R.N.  
Captain H. W. Richmond, R.N.

### II. THE LIBRARY CATALOGUE.

A Catalogue of the accessions to the Library in 1908 and 1909, and of the books struck out of the Catalogue in 1910, has been published, and can be obtained on application to the Secretary; price one shilling.

#### IV. "THE CREATION OF THE JAPANESE NATIONAL SPIRIT."

At the request of several members (interested in the Boy Scout movement), Major Sir A. Bannerman's lecture has been printed in pamphlet form, and can be obtained on application to the Secretary; price sixpence each. There will be a considerable reduction in price for members requiring a large number. It will be of interest to members to know that this paper has been published in a number of Continental countries.

#### V. LECTURES.

Members desiring to deliver lectures in the Theatre or contribute papers in the JOURNAL are requested to submit them for the perusal of the Council, through the Secretary. The Council specially hope that they may receive the offer of lectures on naval subjects.

#### VI. LETTERS.

Officers are reminded that the Council can accept no responsibility in the matter of letters and telegrams addressed to them at the Institution, there being no arrangements for the reception and forwarding of members' letters, etc.

#### VII. ADDITIONS TO THE MUSEUM.

(6125) Shako Plate of the 81st Regiment of the pattern used from about 1854 to 1864.—Given by Mrs. Browne.

(6126) Model of the French line-of-battleship *L'Imperiale* (formerly *Vengeur*), 130 guns and 3,000 tons measurement, flagship of Vice-Admiral Coëntin-Urbain Leissegues, captured and burnt after having run ashore at the battle of Santo Domingo, 6th February, 1806, having lost her main and mizzen masts and some five hundred men killed and wounded. The British squadron was under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir John T. Duckworth and Rear-Admiral the Hon. Alexander F. I. Cochrane. *L'Imperiale*, sometimes described as a 120-gun ship, mounted 130 guns in this action, and is acknowledged to have been "le plus fort et le plus beau vaisseau qui eut jamais été construit dans aucun pays du monde." The Model was taken out of the ship previous to her being burnt.

Given by Thomas B. H. Cochrane, Esq., M.V.O.,

late Lieutenant, R.N.

(6127) Officer's Belt Buckle of the 20th (East Devonshire) Regiment, worn up to 1881.—Given by Mrs. E. E. Rollason.

(6128) Shoulder-belt Plate of the 3rd Regiment, Argyllshire Fencibles.—Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Cottell.

(6129) Scarlet Shell Jacket (Sergeant-Major) of the 96th Regiment, worn up to 1865.—Given by Mrs. E. E. Rollason.

(6130) Pair of Officer's Helmet Chains of the 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, worn up to 1846.

Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. B. Cottell.

(6131) Infantry Officer's Sword, Hon. East India Company.

Given by Lieut.-Colonel W. H. M. Jackson.

- (6132) Collection of British Cavalry Buttons, consisting of 3rd and 13th Light Dragoons; complete Set of Tunic Buttons; complete Set of Hunt Coat Buttons.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham.*

- (6133) Officer's Belt Buckle of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment, worn up to 1881.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Farquhar.*

- (6134) Officer's Shako Plate of the 24th Foot, worn up to 1864.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Farquhar.*

- (6135) Officer's Shako Plate of the 24th Foot, worn up to 1881.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel H. R. Farquhar.*

- (6136) Cap Badges of the Royal Reserve Dragoon Guards, Royal Reserve Hussars, and Royal Reserve Lancers Regiments.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham.*

- (6137) Collection of the following Cavalry Badges, etc.: Shako Badges, 13th and 14th Light Dragoons; Sabretasche Badges, 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Dragoon Guards, 1st, 2nd and 6th Dragoons, 17th Lancers, 10th and 19th Hussars; Sabretasches, 2nd Dragoon Guards, 5th, 12th and 21st Lancers.

*Given by Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham.*

- (6138) Shako with green horse-hair plume of the 105th Madras Light Infantry, worn up to 1881; the plume was abolished in 1873, and a green ball substituted.—*Given by Colonel George Byng.*

- (6139) A Line Engraving entitled "The Distribution of His Majesty's Maundy, Chapel Royal, Whitehall," engraved from the picture drawn by H. S. Grimm, 1773.—*Purchased.*

- (6140) A Painting in Oils by James Ward, R.A., entitled "An Allegory: The Genius of Wellington." It was exhibited at the British Institution Exhibition in 1816, and awarded a premium of 1,000 guineas, and is the original from which the large picture was executed, in the terms of the premium, for Chelsea Hospital. The following description of the picture is by Ward himself, extracted from the catalogue of 1816:—

"The Genius of Wellington on the Car of War, supported by Britannia, and attended by the Seven Cardinal Virtues, commanding away the demons Anarchy, Rebellion, and Discord, with the Horrors of War. Bellona is endeavouring to take the reins and urge on the horses with her many-thonged scourge, but which are tightly held in by Love, seated upon the head of Britannia's Lion; while they are regulated by Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice. Usurpation is sinking under the feet of the horses; Opposition and Tumult expiring under the wheels of the Car, on the sides of which are the Rose, the Thistle, and the Shamrock, and on its end the Palm of Victory; to which are endeavouring to fasten themselves Anger, Cruelty, and Revenge, but falling under the foot of Charity, whose other foot treads on the Emblem of Slavery. She is endeavouring to raise her children into the Bosom of Religion, who, rising above the clouds of Folly and Superstition, is pursued by Malice, Calumny, and Detraction, and bowing under the pressure of Prejudice and Obstinacy, emerging from the dense clouds of Ignorance and

Error. She stretches out her arms to Britannia for protection, supported by Hope and led on by Faith, who, through the medium of the Cross, directs her attention to the Deity, in three incorporated triangles expressive of the Trinity, immediately under the Glory of which is the Dove of Peace, and the Angel of Divine Providence expanding her arms over the whole group, and under whose wings, as her offspring, is Victory ready to crown the Hero and Plenty with the full Cornucopia to pour upon Britannia in the event of Peace, while the children, as the lesser Victories, have, and are scattering the Roses of their Conquests upon the Genius of Britannia. In the background are the allied Heroes, with the Army and the colours of the different nations engaged in the war. In the front is the Hydra-headed monster falling from the clouds into the flames of Remorse. From the gloom of Folly and Superstition, and under the influence of Anger, Cruelty, and Revenge, Death is endeavouring to unveil herself, and send forth her various shapeless and horrid forms, but which sink into annihilation as they approach Humanity (or love to mankind) seated upon the head of the British Lion.

"The Border is expressive of the character of Great Britain.

"In the centre of the top is the Sword of Justice, to which are attached the Emblems of Punishment; they are suspended by Mercy and Judgment, in whose other hands are the Emblems of Riches, and whose other end is supported by a Cable, which entwines itself round the columns that support the fabric of Mercy and Judgment, and, twisting round the Anchor, unites in the central military Trophies; thus incorporating the Laws, the Army and Navy as the pride of the British nation."

*Given by Arthur Kay, Esqre, F.S.A., of Glasgow.*

### VIII. THE CAP BADGE COLLECTION.

This collection of Infantry Regiments of the Line previous to 1881 is now nearly complete; the following badges are still required: 21st, 68th, 76th, 87th, 101st and 104th Regiments. The Curator hopes that members possessing these Cap Badges will kindly contribute them to make a set complete.

THE ORGANISATION OF WELLINGTON'S  
PENINSULAR ARMY, 1809-1814.

By Professor C. W. C. OMAN, F.B.A., Chichele Professor of  
Modern History in the University of Oxford.

On Wednesday, 9th March, 1910.  
Major-General J. M. GRIERSON, C.V.O., C.B., C.M.G., p.s.c.,  
Commanding 1st Division, Aldershot, in the Chair.

THOUGH so much has been written concerning the exploits of Wellington's army during the momentous years 1809-14, and though a considerable number of critics have dealt in more or less minute detail with the Great Duke's strategy and tactics, I am cognisant of only one single author who has taken the trouble to collect some of the details of the internal organisation of his victorious host. Much still remains to be done. The subject, though dry enough compared with the study of battles and manoeuvres, is not without its interest, and it is in the hope of doing something to fill up some obvious gaps that I come before you this day. The actual topic was suggested to me by your Council, and the moment that they named it, I felt that it was my bounden duty to accede to the request, since my work during the last five years has kept me perpetually in contact with the original documents, printed and unprinted, which contain so much unpublished information on this aspect of the Peninsular War.

I need hardly remind an audience such as that which sits before me of the crucial difference that existed between the operations of the British army in Spain and Portugal during these eventful years, and all the early campaigns in which it had been engaged during the preceding stages of the great French War. These, with one exception, had all partaken of the nature of expeditions rather than of continuous campaigns. I mean by this that though on several occasions—for example, during the invasion of North Holland in 1799, the conquest of Egypt in 1801, the operations in the French West Indies, and at Buenos Ayres—considerable numbers of troops had been employed (rising in the case of the invasion of Holland to over 30,000 men), yet all these episodes were affairs of a few months, or even weeks, and all were executed at a short distance from the sea, and with a fleet as the base from which the army

(1) I allude to Mr. C. T. Atkinson's most valuable table of brigade and divisional organisation in the *English Historical Review* for 1905, which I cannot too highly praise. But being mainly tabular it needs comment.



worked. The only instance in the first fifteen years of the war in which an English force kept the field for a couple of campaigns, extending over two full years, was during the Duke of York's operations in North France and the Netherlands in 1793-4-5; and this was a case differing essentially from the Peninsular War, because the British troops were only a contingent, forming the smaller fraction of a great Anglo-Dutch-Austrian combined army, and their commander was under the orders of a foreign General-in-Chief, Coburg, to whose purposes and plans he had to subordinate his own. It was a misfortune for the allies, and a great advantage to the French, that the combined army was far too much governed by Councils of War, in which the British commander was always to be found urging movements that suited British political aims and necessities. But though the Duke's views often had some influence (generally an unfortunate influence) on the combined operations, he in no sense directed them, and all through 1793 and the summer of 1794 the British troops were simply a contingent under the control of the stranger. It was not till the Austrians withdrew from Belgium after their defeat at Fleurus, leaving the British army to defend Holland if it could, that York became an independent general, able to settle his own plan of campaign. But as he had been left no more than 26,000 British troops, with some Hanoverian and Dutch auxiliaries, to resist the whole victorious French Army of the North, his independence consisted only in freedom to choose the route by which he should evacuate the Low Countries. By December the British were behind the Rhine, by January they had retired into Germany, and were thinking only of embarkation for England. There is little profitable comparison to be made between this unhappy campaign and the Peninsular War. It may be added that Holland and Belgium are so close to England that York's army was practically using England as its base from which to draw stores and reinforcements, rather than Ostend, Nieuport or Antwerp, or any of the Dutch ports or fortresses.

The task of Wellington, therefore, in the Peninsula was unlike anything that had fallen to the lot of other British generals during the earlier years of the war. It was no mere expedition that he had in charge, but a war that was certain to be long: and, every month that it continued, it grew more and more clear that he was not to be considered as an auxiliary of the Spaniards or the Portuguese, bound to subordinate his movements to their designs or necessities. Neither of these facts had been fully recognised at the beginning of the struggle in 1808. Very few of the officers of the brigades which landed under Burrard and Wellesley, Moore and Baird, during the early months of the war, had any idea that more than six years would elapse before the Peninsula saw the back of the last British soldier. After the French had suffered the initial disaster of Bailen, and had been obliged to withdraw from their attacks on Saragossa and



Valencia, and to re-form behind the Ebro, not far from their own border, all hopeful spirits thought that Spain had saved herself, and that if the war went on it would be a frontier war of the old sort, along the line of the Pyrenees, such as France and Spain had often fought out before. In this case those who were well informed in higher politics held that Austria would attack Napoleon in the rear (as indeed she did in the coming spring of 1809, despite of all discouragement), and that the Emperor would collapse before the double attack. Under the hypothesis that the Spaniards would be strong enough to maintain a forward position, and to keep up the war on their own frontier, the rôle of the British army, which had won Vimiero and cleared Portugal, would be merely to act as an auxiliary contingent to the Spaniards, much as it had acted as a subordinate corps to the Austrian main army in the Low Countries in 1793-94. Indeed, a place was actually found for the 30,000 British, who lay at Lisbon in August under Moore, in the general line of the Spanish forces. They were to be united to the small Spanish army of Estremadura, and to form, somewhere in front of Burgos, the left centre of the broad front which was to be opposed to the French all along the line of the Ebro. They would have been more or less under control of Castaños, the Spanish Commander-in-Chief, and would have been used for purely Spanish ends.

This conjunction never came to pass, for two reasons. The first was that the British army at Lisbon had been put on shore so entirely destitute of transport that it had hardly succeeded in mobilising itself, and starting on its forward march, three months after the Convention of Cintra had been signed. That unfortunate agreement was ratified on 30th August; the head of Moore's column, advancing from Lisbon into Spain, only entered Salamanca on 13th November; its rear only reached that place on 23rd November, and several columns which had taken flanking routes were not even then arrived. The second was that, a few days before this, about the moment that Moore was actually crossing the Spanish frontier, Napoleon had broken through the line of defence which his enemies had opposed to him behind the Ebro, the Spanish left wing having been routed and dispersed at Espinosa on 11th November, and its weak centre pierced at Burgos on 10th November. There was no longer any chance that the Peninsular War would take the shape of a struggle not far from the frontier, of which the English and Spaniards alike had dreamed. I need not go into the well-known details of Moore's campaign, which he had to conduct on his own responsibility and with his own resources. He was delivered, by Napoleon's early successes, from the inevitable disaster that would have befallen him if he had arrived at the front a month earlier, and had been involved as a subordinate factor in the Spanish campaign that began at Zornoza and ended with the fall of Madrid on 3rd December. How he stayed Napoleon's further progress by his famous flank march, drew

upon himself the main force of the enemy, and escaped from it by that terrible piece of hard marching, the Corunna retreat, does not concern us on this occasion.

The second phase of the Peninsular War, that with which we deal to-day, only opens with Wellesley's return to Lisbon on 22nd April, 1809. By this time the French were in possession of all central Spain and of a not inconsiderable part of Northern Portugal. The Spanish armies had all been dashed to pieces, and the Junta—busily engaged in rallying their miserable wrecks—could no longer affect to treat the English forces as mere auxiliaries, who might act as a subsidiary contingent in their aid. Indeed, the army of which Wellesley took command in Portugal on 22nd April, though it only mustered 19,000 men present, or 21,000 including men in hospital, was the sole serious and solid force, in good order and intact in *morale*, on which the allies could count in the Peninsula. The position, therefore, was very different from what it had been in the autumn of 1808, and the task set before Wellesley was how he could best defend Portugal, and co-operate in the protection of the South of Spain, it being obvious that the French were in vastly superior numbers, and well able to take the offensive if they should chose so to do. There were two armies threatening Lisbon: the one, under Soult, had already captured Oporto shortly before Wellesley's landing; the other, under Victor, lay in Estremadura, on the Guadiana, and had recently destroyed the largest surviving Spanish army at the battle of Medelin on 28th March.

We have fortunately three documents from Wellesley's own hand which show us the way in which he surveyed the position which lay before him, and state his views as to the future course of the Peninsular War. He recognised that it was about to be a very long business, and that his task was simply to keep the war going as long as possible with the resources at his disposition. Ambitious schemes for the expulsion of the French from the whole Peninsula were perfectly futile. The hypothesis, which he states in his great "Memorandum on the Defence of Portugal," laid before Castlereagh on 7th March before he had taken ship to Lisbon, is shortly as follows:—An English army of 20,000 or 30,000 men, backed by the levies of Portugal, would be able to maintain itself almost indefinitely on the flank of the French army in Spain. Its presence on the Tagus would paralyse all offensive movements of the enemy, and enable the Spaniards to make head in the South as long as Portugal remained unsubdued. The French ought to turn all their disposable forces against the British army and Portugal, but he believed that, considering the geography of that country, they would fail in their attempt to overrun it. They could not succeed, so he held, unless they could set aside 100,000 men for the task, and he did not see how they could spare such a large detachment out of the forces which they then possessed in the Peninsula. If the Spaniards pursued a reasonable military policy, and confined their efforts

to occupying the attention of as many French as possible, without risking anything by rash offensive operations, the enemy ought never to be able to set aside anything like 100,000 men for an attack on Portugal. If he tried to undertake an invasion of that country with insufficient resources, he would be badly beaten. Further forward it was impossible to look; if a war should break out between Napoleon and Austria, as was almost certain at the moment to those who were (like himself) in the secrets of the Ministry, the Emperor would not be able to spare any further reinforcements for Spain for many a day. But even allowing for this probability, the position of the French in the Peninsula would only be endangered when a very large allied force, acting in unison under the guidance of a single general, should be brought to bear upon them. Of the collection of such a force, and still more of its being placed under the orders of one master mind—his own—there was as yet no question. Indeed, it was not till more than three years later that he actually acquired, in 1812, the position of commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies. At present all that he could hope to do was to co-operate to the best of his ability with such Spanish forces as might exist in the neighbourhood of his own Portuguese sphere of operations.

This Memorandum is a truly prophetic document, which shows Wellesley at his best. It is not too much to say that it predicts the whole course of the Peninsular War—whose central point was to be that invasion of Portugal by an army of less than 100,000 French, foiled by the difficulties of the country and the tactics of Wellesley himself, which had been foreseen more than eighteen months before it happened. The Memorandum was written in March, 1809; Massena's advance to the lines of Torres Vedras was to take place in September and October, 1810.

Having made up his mind that the defence of Portugal was to be his main business for an indefinite time, Wellesley set to work to provide for it. With that part of his activity which was displayed in the fortification of the Lisbon Peninsula by the building of the lines of Torres Vedras, we are not here concerned—they were commenced in October, 1809, just a year before Massena came up against them, another example of Wellesley's prescience. But the other side of his activity, the organisation of his troops, English and Portuguese, is the subject with which we are concerned to-day.

The total English force in Portugal in April, 1809, was, as I have already mentioned, no more than 21,000 men, including the sick and detached. There were, in addition, 26,000 Portuguese Regulars under arms, formed of a medley of broken and incomplete cadres, the relics of the army which Junot had disbanded in 1808, hastily refilled with raw recruits. Part of this hastily organised force was already in the field in Northern Portugal under Silveira, actually engaged at Amarante against one of Soult's flanking columns. But the bulk, ten line regi-

ments of infantry, three battalions of Caçadores, and three incomplete cavalry regiments, was massed about Abrantes and Thomar, in camps of instruction, with a strength of about 15,000 sabres and bayonets. The English and the Portuguese armies, therefore, were concentrated quite close to each other, and it remained to be seen how the new commander-in-chief would organise them. For he had, in that respect, a perfectly clean slate before him; neither the English nor the Portuguese regiments had at that moment any general organisation higher than that of the regiment. The English consisted partly of the odd regiments which Moore had left behind him, when he marched into Spain six months before, partly of the new reinforcements which had arrived since. The former, almost entirely Moore's leavings, comprised 11 battalions of infantry,<sup>1</sup> (4 of which belonged to the King's German Legion), one complete regiment of cavalry with fractions of two others,<sup>2</sup> and five companies of field artillery. They had never been permanently reorganised into larger units by Cradock, the interim commander in Portugal between Moore's departure and Wellesley's arrival, though some provisional brigading took place. The other British troops at hand in April consisted of thirteen newly-landed battalions of infantry,<sup>3</sup> including two of the Guards, and three regiments of cavalry,<sup>4</sup> with three field batteries.

It will, no doubt, surprise many of my hearers to learn that Wellesley fought out his first short campaign, that of Oporto, with no higher organised unit than the brigade. But this is the fact: the eighteen thousand infantry were distributed into eight brigades of two or three battalions each, varying in strength from 1,400 up to 2,500 bayonets. But Wellesley was not so belated in failing to form divisions at once as might be thought. They were still rather an abnormal than a usual unit for a British army; indeed, in nearly all the expeditions in which our armies had been engaged since 1793, the numbers were so small that any unit above a brigade had been unnecessary. But it is to be remembered that not only in the Duke of York's first campaign in the Low Countries, in 1793-4, but in his second in 1799, and in Abercrombie's Egyptian Expedition of 1801, no divisions had existed. When several brigades acted together, not under the immediate eye of the commander-in-chief, the senior brigadier present took temporary command of the assemblage. In the Low Countries,

(1) 1/3rd, 2/9th, 29th, 1/40th, 1/45th, 5/60th, 97th, and 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th line battalions of the K.G.L.

(2) The 14th Light Dragoons had not belonged to Moore, but had come straight from England in December. The 20th (2 squadrons) and 3rd Hussars K.G.L. (1 squadron) had been left behind by Moore.

(3) 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards, 1st Battalion 3rd Guards, 2/7th, 2/24th, 3/27th, 2/30th, 2/31st, 2/48th, 2/53rd, 2/83rd, 2/87th, 1/88th 2/66th.

(4) 16th Light Dragoons, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons.

York generally speaks of his army as being divided into columns,<sup>1</sup> of two or three brigades each; but there was no fixity in the arrangement. Abercrombie, on the other hand, in the last dispatch which he wrote before his victory and death, lays down the theoretical organisation that the army is to be considered as being divided into three "lines": the first composed of three brigades, the second and third of two each. If the word *division* is used in any official documents of these campaigns, as I have seen in one or two places,<sup>2</sup> the word has no technical military sense, but is used as a vague synonym for section or part of the army. Indeed, so far as I know, the first British force during the French war, which was from the first formed into divisions in the proper modern sense, was the army which went on the Copenhagen Expedition in 1807, which was regularly distributed into four such units, each under a Lieutenant-General (who was not merely the Senior Brigadier) and each composed of two, three or four weak brigades, generally only two battalions strong. This was a force of some 26,000 men. The original Peninsular army of 1808, which had landed at the mouth of the Mondego and won the battle of Vimiero, was therefore not far from being the first British force organised in divisions; but it is to be noted that they were rather theoretical than real, for several brigades had not landed when Vimiero was fought, and Wellesley had worked the incomplete army on a brigade system, so that no trace whatever of any divisional action will be found in that battle. Indeed, even the theoretical composition of the brigades differed from the real. No true divisions were formed in the Peninsula, till those of Moore's army of the Corunna campaign came into existence. We must not, therefore, be surprised to find that for some three months after he arrived in Portugal in 1809, Wellington worked his 21,000 British troops in detached brigades, only connected in a casual and temporary way when two chanced to form a marching or fighting unit under the Senior Brigadier.

But two more points concerning Wellesley's Oporto campaign deserve notice. This was the first and only occasion on which he tried the experiment of systematically mixing British and Portuguese regiments in the same brigade. To five of the eight brigades forming the infantry of the army there was a Portuguese battalion attached, picked as being one of the best in the rather disorganised assembly which Beresford had collected at Abrantes and Thomar. Though the Portuguese fought not amiss during the short campaign, and are mentioned with praise in Wellington's dispatches, yet the experiment was not continued, evidently because it was found not to work happily. The five Portuguese battalions were sent back to Beresford not long after the fall of Oporto.

(1) See for example his Alkmaar dispatch of 6th October, 1799.

(2) e.g., in Walsh's "Expedition to Holland in 1799," p. 22, the whole original landing force of the British, 15,000 bayonets, is called the "first division," but only in contrast to the troops yet to be landed, not in a technical sense.



The other point in Wellesley's organisation of his first army is, on the other hand, one that was to be continued all through the war, and had a deep meaning. His whole theory of fighting the French column formation with the two-deep line had an essential postulate at the base of it, which is often omitted by the historians of tactics. This was, that in the day of battle the column must be brought directly face to face with the line, and not allowed to hide its approach with a cloud of skirmishers, who should shield it from the fire of the line till the last moment of contact. The French always came on with such a screen of light troops in front of the heavy and vulnerable mass that formed the striking force. It was always composed of the *voltigeur* companies of each battalion in the regiment or brigade. To keep off this skirmishing advance from the front of the British line, Wellesley always used the device of having a heavier skirmishing line of his own, which should be strong enough to hold back the French screen, and could only be forced to retire by the supporting columns. This device was accomplished by attaching to each brigade of his army an extra company of trained light troops, selected from rifle battalions which were broken up for this purpose and distributed in companies to every brigade. During the Oporto campaign the 5/60 was treated in this fashion, and supplied a company each to five brigades. Later on, not only was this battalion completely broken up and dispersed, to give skirmishing force to eight brigades, but a foreign rifle corps, the Brunswick Oels Jägers, and part of the 95th Rifles, were called upon to supply companies to the other brigades unserved by the 5/60th. The result of this arrangement was that proportionately the British skirmishing line was always stronger than the French, with the difference of about four to three, when the numbers opposing each other were anything like equal. If, for example, an English brigade of three battalions faced a French force of an equal number of units, the latter would send out a skirmishing line of three companies, the former one of four, owing to its possession of the extra rifle company. Hence came the all-important fact that, throughout the war, the English fighting line was never worried or molested by a swarm of hostile light troops, in the fashion that generally occurred when continental troops, who used far too weak a skirmishing force, were attacked by the French. The British protective screen held its own, and had always to be pushed back by the enemy bringing up his columns into the firing line, to strengthen his *tirailleurs*. This simple fact accounts for a statement frequently to be found in French narratives of Peninsular fights, viz., that such-and-such a regiment or brigade broke the first line of the British, when we knew as a fact that our troops were fighting in a single line only.<sup>1</sup> What the advancing enemy had done was merely to break through the thick and strong screen of light troops in

(1) As for example in Vigo Rousillon's account of Barrosa, and Regnier's report on his doings at Bussaco.



front of the real fighting formation. We shall note further developments in this system a little later on in the war.

So much for Wellesley's first organisation of the Peninsular army. It only endured for two months, and the Oporto campaign was the sole scene on which it was displayed. For on 18th June, 1809, a General Order, dated from the Adjutant-General's office at Abrantes, gave to the army the organisation in divisions, under which it was to fight out all the rest of its victories. In the midst of some insignificant directions as to forage and ammunition, appears the all-important clause that "as the weather now admits of the troops hutting, and they can move together in large bodies, brigades can be formed into divisions as follows." The original disposition was for four divisions only, of which the first consisted of three brigades, the other three of two brigades each. All the troops included in them were in the British service, the five Portuguese battalions which had been serving in the army, having been sent back to Beresford. But the four King's German Legion battalions were retained as two brigades of the 1st Division. Of the nine brigades into which the infantry of the army were now divided, five had two battalions each, the other four three battalions each. The cavalry, which had recently been increased by the arrival of two regiments from England, was organised in a division consisting of three brigades of two regiments each. The artillery, of which only five batteries went to the front, was not told off to the divisions in permanent fashion, though certain batteries are generally found acting with certain infantry units.

As to the command of divisions, Wellesley contemplates that each shall ultimately be commanded by a Lieut.-General; but as only three such officers were at his disposition—Hill, Sherbrooke, and the cavalry Commander, Payne—the General Order directs that "the senior General Officers of Brigades will respectively take the command of the division in which their brigades are placed, till the other Lieut.-Generals will join the army." This placed two Brigadiers, McKenzie and A. Campbell, in temporary charge of the 3rd and 4th Divisions, Sherbrooke and Hill taking definite and permanent charge of the 1st and 2nd. Hill was to remain in command of the 2nd Division throughout the war, except during the short periods when he was on leave. But during the last three years of it, while he was acting practically as the Commander of an army corps, the 2nd division was, in fact, under the leadership of William Stewart as his substitute. The only modification caused in internal organisation by the creation of the new divisions was that an Assistant-Adjutant-General and an Assistant Provost Marshal were attached to each of them, and that the Brigadiers acting as Divisional Generals, were authorised to take on extra aides-de-camp. Several such officers appeared gazetted in the General Orders of June and July.

It was with this new organisation that Wellesley's army went through the Talavera campaign and the retreat to the

valley of the Guadiana that followed it. The whole force was British, no single Portuguese battalion accompanying it. The troops of Portugal were employed during this time under Beresford, so far as they could be mobilised, in covering the frontier between the Tagus and the Douro. There were some 18,000 of them in the field in August, but they never came into contact with the French, whose whole force was turned against Wellesley and the Spaniards in New Castile. And so the campaign of 1809 came to an end. Long before it was over, a considerable number of fresh British battalions had landed at Lisbon, and had been pushed forward some distance beyond it. One brigade, that composed of the three light battalions under Robert Craufurd, afterwards to be very famous in Peninsular annals as the nucleus of the "Light Division,"<sup>1</sup> got to the front only a day after the battle of Talavera. Wellesley incorporated it for the moment in his 3rd Division, with which it finished the campaign. There were seven battalions more<sup>2</sup> which did not get so far forward, and were halted on the Spanish-Portuguese frontier, where they ultimately joined Beresford's Portuguese on the Tietar river. In September Wellesley drew these corps down to join his main army in Estremadura, and made from them a third brigade each for his 2nd Division and 4th Division; but there was an amount of moving about of battalions at this time from division to division which it would be tedious to give in detail. The net result, however, was that at the end of the year 1809 Wellesley had four much stronger infantry divisions than he had owned in the summer: the 1st counting nine battalions instead of its old eight, the 2nd ten instead of six, the 3rd still six, but the 4th eight instead of five.<sup>3</sup>

(1) 1/43rd, 1/52nd, 1/95.

(2) 2/5th, 1/11th, 2/20th, 2/24th, 2/39th, 2/42nd, 2/88th, forming the two brigades of Catlin Craufurd, and Lightburn. There was one company of British field artillery with them, and the whole came to about 4,500 men. The 2/24th and 2/42nd arrived separately and joined Wellesley earlier.

(3) It may be worth while to set forth these changes:—

*1st Division* in June: 1st Coldstream, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards; 1/40th, 2/83rd, 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th Battalions K. German Legion. In December: 1st Coldstream, 1st Scots Fusilier Guards; 2/24th, 2/42nd, 1/61st, 1st, 2nd, 5th, 7th Battalions K. G. L.

*2nd Division* in June: 1/3rd, 29th, 1/48th, 2/48th, 2/66th, 1st Battalion of Detachments. In December: 1/3rd, 2/28th, 29th, 2/31st, 1/48th, 2/48th, 2/34th, 2/39th, 1/57th, 2/66th.

*3rd Division* in June: 3/27th, 2/31st, 1/45th, 5/60th, 2/87th, 1/88th. In December: 1/43rd, 1/45th, 1/52nd, 1/88th, 5/60th, 1/95th.

*4th Division* in June: 2/7th, 1/40th, 2/53rd, 97th, 2nd Battalion of Detachments. In December: 2/5th, 2/7th, 1/11th, 3/27th, 1/40th, 2/53rd 2/58th, 97th.

N.B.—The two battalions of Detachments had meanwhile been dissolved, and the 2/83rd and 2/87th sent back to Lisbon. So, though twelve battalions had joined the army, it was only eight stronger at the end of the year.

The early months of 1810, as you are well aware, were spent by Wellington in an expectant attitude, behind the Portuguese frontier, as he waited for the inevitable French invasion under Massena, so long announced and so long delayed. Meanwhile the lines of Torres Vedras were being hurried on, to serve as cover for the retreat to the vicinity of Lisbon, to which the British Commander always looked forward as the central point of the oncoming campaign. While the enemy was still delaying his advance, Wellington carried out some most important changes in the organisation of his army. The most notable of them was that he had made up his mind to revert to his old plan of April, 1809, for mixing Portuguese and British troops. It took a new form however: they were not this time placed together in brigades of mixed nationalities, but one Portuguese brigade of four or five battalions was for the future to be attached to most of the British divisions as a separate unit. This was started with the 3rd and 4th Divisions on 26th April. A complete Portuguese brigade consisted of two line regiments of two battalions each and one caçador or rifle battalion. The latter was always employed for the brigade skirmishing, in addition to the four light companies of the four line battalions forming the brigade, so that a Portuguese unit used no less than ten companies of light troops when set out in battle order. This enormous proportion of skirmishers, Wellington considered necessary because of the untried quality of the whole Portuguese army, which had not yet taken a serious part in any general action. Instead of having an extra rifle company attached to it, like an English brigade, the Portuguese brigade was given a whole battalion of rifles to place in its protective sheath of light troops. In the autumn the Portuguese justified Wellington's entire confidence in them at the battle of Bussaco, where two of the caçador battalions and two of the brigades attached to British divisions behaved with distinguished courage.

The second great innovation made in the spring of 1810 was the creation of the celebrated "Light Division." This force came into existence on 1st March; it was formed by taking out of the 3rd Division, Robert Craufurd's Light Brigade, the 1/43rd, 1/52nd, and 1/95th, and brigading with it two Portuguese Caçador battalions, Nos. 1 and 3. Wellington's design was to produce for the whole army, by the institution of this new unit, what he had already done for the brigades by the addition to them of the extra rifle companies. The light division was to be, as it were, the protective sheath for the whole army, its strategical skirmishing line, thrown out far in front of the rest of the troops, to keep off the French till the actual moment of battle, and to hide the disposition of the main body. At the head of this small corps of picked light battalions was placed Robert Craufurd, whom Wellington rightly considered his best officer for outpost and reconnaissance work. There was some difficulty in keeping this post open for Craufurd, because he was a rather junior Brigadier-General, and many of his seniors

thought that they were entitled to a divisional command in preference to him, because of their standing. How well Craufurd justified Wellington's choice I need hardly point out to you. From February till July, 1810, the Light Division lay out on the Spanish border, fifty miles ahead of the rest of the army, guarding an extensive and open frontier against an enemy of six-fold force, without suffering its line to be pierced on a single occasion, or permitting the French to gain any information whatever as to what was going on in its rear. Craufurd was never surprised, never thrust back, save by overwhelming numbers: he never lost a detachment or even a picket, and never sent his Commander-in-Chief false intelligence. This was the result of science and system, and the orders of the Light Division, which fortunately have been preserved in the diary of Craufurd's aide-de-camp, Shaw Kennedy, might still serve as an illustrative manual of outpost duties. With one cavalry regiment (the 1st Hussars, K. G. L.), and his five battalions, he covered the Portuguese frontier for six months with the most extraordinary efficiency. All through the war Wellington used the Light Division as an advanced guard, when he was moving to the front, or a rearguard, when he was on the retreat, and was never betrayed by it.

After the creation of the Light Division, Wellington had five instead of four infantry divisions, and another was added to them in the summer of 1810, when in August he created the 5th Division, so long commanded by Leith, by adding to one British brigade of troops newly arrived from England,<sup>1</sup> two Portuguese brigades hitherto unattached. A second British brigade was afterwards formed in October for the 5th Division, from battalions newly arrived at Lisbon from Cadiz.<sup>2</sup> Having received its second British brigade, the 5th dropped one of its two original Portuguese brigades, and became of the normal size, with six British and four Portuguese battalions as its total.

During the campaign of Bussaco, therefore, Wellington had six divisions in his field army; the old ones numbered 1st to 4th, the new 5th, and Craufurd's small but very effective Light Division. In addition to the Portuguese brigades which had been absorbed into the divisions, there remained six more brigades of the troops of that nationality, which formed part of the force engaged in active operations. Of these two, those of the brigadiers, A. Campbell and Da Fonseca, were formed into a Portuguese division, under General Hamilton, which was always attached to Hill's 2nd British Division, but was never formally amalgamated with it. But since Hamilton was invariably under Hill's command, and the two divisions with their ten British and eight Portuguese battalions were never separated, an arrange-

(1) The original British Brigade of the Fifth Division was formed of the 3/1st, 1/9th, 2/38th.

(2) viz., 2/30th and 2/44th, to which the 1/4th was soon afterwards added.

ment was thus made which, for all intents and purposes, resembled exactly the system used for the other Anglo-Portuguese combined units. There remained four independent Portuguese brigades, those of Pack, Alex. Campbell, Coleman and Bradford. But by the next year these were reduced to three, as Coleman's was withdrawn to serve along with a new British division when one was next created. The surviving three, those of Pack, Alex. Campbell, and Bradford, served as separate units till the end of the war, always accompanying the main army, but being frequently used for detached work, when a small force, less than a division, was wanted for some subsidiary operation. Into the frequent changes of their brigadiers I need not go, as the alteration in the name of the Commanding Officer made none in the numbers or character of the force with which he was entrusted.<sup>1</sup>

The completion of the Peninsular army to the final shape from which it was not again to be varied, took place during its stay behind the lines of Torres Vedras, during the winter of 1810-11. The two junior divisions were created, the 6th in October, the 7th early in March. Their appearance was, of course, due to the arrival of a considerable number of new battalions from England during the autumn and winter. But Wellington did not take all the new-comers and build up fresh units from them. The 6th Division was made by taking an old brigade (Archibald Campbell's) from the 4th Division, and uniting to it one of the spare Portuguese brigades.<sup>2</sup> Its second British brigade was provided some months after from newly-arrived troops from England.<sup>3</sup> The 4th Division was made up to the proper strength again by receiving a brigade from the 1st Division (that of Packenham), while the 1st Division was compensated by receiving three of the newly-landed battalions under Erskine,<sup>4</sup> to replace Packenham.

In making up the 7th Division, however—his last creation—just as Massena was starting on his retreat from before the Lines, Wellington did use nothing but freshly-arrived troops to form the new unit, which was at first very weak, containing

(1) These independent brigades were:—Pack (afterwards Alex. Campbell), 1st and 16th Line and 4th Caçadores; Alex. Campbell (afterwards Ashworth and Harding), 6th and 18th Line and 6th Caçadores; Bradford, 12th and 13th Line and 5th Caçadores. The 24th was afterwards substituted for the 13th in Bradford's brigade, which that Brigadier commanded to the end of the war. In 1813-14, the first and third of these brigades often acted together as a separate Portuguese division, but they do not seem to have been formally united, or considered as a regular division.

(2) Eben's, hitherto attached to Leith's 5th Division, but no longer wanted there when the 5th received its second British brigade.

(3) 2nd, 1/36th, and (added month's afterwards) the 1/32nd.

(4) 1/50th, 1/71st, 1/92nd.



only two British battalions<sup>1</sup> and three foreign ones (1st and 2nd Light Battalions of K.G.L., and *Chasseurs Britanniques*), to which there was added to make an Anglo-Portuguese division of the usual type Coleman's (or, later, Collins's) brigade from the undistributed Portuguese reserves. The 7th Division was for some time looked upon somewhat as the "ugly duckling" or "backward child" of the army—it had a very small proportion of British in it, and suffered a mishap at its first venture in the field at Fuentes de Oñoro in May, when it was the corps which was turned and much cut up by the French cavalry. There is a little joke about it in the list of divisional nicknames given by several Peninsular diarists.<sup>2</sup> The names run: Light Division—the Division, no doubt, the name given it by its own proud members; 1st Division, the "Gentlemen's Sons"—because it included first one and afterward two brigades of the Guards; the 2nd Division is "the observing division," because it was so often detached as a containing force against Soult on the side of Estremadura and Andalusia, while the main army was fighting on the side of Leon. The 3rd Division was called the "fighting division," its fiery leader, Picton, having contrived to get it into the forefront of the battle, both at Bussaco and Fuentes, and at the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The fourth is nicknamed the "supporting division"—I suppose because it was the unit which was usually sent off to support the 2nd, when the latter was found too weak to "contain" Soult in the South. The 5th is called the "Pioneers." I cannot exactly say why. The 6th the "marching division," mainly, I believe, because Wellington always took it with him when he was making one of those frequent marches by which he transferred himself from the Leonese to the Estremaduran frontier in 1811 and 1812, while other divisions got less of these cross-transferences. The note to the 7th, however, is the rather cruel "We have heard that there is a seventh division, but we have never seen it." The fact is that in 1811-12 the 7th were singularly little engaged—except for the mishap in Fuentes they never took a prominent place in any of the main operations of those years. In 1813, however, they were gloriously prominent in the battles of the Pyrenees, and the dash at the French on the day after Sorauren by Barnes's brigade of the 7th was called by Wellington "about the best and most effective attack that he had ever seen."

After the creation of the 7th Division in March, 1811, Wellington never put together another divisional unit. He received, of course, a good many new battalions during the years 1811-12-13, but contented himself with adding them in ones or twos to already existing brigades, or at the most giving three of them together as a fresh brigade to one of the old divisions. The former practice was usual, the only instances of

(1) 51st, 85th: there was added afterwards, after Fuentes had been fought, the 68th.

(2) e.g., in Tomkinson, *Diary of a Cavalry Officer*, page 133.



the latter that we note being that in 1812 the 1st Division got a second Guards' brigade, and in 1813 another line brigade. The increased number of battalions in the army was not so great as might have been expected, because from time to time corps that had got thinned down almost to extinction point were sent back to England to be recruited and reformed.<sup>1</sup> The number of British battalions (including K.G.L. units and two other foreign corps) present in the Peninsula in March, 1811, was about fifty-seven, in March, 1814, about sixty-five, a net gain of only eight units. There had been a considerable exchange of service between the 1st and 2nd Battalions of regiments; in several cases when the 2nd Battalion had been the original Peninsula unit, it went home when its 1st Battalion came out, returning as a mere cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers, after turning over its serviceable rank and file to the newly arrived sister battalion.<sup>2</sup>

There was only one considerable rearrangement of the internal organisation of a division after March, 1811. This happened in the following summer, owing to the fearful losses suffered by the 2nd Division at Albuera. Of the seven battalions forming the two brigades of Colborne and Hoghton, which were so dreadfully mauled in holding the famous heights, three were sent home and the other four shrank into a single brigade. To fill the place of the vanished units a whole brigade<sup>3</sup> was transferred from the 1st to the 2nd Division, and became part of it for the rest of the war.

It is perhaps worth while to make a note of the fashion in which Wellington persisted in regarding the single battalion rather than the regiment of two battalions as his working unit. In all Continental armies, if more than one battalion of the same corps were present in an army, they always served together, and were treated as a single entity. A French regiment had seldom less than two, and often as many as four, of its battalions working together (though there were exceptions in the 8th Corps and in Catalonia during the Peninsular War). But when Wellington chanced to have two battalions of the same regiment with him, it by no means struck him as necessary to keep them together. For example, the 1/7th and 2/7th were both with him from October, 1810, till July, 1811, but for a great part of that time one was in the 4th Division, the other

(1) The battalions sent home after March, 1811, were the 2/4th, 2/5th, 2/7th, 1/26th, 2/28th, 29th, 2/30th, 2/38th, 2/39th, 2/42nd, 2/44th, 2/48th, 2/52nd, 85th, 2/88th, 97th, 7th K.G.L. = 17 battalions. Those which joined Wellington after that date were the 1st and 3rd Grenadier Guards, 2/4th, 1/5th, 1/6th, 20th, 1/32nd, 1/36th, 1/37th, 1/38th, 1/39th, 1/42nd, 2/47th, 2/58th, 2/59th, 2/62nd, 68th, 76th, 77th, 1/82nd, 2/84th, 85th, 2/87th, 1/91st, 3/95th = 25 battalions.

(2) This happened with the 5th, 38th, 39th, 42nd. The 2/4th and 2/52nd came out for a short time, then discharged their serviceable men into their 1st Battalion, and went home after a comparatively short turn of campaigning.

(3) Howard's of the 1st Division, consisting of 1/50th, 1/71st, 1/92nd.

in the 1st. A still more striking instance is that of the 48th. The two battalions of that corps were both from their first arrival in the 2nd Division, where they served from June, 1809, to May, 1811, nearly two years, in different brigades. It never seems to have occurred to Wellington that there would be any advantage in having them together. The only amalgamation that ever took place was when the 2nd Battalion, having suffered terribly at Albuera, sent its cadre back to England in July, 1811, after transferring its able-bodied rank and file to the 1st Battalion. The occasions when two battalions of a corps did get placed in the same brigade are very rare, though such an arrangement was made for the above-named 7th Fusiliers for a few months in the spring of 1811, and for the two battalions of the 52nd in the Light Division between March, 1811, and March, 1812. In each of these cases the 2nd Battalion was ultimately drafted into the 1st, and the cadre sent to England.

I have hitherto confined my remarks as to the organisation of the army almost entirely to the infantry divisions. A few words must be added as to the cavalry and artillery. The mounted arm was always weak in the Peninsula, and it was not indeed till the year 1813 that Wellington could oppose anything like a proper proportion of cavalry to the great strength of the French in that arm. In the end of 1809 he had still only six regiments, divided into three brigades of two corps each.<sup>1</sup> Only one cavalry regiment more arrived in 1810,<sup>2</sup> and when Wellington divided his army between himself and Beresford in March, 1811, and sent the latter to face Soult in Estremadura, he could only spare him three regiments, and take four with himself for the pursuit of Masséna. Nor could this deficiency be supplied from the Portuguese army: in the matter of infantry the latter could give 25,000 men to add to the 30,000 British, but their cavalry was so weak and so badly mounted that only 2,000 men, in three small brigades of two regiments each could ever be put into the field. Two of these weak brigades under Madden and Otway served with Beresford in Estremadura, one with Wellington on the frontier of Leon. When the total field force of infantry was over 50,000 men, there were not 5,000 cavalry available. Wellington had at Fuentes only 2,200 of both nations; Beresford fought at Albuera, nearly on the same date, with just 1,900.

It was not till the summer and autumn of 1811 that large reinforcements of cavalry were at last granted from England, doubling Wellington's force in this arm, for in the campaign of 1812 he had no less than 15 regiments.<sup>3</sup> These were divided

(1) 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1st and 4th Dragoons, 14th and 16th Light Dragoons, 1st Hussars, K. G. L.

(2) 13th Light Dragoons.

(3) 11th and 12th Light Dragoons arrived in June of 1811, 9th Light Dragoons and 4th Dragoon Guards in August, 3rd Dragoons and 5th Dragoon Guards in the autumn, 1st and 2nd Heavy Dragoons, K. G. L., arrived in January, 1812.

for a year into two divisions, one of 11 regiments in 5 brigades, the second of 4 regiments only, in 2 brigades. This latter depleted division was the charge into which Wellington ultimately thrust Erskine, whom he had tried and found wanting in several other posts, yet for whom, as a Lieut.-General, he was bound to discover some sort of a divisional command. But in the winter of 1812-13 he finally abolished the second cavalry division, and placed the whole seven cavalry brigades as a single division, under the orders of Sir Stapleton Cotton, his chosen cavalry commander. In this same winter three cavalry regiments which had sunk very low in numbers went home,<sup>1</sup> and were replaced by four fresh corps, all Hussars,<sup>2</sup> the first British regiments of that sort that had been seen in Spain since Moore's retreat; in addition there came out a composite unit (too big for a regiment but very small for a brigade), composed of two squadrons each from the three regiments of Household Cavalry. Taking loss and gain together, this gave the army an addition of two mounted units and one brigade, and the cavalry was organised as a single huge division of seventeen regiments during the campaigns in the Pyrenees and the South of France.

Since we are here dealing with organisation, and not with tactics, I must not enlarge on the comparatively small part which cavalry played in Wellington's scheme of operations. Though his mounted regiments performed many a gallant exploit, they were seldom used as the main striking force to win a victory; indeed, the charge of Le Marchant's Dragoons at Salamanca is about the only instance that can be cited of really decisive action with cavalry during any of the Duke's battles. Even when he had in 1812-14 a large cavalry force, it was seldom found massed, and I believe that never more than three brigades can be found acting together. Such a force as that was seldom seen in line and engaged. I believe that the combat of Venta del Pozo, during the retreat from Burgos in 1812 was the only case where three brigades were employed on a single front, this being a skirmish fought by the cavalry to cover the withdrawal of the infantry, which had to hurry hard on the road towards Salamanca and safety.

In artillery Wellington was almost as weak as in cavalry during the early years of his command. There was not even one battery per division available in 1809. But the Portuguese artillery, being numerous, and ere long very efficient, it was largely used to supplement the British. By 1811 there was a regular allowance of one field battery (or "company," as they were then called) per division, and one horse artillery battery (or "troop," in the nomenclature of that day) for each light cavalry brigade. The heavy cavalry had not guns attached.

(1) 4th Dragoon Guards, 9th and 11th Light Dragoons.

(2) 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars in the winter, 7th Hussars in the summer of 1813.

This arrangement was working through the later years of the war, and in addition there came to be a small artillery reserve of three or four batteries, which were attached to the "wings" of the army rather than to any division. The battering train, which only came into existence in 1811, and was first used for the unlucky siege of Badajos by Beresford, was partly British, partly Portuguese: the British half was originally formed from some companies, which (without horses or field guns) had been serving in the lines of Torres Vedras. All this has been treated of in great detail and accuracy by Major Leslie in his edition of the "Dickson Papers," so that I am the less obliged to dilate upon it.

The engineers were at first only a small body of officers, without rank and file. There were only 22 present during the campaign of 1809, one attached to each division, the rest at headquarters. In 1810 a few "military artificers" begin to appear; there were just 19 of them in the Bussaco campaign, to 24 officers in the engineer branch, and though more of this small body came out in 1811-12, the army was ludicrously ill-provided with them throughout the war. The work which should have been done by trained sappers had to be managed by volunteers taken at haphazard from the infantry of the line, with manifest hindrance to all siege work in especial, but almost equally tiresome results in small engineering operations, such as the destruction or construction of bridges. The engineer officers had practically to train the large majority of the men in their charge under the enemy's fire.

Wellington never created army corps by name during the whole Peninsular War, though he did divide his Waterloo army (which was no larger) into such units. But it may be said that practically he employed something very like army corps during the latter part of his service in Spain. For when from March, 1811, to October, 1812, we find the 2nd and 4th divisions, plus Hamilton's Portuguese division, kept permanently in Estremadura, first under Beresford and then under Hill, it is hard to call this union of three divisions anything but an army corps. Similarly during the Vittoria and Pyrenean campaigns in 1813-14, the movements of large combined bodies of troops acting far away from headquarters, and often kept together for long periods, under Hill, Hope, and Graham, produced something of the same appearance. But Wellington, of deliberate purpose, avoided any recognition of a larger unit than the division in General Orders or any official document. Perhaps he may have been influenced by his observation of certain drawbacks which the existence of army corps had occasioned among his French adversaries. The chief of these was the tendency to self-assertion, and the habit of taking independent action without any consultation of the Commander-in-Chief, which had been shown by subordinates such as Ney, Junot, and Victor during the earlier years of the war. The commander of an

Army Corps often was a personage of over-great importance in his own eyes, prone to regard the General-in-Chief as a senior colleague rather than a superior; and Wellington was determined to have nothing of that kind in his army. He found even divisional generals, such as Picton and Robert Craufurd, hard enough to manage on occasion. Any authority that might trench upon his own was distasteful to him; it was for this reason that he repeatedly expressed his dislike for the appointment of any general to the title of "Second-in-Command." He preferred to keep the direct management of everything in his own hands, and to have no authority interposed between himself and the divisional generals. When it was necessary to make a large detachment for a period extending over weeks or months, he intended to keep the power of entrusting that detachment to whomever he should please, entirely at his own good pleasure, and not to be compelled by rules of seniority to give it to any particular person. In the early years of his command, 1809-10-11, Beresford was the person whose position most embarrassed him, for as a Portuguese Field-Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army, he seemed entitled to any secondary charge that might be created by the parting of the army into a larger and a smaller section. And, as a matter of fact, Beresford operated as an Army Corps Commander, so to speak, at the head of the whole Portuguese field army, in the autumn of 1809, while in 1811, he took charge of the great detachment to Estremadura, formed by the 2nd and 4th British Divisions and Hamilton's Portuguese. But the result of the battle and campaign of Albuera having convinced Wellington that Beresford was not a safe man to entrust with such a duty, he brought him back to headquarters, and kept him there, in a rather anomalous and otiose position, all through the rest of 1811, 1812, and 1813, only giving him a separate detached charge again when he was sent on the Bordeaux Expedition in the spring of 1814, that expedition being one of no very great danger or responsibility. Instead of Beresford, Hill was the man whom Wellington selected during the rest of the war for detached work of high importance, his choice being governed by the fact that Hill, though eminently capable, was very cautious, very loyal, entirely destitute of self-assertion, and never prone to form a plan or start a movement for which ample authority had not been granted him.

Wellington, in a letter written in the spring of 1815,<sup>1</sup> makes a casual statement concerning the internal organisation of his army, which throws a flood of light on his conception of it. He says that his system during the Peninsular War was to have two flanking detachments, which he reinforced alternately, as was necessary, by a force of three or four divisions, which he kept under his own immediate command, and these were, "in

(1) To Sir H. Torrens, Brussels, 21st April, 1815.



fact, the working part of the army, thrown as necessary upon the one flank or the other." This very well represents his organisation of 1811-12, and even of 1813, though not quite so accurately. The troops of Hill, the 2nd Division, in Estremadura to the south, represented one flank, the 1st Division, generally left on the frontier of Leon in the north, the other; while Wellington transferred himself from the one side to the other at choice, with a marching force usually composed of the 3rd, 5th, 6th, and Light Divisions. Clearly he did not want an army corps commander to take charge of the four divisions which he managed himself, while as to the two flanks, the existence of such an officer was not needed when Wellington was present in person on that flank, but only when he was absent. He preferred to accept some risks, rather than to give himself a lieutenant who might seem too much like a colleague, and practically worked the arrangement through the convenient existence of Hill, who, though technically no more than a Divisional General, did the work of a Corps Commander with infinite care and prudence, and with a laudable lack of rash initiative. This was all that Wellington wanted; a less cautious General than Hill would probably have won more successes, but might have imperilled the general plan of the defence of Portugal. That Hill was not really lacking in dash and decision was sufficiently shown by his exploits at Arroyo dos Molinos and Almaraz, no less than his battle of St. Pierre, near Bayonne, during the Pyrenean campaign. But he understood, in 1811-12, that Wellington wanted from him not victories, but only an assurance that his right flank was safely covered. And this the self-denying Hill could always guarantee.

On the whole, Wellington contrived to manage his whole army at his own good pleasure, without much friction caused by the existence of subordinates, who wished to think for themselves and take their own initiative. Where his difficulty lay was lower down in the scale. He had not been conceded the right of choosing all his own officers by the home Government,<sup>1</sup> and many Brigadiers, and occasionally a Divisional General, were sent out from England for whom he had to provide a command, though he had the gravest distrust of their talents or their personal character. Sir William Erskine seems to have been his veritable nightmare in 1810-11; the blanks in many of Gurwood's despatches, where complaints are made of an anonymous General Officer, may generally (as those who know the Record Office can tell) be filled up with this officer's name. Wellington seems to have considered him most dangerous, and kept him moving about in temporary posts from one division to another, sometimes in the cavalry, sometimes the infantry, in the queerest

(1) See his bitter complaint on this subject in the letter to Colonel Torrens of 4th August, 1810, from Celorico.



fashion.<sup>1</sup> There were two or three brigadiers of whom he equally disapproved and got rid of as soon as he could manage, showing some ingenuity and much highhandedness in his dealings with them.<sup>2</sup> By the end of the war he had, fortunately for himself, established such a reputation that the Ministry ceased to send him men whom he did not want, and allowed him a free hand for selection among his subordinates. At the time of his Pyrenean campaigns he had men of his own choice in all the important subordinate commands, and was in a comfortable condition of mind, as he had got beyond the day when some General not of his own selection, might ruin everything by an ill-considered movement.

It remains to speak of the Staff. Wellington, as everyone knows, was as averse to providing himself with a regular Chief of the Staff as to allowing a formal Second-in-Command to accompany his army. The duties which would, according to modern ideas, fall to the Chief of the Staff were by him divided between three officers, one of whom was of quite junior standing and modest rank. These were the Military Secretary, the Quartermaster-General, and the Adjutant-General. The first-named was merely responsible for the correct drawing out and transmission to the proper department or person of the Commander-in-Chief's correspondence. The post was held from 27th April, 1809, to 19th February, 1810, by Lieut.-Colonel Bathurst, of the 60th; on the latter date he went home on leave, and Captain Lord Fitzroy Somerset was given the status of Acting-Secretary, and confirmed to it as actual Secretary on 1st January, 1811. This officer, better remembered by his later title as Lord Raglan, held the office to the end of the war, by which time he had reached the rank of Colonel. He was one of Wellington's best trusted subordinates, and his personal friend; but being very young, and junior in rank to all heads of departments, he was in no sense a controlling factor in Wellington's conduct of the war—in fact, he was nothing more than his title indicated, and was in no way responsible for organisation, or entitled to offer advice. Much more important were the two great heads of departments, the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General. The former was charged with all matters relating to the embarkation or disem-

(1) He is appointed on the General Staff of the Army, 8th August, 1810, commands an infantry brigade of the 1st Division, October, 1810, to 15th February, 1811. On that day he is transferred to temporary command of the 5th Division, but really took temporary charge of the Light Division, and at its head mismanaged the affair of Sabugal. On 22nd April he is again put back to the 5th Division, but leaves it on 5th May to command two brigades of cavalry till 8th December. In the next year Wellington determines to have only one cavalry division—in order to get rid of him—but he committed suicide at Brosas in the winter of 1812-13.

(2) See for example the despatch to Torrens at the Horse Guards on 4th October, 1810, concerning a brigadier-general of the 3rd Division.

barkation, equipment, quartering, hutting, encamping, and route-marching of the different divisions. He had to convey to the general officers commanding them all the orders of the General-in-Chief, and for this purpose had under his orders a number of Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals and Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-Generals. Of the former there were five, of the latter seven when the army was first organised in 1809, but their numbers were continually increasing all through the war, for each division had an Assistant-Quartermaster-General and a Deputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General attached to it, and as the divisions increased in number, so did the officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department told off to them. But there was an equal growth in the number of those who remained at headquarters, directly attached to their chief. There is an interesting minute by Wellington laying down the relations between the divisional generals and the staff officers of the department, pointing out that, though the latter are the organs of Headquarters in dealing with the divisions, they are yet under the command of the divisional general: and the responsibility both for the orders given through them being carried out, and for their acts in general, lies with the division commander. "Every staff officer," he says, "must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer for whose assistance he is employed, and who is responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of the general officer and the staff officer in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service, and in fact might give the command of the troops to a subaltern staff officer, instead of to their general officer."<sup>1</sup>

The officers of the Quartermaster-General's Department, besides their duties with regard to the moving of the army, or detachments of it, had also very frequently to undertake independent work at a distance from the actual theatre of war, such as topographical surveys, reports on roads and bridges, and on the resources of districts to which the army might have to move in the near or distant future. I do not find, however, that any of the men who were employed by Wellington in the capacity of intelligence officers on the outposts or behind the enemy's lines were considered to be attached to this department, at least the names of the most famous of them, Colquhoun Grant,<sup>2</sup> Waters, and Rumann do not appear in the lists of assistant Quartermaster-Generals or Deputies during the time when they were engaged in their venturesome tasks. There was issued early in 1810 a little manual called "Instructions for the officers of the department of the Quartermaster-General," which was given to all its members; it contains a

(1) p. 572, of General Orders, supplementary volume of Wellington despatches.

(2) For whose extraordinary adventures in the rear of Marmont's army, see the chapter on his life in the autobiography of his brother-in-law, Sir James McGrigor.

selection of orders and forms dealing with every possible duty with which its recipients might be entrusted. The most interesting section is that on topographical reports, to which there is annexed a model report, with a rough map annexed of the road from Truxillo to Merida, containing notes on everything which a staff officer ought to notice—positions, defiles, size of villages, character of sections of the road, amount of corn-land as opposed to pasture or waste, warnings as to unhealthy spots, notes as to size and practicability of rivers and fords, etc., etc.

As far as I can ascertain, Wellington had only two Quartermaster-Generals during the whole of his period of supreme command. Colonel George Murray, of the 3rd Guards, held the post from April, 1809, to May 28th, 1812: he must be carefully distinguished from two other Murrays, who are continually turning up in despatches. One is Major-General John Murray, who commanded a brigade during the Oporto campaign, and went home because he thought Beresford had been unjustly preferred to him; he came out afterwards to the Peninsula on the Catalonian side, and was in charge of the disgracefully ill-conducted operations before Tarragona. The other is John Murray, the Commissary General. As Wellington sometimes uses such phrases as "Murray knows this," or "See that Murray is informed," it is often most difficult to make out which of the three men he means. I have sometimes fallen into the trap myself. In 1811 Colonel Geo. Murray became a Major-General, and in the following May appears to have gone home. He was replaced as Quartermaster-General by Colonel James Gordon, who must not be confused with Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon, one of Wellington's senior aides-de-camp, who was afterwards killed at Waterloo. This is another of the confusions between homonyms, which is only too possible. James Gordon went home in January, 1813, and George Murray returned in the following spring and worked out the rest of the war in his old position.

Parallel with the Quartermaster-General was the other great departmental chief at Headquarters, the Adjutant-General, whose sphere of activity was statistical and disciplinary. He was charged with all the details of duties to be distributed, with the collecting and compiling for the use of the Commander-in-Chief of all returns of men and horses in morning states, etc., with the supreme supervision of the discipline of the army, and with much correspondence that did not fall to the Military Secretary. Roughly, the internal condition of the army fell to his share, while its movements belonged to that of the Quartermaster-General. He had to assist him on the first organisation of the army in 1809 eight Assistant Adjutant-Generals, and six Deputy Assistant Adjutant-Generals, but as was the case with the Quartermaster-General's Department, the numbers mounted up as the war

went on, and new units were created; since an Assistant Adjutant-General was attached to each division. The first holder of the office was Brigadier-General the Hon. Charles Stewart, who was discharging its functions from April, 1809, till April, 1813, just four years. He was then sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin, and Wellington offered the vacancy to his brother-in-law, Major-General Edward Packenham. That officer held the post down to the end of the war, and went straight out from Bordeaux in 1814 in command of the unhappy New Orleans expedition, in which he lost his life.

It will be noticed that Wellington actually had only two Quartermaster-Generals and two Adjutant-Generals under him during the five and a half years during which he was in command in the Peninsula, a sufficient proof that when he had found his man he stuck to him.

Attached to Headquarters, in addition to the officers already named, there was (1) the General Officer commanding the Royal Artillery, who had a general supervisory charge over the batteries attached to the divisions, and a more specific control of the battering train, reserve artillery, and ammunition columns; (2) The commanding Royal Engineer with his staff, having the superintending duty over the officers of Engineers attached to divisions, the small corps of sappers and military artificers, and the Engineers' Park and Pontoon Train; (3) The officer commanding the corps of Guides, a small body of 150 or 200 men, mostly Portuguese, who were detached in twos and threes, to act as interpreters as well as guides to bodies of troops moving through country not known to them. The officer commanding the guides had also charge of the Post Office, and the transmission of Headquarter correspondence to Lisbon. (4) The officer commanding the Staff Corps, also a small unit of 200 men or so, who was in charge of the police of the army, and worked along with the Provost-Marshal and his assistants. The latter had charge of all prisoners of war, deserters, and men waiting trial before general courts-martial.

The Civil Departments attached to Headquarters would take up a whole lecture to themselves were I to enlarge upon their functions, and in especial the Commissariat, its very real merits, and its occasional failures, would form a subject on which I might dilate for hours.<sup>1</sup> I shall content myself with giving a mere list of them. They consisted of

- (1) The Medical Department, under an Inspector of Hospitals, a Deputy Inspector, Physicians, Staff Surgeons, etc. The best and liveliest account of the management of this department is to be found in the autobiography of Sir James McGrigor, chief of the Medical Staff in 1812-13-14.

(1) There are two interesting autobiographies of commissaries, those of Henegan and Dallas, which contain an immense amount of illustrative anecdote.



- (2) The Purveyors' Department, under the 'Purveyor to the Forces' in charge of Hospitals, etc.
- (3) The Paymaster-General, who was generally from three to six months in arrears, owing to the dearth of specie.
- (4) The Commissariat, under the Commissary-General, on whose difficulties, as I said above, whole volumes might be written, not without profit.
- (5) The Storekeeper-General, having charge of the field equipment, tents, and heavy baggage of the army.
- (6) The Controller of Army Accounts, to whom all other departments save the Commissariat rendered their statistics of money received and spent.
- (7) And last, the Press, for a travelling press and a small staff of military printers accompanied the headquarters when possible, and printed general orders and other documents and forms, of which many copies were required. I have seen much of its work in the Record Office, but have never come upon an account of its organisation, or any anecdotes as to its wandering life, and the many vicissitudes through which it must have passed.<sup>1</sup>

Much though I should wish to dilate on some of the work of the civil departments, especially the commissariat, the clock warns me that I have already exceeded the limits of your patience, and I must conclude with an apology for the fact that my first lecture to the Institution has been, I fear, both long, technical, and alas! very dry.

Colonel LONSDALE HALE: I rise, Sir, because I, probably more than anybody else here, except one or two friends, realise the very great value of the lecture which Professor Oman has been good enough to give us. I daresay there are certain wearers of hats here, if I may use that expression, and certain very young people to whom this lecture has been, as the Lecturer's modesty suggested, a little bit dry; but we go in for other than amusing lectures at this place. We want a lecturer to give us a lecture full of really good matter, and not to give a lecture merely to please those who may be listening to him. What a lecturer says at this Institution goes to the whole of our 5,000 members in all parts of the world, and therefore we always hope that a lecturer will not judge of the value of what he has spoken merely by the large or small audience that he may address, but that he will always bear in mind that his words will go to all quarters of the world and to all branches of the Army and Navy. The lecturer has on the present occasion, I have no hesitation in saying, filled up a number of very marked gaps in our knowledge of the Peninsular War. I do not know what my friends, Dr. Miller Maguire

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(1) The most ambitious effort of the press was a thin volume of maps and plans, printed at Cambray during the occupation of France after Waterloo, with explanatory notes by Colonel Carmichael Smith, R.E.

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and Sir Thomas Fraser may say, but I honestly say that, as the oldest student of this campaign, I have learned from Professor Oman in the space of an hour and a quarter an amount of information which I never possessed before, and which I have always longed to get hold of; and I am sure that the members of this Institution will, when they find in the JOURNAL the great amount of valuable information which Professor Oman has obtained from all sorts of sources, and which he has been good enough to place before us on this occasion, be deeply grateful to him.

Major-General Sir THOMAS FRASER, K.C.B., C.M.G.:—I think this lecture is one of the most valuable we have had here. Although I have given some time to the study of military history, it has taught me much I had never learned before. We must all agree that the great advance in tactics that Wellington introduced has been ably illustrated by what Professor Oman has expressed to-day. Napoleon said: "*Il faut changer de tactique toutes les dix ans*," but he did not do so to the extent Wellington did! Line tactics had been used before, but the latter widened their scope out of all proportion to what had occurred in the past, backed as he was by the improvement in the power of musketry fire in his day. Professor Oman has given us a most admirable series of facts, showing how he gave an unprecedented and most far-reaching effect to the idea of opposing mass by line fire. That was rather a revolution than a development, and I do not think its value has been appreciated in this country to the extent it deserves. Wellington showed great force of character in trusting to his own judgment, matured in India, as to the method; and still more as to the unbending qualities of the race that could face such a change. I would only touch on one point; apart from the general question, that may be of interest, as no artillery officer has risen to do so. During the Peninsular War, the Master-General introduced with justifiable confidence an invention due to Colonel Shrapnell, R.A., based on the principle of shell throwing bullets on burst, that has revolutionised field artillery to a very great extent. The fused shrapnel of those days, which I think ranged nearly 1,800 yards, was a great advance upon what was in use at the commencement of the war. If you will only think of how nearly the whole of the field artillery effect depends now on that one idea of firing bullets from the shell, you will realise that the small force of artillery there had a means of offence that helped to make up for the lamentable shortness of its numbers present. The invention was also destined, presently, to destroy the mastery of grape fire, with its longer range than the effective fire of infantry of the day.

T. MILLER MAGUIRE, M.A., LL.D. (Barrister-at-Law, Inner Temple): I think it would be unfair to the admirable lecture we have heard if the discussion were to collapse so prematurely. It is worthy of a better fate, and therefore with the object rather of prolonging the operations and acting as a kind of delaying or retaining force, I venture to obtrude upon your attention for a few moments. I cordially endorse every word that my most excellent and authoritative friend, Colonel Lonsdale Hale, has said. The preparation and delivery of this lecture must have been not only a labour of love, but also like many other self-devoted performances, a labour of difficulty and toil on the part of the lecturer. I have had some experience, not exactly of examining for entrance to the Staff College and so forth, but of knowing how people prepare for similar Institutions, and I am well aware that neither Napier, nor Alison, nor



General Foy, Jones, Lapena nor Sarrazin, nor any of the other ordinary authorities would have sufficed for the preparation of this lecture. The author must have used much midnight oil, but I quite agree with the previous speakers that he has not used it in vain. I think it is the view of Colonel Lonsdale Hale, with which I cordially agree, that the lecturer has just filled up the *lacunæ* of our histories. We always have wondered at certain gaps that are left by these distinguished historians, gaps which are also frequent in some of our modern military histories about other campaigns besides the celebrated Peninsular War. There is one question I would like to ask the learned lecturer. The gallant General who has just sat down seemed to attribute the great discovery of the use of the line *versus* column to Wellington.

Sir THOMAS FRASER: Yes, I think so.

Dr. MILLER MAGUIRE: I say it with all deference, but I do not think that is right. I think the gallant Colonel on my right (Colonel Pollock) will support me in saying that the idea was by no means new, indeed it was put into practice at Shorncliffe, and battalions were thoroughly drilled in line formations in the camp. It was adopted by Wellington rather than originated by him. That is a mere matter of detail, but when we come to discuss such a subject as line *versus* column, and the application thereof in the immortal battles of the Peninsula, I think it is a matter of legitimate curiosity, as to which I trust the learned lecturer before he leaves us will say whether my memory is right as to its origin. Then there is another point in the lecture to which I wish to refer, namely, the wonderful services of the Light Division. Those services have been commemorated not only by Sir W. Napier, who was an officer of the Division, but also by a writer of the name of Craufurd, who was either a son or nephew of General Craufurd, and who dwells on the extraordinary operations of the wonderful Light Division. To have belonged to a battalion of that Division constitutes in itself fame, which I think you will admit has been well supported by its battalions on many a well-fought field from 1809 up to the present day. How General Craufurd organised the admirable system of outposts to which the lecturer referred, on the Agenda, how with a small force month after month he detained such masters of their art as Masséna and his subordinates, and how he retired gradually back towards the main body, to the Coa and the Mondego, and how he went on with this detaining system to the lines of Torres Vedras, and his vast works at Arnda are events not sufficiently known, and for directing attention to which the lecturer deserves, as every officer will admit, our heartiest thanks. Those orders of Craufurd are model orders. I ventured to re-issue them some years ago and we propose to publish them soon again for the use of Territorials. But there is just one exception I again take to the lecture. If I do not criticise I might just as well sit down. I think on some occasions Homer nodded; the lecturer agrees, well then even General Craufurd also may nod. But what has been more irritating than anything else in modern military literature is the way in which fools criticise generals. An Attorney-General may play the ass as much as he pleases, though in security among his books in his library, and get £7,000 a year and become a Judge and a Peer. A Solicitor-General certainly may; I know both to have done so frequently and flagitiously, but when any kind of a Regular General, who only gets £2,000 a year, blunders he is held up to ignominy, and appears to be a legitimate butt for any tomfool in

Fleet Street. Therefore I am not inclined very much to dwell on the mistakes of generals, but on one occasion I think the lecturer will admit that his military Homer, the great General Craufurd, nodded, and that was at the Coa. I see the lecturer nod assent to this proposition. I am not quite clear that it is a bad thing for a general to take up a position with a river or some other considerable obstacle behind him. Wellington was right in taking up a position with an obstacle behind him in the shape of a forest (Soignies) at Waterloo, and we know that many battles have been fought with rivers behind the Commander-in-Chief, but I do not think it was wise to fight with a river so situated as was the Coa on that occasion, 1810. I hope the lecturer will dwell upon this point in his reply. Seeing you, Sir, in the Chair reminds me of some very great operations indeed. I had the honour I think of meeting you at Woolwich before or at the time of the Boer War, and I remember you propounding this question before General Goodenough, whether at all periods since the development of modern civilisation, such as the time of Elizabeth and during the wars of the eighteenth century, a thoroughly organised, vigorous striking British force of say a few divisions, 50,000 or 60,000 men, ready and well equipped in body, mind and material could not play a very important part indeed in the history of Europe. I think that was your theme, Sir, and I remember you referred to the latter part of the war in France, 1870-1871. It was an admirable point, and I have remembered it ever since, because it is my duty to pick up knowledge wherever I can. The point was whether 50,000 British soldiers, who were "the very soldiers of battle," according to the Prussian Baron Müffling, at the end of the Peninsular War, could not have turned the fate of France at the time of Chanzy's battle of Le Mans. With such a force Marlborough, allied with Prince Eugene, determined the fate of Europe at Blenheim, 1704, and our assistance was invaluable in turn to Maria Theresa, 1740-1748, and to Frederick the Great, 1756-1761. Why should we not always have a good sound, sufficient and efficient British force in proportion to the resources and responsibilities of the Empire? We had a hundred years ago; considering our population, our wealth, our responsibilities and the powers of other States, we had a very satisfactory position indeed when Wellington conducted the Peninsular operations of 1809, and carried our flag from Torres Vedras across the Pyrenees, 1810 to 1814. Our navy was greater than every other navy put together, therefore we commanded every sea, and could put expeditions where we liked—to Corunna, to the Douro, to Lisbon, to Carthage, to Italy, to Belgium, across the seas to South America, and to Egypt, to the far Eastern peninsulas and Archipelago—wherever we pleased. We always had ready some 80,000 or 90,000 men, and at home another 150,000 Regulars, and available under the Ballot and Obligatory Service Acts, the Militia and the Volunteers, 400,000 more at least. We were a great military Power then, and we were an equally great Power a hundred years before, when Marlborough was able to operate on the Danube and in Belgium with a sufficient and decisive force. Are we equal to that in relative power and influence now, and if not, why not? Wellington wrote from Badajoz to his Government saying he would undertake to defend Portugal if the Government would properly supply him, if Masséna was to be his rival or if any other Marshal was opposed to him, but if Napoleon came he must retire as Napoleon was himself equal to 40,000 men. He also wrote that nothing was organised by the Perceval administration except confusion. It is a hundred years exactly since that letter was written, and I am sorry to say that at the present moment our military organisation and our

political organisation are in a state of disorganised confusion once more. Our naval and military organisation are far inferior relatively to what they were 1809-1815, far inferior considering our International relations and our responsibilities and our risks. These risks will become in a degenerate age, and under the guidance of vote catching charlatanism more terrible every year and may bring about hopeless ruin before 1915. We must acknowledge with shame our relative deterioration since the epoch of your question, Sir, fourteen years ago, let alone since the immortal epoch which has been the theme of the lecturer. With regard to the lecture, so interesting and so instructive, as one who has toiled hard and with fruitless results in the thankless sphere of British military operations most of my life, I can honestly support the views of General Sir Thomas Fraser and of my veteran colleague and chief in these labours, Colonel Lonsdale Hale, and hence I cordially vote for the hearty thanks of this audience being accorded to the learned lecturer.

Professor OMAN, in reply, said: It is very good of you to have received my lecture with such friendly words. I can only say that nobody can be more conscious of the gaps in the lecture than I am myself. There are a good many of them. If I have filled some of the existing holes I am conscious I have left many still gaping, and if you have not noticed them I can assure you I have. There is one point which has been raised in the discussion about which I venture to say a word. The question of line and column has been referred to. What Wellington really did was this. He saw that the French column's striking power was due to its arriving intact near the hostile line, because it was well sheltered by its skirmishers, and he therefore said that "The column shall never arrive near me well screened and intact, I will smother its *tirailleurs*." He put in five to four, or six to four, of his own rifles and light company men against the French skirmishers, thrust them back into the column, and then the column had to make its attack on the English line unprotected, with its screen of *tirailleurs* driven back and wedged into it. The column was then beautifully blown to pieces, in the style that Marshal Bugeaud mentions in his description of how the column used to meet the line. It is very fortunate that this famous narrative has been left for our benefit. Wellington was not the first General to use the line formation. The line of course had been used by Frederick the Great, and others, but the two-deep line with a very heavy skirmishing force in front was Wellington's particular speciality. It was not merely the line—that other people had tried before him—but the line with such a force of skirmishers in front of it that it could never be harmed till the crucial moment of contact. As to the combat of the Coa, I quite appreciate what Dr. Miller Maguire said with regard to that matter. Craufurd's mistake is very comprehensible. It is a most beautiful little battlefield for a detaining action. There is ridge after ridge, with stone walls just high enough to rest men's muskets upon; you can go on for a long time, retiring a little bit, and shooting at the enemy until you almost lose the memory of what is behind. If you keep on skirmishing too long, there is a narrow crooked bridge in the rear of you, and you will come to the awful moment when you realize that your flanks are getting near the water, and that how those flanks are to get over the bridge is a puzzling thing. It was only done in Craufurd's combat by a *tour de force*, by the extraordinary courage of the central regiment in charging the French, and holding them back, while the wings ran along the brink of the water and escaped over the bridge behind the covering force. Craufurd was so wrapt up in fighting

a detaining action that he forgot, for half an hour too long, this little bridge behind him.

The CHAIRMAN (Major-General J. M. Grierson): Before I ask you to give a most cordial vote of thanks to Professor Oman for the lecture he has given to us this afternoon, I should like to make a few remarks. In the first place, I think the Army at large owes a very great debt of gratitude to the Council of this Institution for having asked Professor Oman to deliver a lecture here, and for choosing the subject. It is, as Colonel Lonsdale Hale has said, exactly what we wanted. We have all read descriptions of the Peninsular War by historians from Napier downwards. Only within the last few days I have been reading a most interesting life of Lord Hill. But in those historical works to which I have referred there is hardly any mention made of anything connected with the organisation of the Army, and few particulars of the *ordre de bataille* are given. In the whole of the life of Lord Hill there is not a word as to the regiments composing his division or its interior organisation. That is what we ought to know, and that is the gap which Professor Oman's lecture has filled. When you come to read the lecture in the JOURNAL of the Institution you will find there is a great deal more in it than has been spoken to-day; there are many footnotes containing much valuable information, which I am certain will be of great use to military men at the present time. Colonel Lonsdale Hale has spoken from the point of view of an instructor of officers preparing for examinations. I speak from the point of view of the officer who is in command of troops, and I find that a knowledge of the past history of those troops is a very great help to me in commanding them and getting the best out of them. I cannot get the best out of my men unless my knowledge of the wars the regiments have served in is as detailed as possible, and it is such details which we have had an opportunity of hearing this afternoon. There are one or two points which seem to me to bring out the manner in which the organisation created by the Duke of Wellington has come down to us to this day. There is one principle which we have all accepted to-day, namely, that no man can command more than six or seven large units. As Professor Oman has pointed out to us, when Lord Wellington found that he could not command eight brigades, they were organised into divisions. Wellington never left himself above six or seven units to command, and when detachments of two divisions were made like those of Lord Hill and Sir Thomas Graham on the right or left flank, both divisions were placed under either Lord Hill or Sir Thomas Graham, so that the number of units under the direct control of the supreme commander was always kept down to six or seven. That is a principle which we have carried on, and which is practised to this day. The only place in which it was departed from in the Peninsular War was, as Professor Oman has pointed out, in the organisation of the cavalry. I think probably the formation of the cavalry in one huge division of seven brigades is the reason why nothing great, except the Charge of Salamanca, was carried out by the British cavalry on the battlefield during the Peninsular War. We have come back to-day to the same type of division which the Duke of Wellington found the best in the Peninsula, a division of three brigades, very much to the convenience of everybody who has to direct such an organisation. There were two British brigades, a third brigade of Portuguese being attached, and I notice that wherever there were no Portuguese to attach they had a third British or German Legion brigade, as in the 1st Division. The divisions of other great Powers are

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at present generally organised in two brigades, but the division of the Duke's army is the type of division which we have to-day, and I am very thankful that we have reverted to it. There is only one other point about the organisation of the Peninsula divisions to which I wish to refer, and that is their permanency. I wish we could copy that. If we could get a little more permanency in the composition of our brigades and perhaps of our divisions it would tend enormously to the improvement of the training of the Army. But that is a matter which it is very difficult to organise—everybody knows the difficulties connected with it—it is, however, a desideratum which perhaps we may attain to some day, because what we mean to use in war I hope we shall organise for in peace. There is a point Professor Oman referred to which I should like to mention, namely, the reliefs of battalions of the same regiment. I think I read in that admirable history of the Peninsular War by Captain Lewis Butler the explanation of that. At first, as a rule, 2nd battalions were sent out because the 1st battalions were engaged in service elsewhere, but as soon as the 1st battalions became available for service in the Peninsula they were sent there, and the 2nd battalions handed over to them the bulk of their officers and men fit for service, and returned home to resume their proper rôle of reserve or dépôt battalions, which is practically what our 3rd battalions of to-day are intended for. From the artillery and engineers' point of view the circumstances are so entirely different now that there is hardly any comparison possible with the Army of Wellington and the Army of to-day, but I notice a curious likeness between the Duke of Wellington's staff arrangements and our present organisation. It strikes me that what he called the Quartermaster General's Department is very much the same thing as what is called the General Staff to-day. There are a few extra things tacked on which are not the proper duties of the General Staff, but the bulk of the work of the Department is the work of the General Staff, and I cannot but think that the Intelligence Service must also have been under Sir George Murray, who was certainly responsible for all operations, and these operations must have been based on information received. I now ask you to accord a most hearty vote of thanks to Professor Oman for the most interesting lecture he has given us, which must have taken a great deal of time to prepare. It is the first lecture he has given to the Institution, and I am sure we all hope it will not be the last.



## THE MERCHANTMAN AND ITS CARGO IN NAVAL WARFARE.

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THE legal position of the merchantman and its cargo in naval warfare has always been one of the most vexed questions of international law. Individual States have in the first place taken up positions corresponding to their interests in the conflict between the requirements of war and the doctrine of the immunity of private property, between the rights of belligerents and of neutrals. Of course, their legal convictions have been guided by their individual needs. In the course of the last century in individual States, this conviction has gradually found expression more and more in the shape of definition of rights, legislation and special treaties; but that part remained comparatively small which received the express recognition of all civilised States as the custom of nations, or even as absolute law, and for this reason had escaped from the domain of particular international law into that of the general.

The Declaration of Paris of 1856 marked the greatest advance which had up till then been made in the development of the question of the legal position of merchantmen in naval warfare. But even after the Declaration the legal uncertainty of the shipping remained great, because the legal views of different States frequently varied and were often directly opposed. From year to year the advance of knowledge placed these differences in a clearer light and caused their disadvantages to the commercial world and the States themselves to become more apparent, until the wars at the turn of the century brought the seed to fruition. The harvest was gathered at the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in 1907, and at the London Conference on Maritime Law of this year, of whatever was ripe and in a condition to be gathered, in the political circumstances of the day.

The Hague Convention of the 18th October, 1907, and especially the Declaration of London of the 26th February, 1909, represent an extraordinary advance in the development of the legal position of the merchantman in naval warfare. Even he



who does not acquiesce in all the solutions of the respective problems arrived at, must admit that a valuable advantage has been gained in the far-reaching settlement of what was hitherto a legal uncertainty. Only now is it possible to describe the legal position of the merchantman and its cargo in naval warfare, without being wrecked upon the numerous *ifs* and *Buts*. An attempt will be made in the following article.

It is true these remarks must be prefaced by two *Buts*: Firstly, neither the Hague Convention nor the Declaration of London has yet become law; they have not yet been ratified by the contracting Powers, indeed, parts of them have not yet been signed. Further, they are not absolutely generally accepted as international law; their decisions are applicable only to the contracting Powers, and then only if the belligerents are jointly parties to the treaties. On the other hand, however, there is hope that a great majority of the States will agree little by little, if not immediately, both to the Declaration of Paris and the Declaration of London, and, at all events, to most of the Hague Agreement. But then the guiding influence must not be underestimated which such a treaty, signed by many great Powers and other States, exercises on the ideas and the sense of equity of peoples and nations. A State cannot for long offend against rules which are considered law by its people or which, as stated at the beginning of the Declaration of London, are in accord (by unanimous agreement of all great Powers) in all essentials with the generally recognised principles of international law.

Let it be premised, that it was recognised at the London Conference that under the term "merchant vessel" every ship not belonging to the State was to be understood.

#### A.—ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS AND THEIR CARGOES.

The third paragraph of the Declaration of Paris declares "neutral merchandise under a hostile flag, with the exception of contraband of war, may not be seized," and therein lies indirectly the recognition of the right of capture at sea. It follows that enemy ships are subject to seizure by belligerents, and the hostile merchandise in their cargo may be taken; and the belligerent may seize goods which he regards as seizable or hostile goods from the cargo of an enemy ship, the bringing in of which he either does not desire or is unable to effect. Finally, he is justified, if circumstances demand it, in destroying an enemy ship with its entire cargo. The question as to whether he must grant compensation for neutral goods destroyed with the ship is certainly answered in the affirmative by the Declaration of Paris, but is disputed assuming a military necessity. The Hague Convention and the Declaration of London have not made any material difference in the right of capture at sea. It is true that the United States in 1907 made a proposal at the Hague as to the inviolability of private property in naval

warfare, but there was no general agreement to it. The Powers possessing great fleets partly thought they had just as little right to resort to the weapon of capture as many Powers with only small fleets, who saw in the right of capture the only means of damaging a powerful opponent, while to other Powers again, among them Germany, the American proposal did not go far enough in that it desired to maintain the rights of contraband and blockade.

In future, too, the hope of an international cancellation of the right of capture must be given up—at least for the present—the Liberal British Cabinet having defeated a resolution to that effect on the 21st April, 1909, in Parliament, on the plea that the possibility of holding up foreign trade with a superior fleet would be a powerful weapon in the hands of Great Britain, and that to give it up would be an act of voluntary disarmament without any reciprocity. The Hague Convention and the Declaration of London limited themselves, therefore, to a more exact definition and to a modification of the right of capture.

What is an enemy ship? Hitherto the answers to this question have been various: here, the flag was considered the criterion, there, the owner, and often all sorts of special circumstances were regarded as reasons for handling a neutral ship as an enemy ship. Article 57 of the Declaration of London decided the question in the sense that, apart from the special regulations as to transfer of flag, the neutral or hostile quality of a ship is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. A neutral ship has, therefore, reason to take care that she is always provided with the proofs of her right to the flag. If she has these proofs and it is not a case of transfer from the hostile to the neutral flag, then she runs no danger of being seized as an enemy ship.

As already observed, it may in certain circumstances be a serious matter for a neutral ship to have previously belonged to the flag of one of the belligerents, this being the case when the transfer of flag has taken place to relieve the ship of the consequences of its hostile character, i.e., from the right of capture. In this case she is still regarded as an enemy ship.

The later the change, the more dangerous the position of the ship. In this matter three periods must be differentiated:—

1. If the transfer of flag has taken place after the commencement of hostilities, it is considered null and void in the three following cases:—

- a. When it took place while the ship was on a voyage or in a blockaded port.
- b. When a stipulation has been made as to re-purchase or right of return to original flag.
- c. When the conditions have not been fulfilled which give the right to fly the flag in accordance with the legislation of the State of the neutral flag.

If none of these three is the case, then the owner of the ship must prove to the Prize Court, in order to release her, that the transfer has not taken place to relieve the ship from the right of capture. This proof must generally be very difficult to produce, except in cases where the ship would obviously have gone over to the neutral flag, even had war not broken out, as for instance in consequence of inheritance or by reason of a construction contract (Declaration of London, Article 56).

2. If the transfer of flag has taken place *within 30 days before the commencement of hostilities*, the captor, on the other hand, in order to maintain the seizure of the ship, must prove to the Prize Court that the transfer has been effected in order to evade the right of capture. Only in the case when the Bill of Sale is not on board the ship, shall the burden of proof be shifted from the captor to the owner, the latter having in such a case no claim to damages (Declaration of London, Article 55).

3. If, finally, the transfer has taken place *more than 30 days before the outbreak of hostilities*, the captor may only use the proof mentioned in case 2 when the transfer is conditional or incomplete or not in conformity with the laws of the two countries concerned, or if its effect is that the control of the ship or the profits accruing from its employment remain in the same hands as before the transfer. In this case, the want of the Bill of Sale on board the ship has only the same effect as in case 2, *viz.*, the shifting of the burden of proof and the disappearance of the right to damages when the transfer has taken place later than 60 days before the outbreak of hostilities.

If, on the other hand, the transfer is unconditional and complete, in accordance with the laws of both countries, and has finally as effect that the control of the ship and of the profit therefrom has been transferred to other hands, then it is unassailable. In this case the want of a Bill of Sale on board the ship has only the effect of justifying the taking of a ship, thereby excluding compensation; it only has this effect when the transfer took place later than 60 days before the outbreak of hostilities. It is only by means of this document that the detailed circumstances of the transfer can be proved; its absence is *per se* suspicious; it is no ground for complaint against the warship capturing it when it takes the ship in question in order to have the matter examined by the Prize Court (Declaration of London, Article 55).

These regulations are very complicated, but in any case they constitute a legal certainty hitherto lacking, and represent approximately a middle line between the ideas of the various States current hitherto. Their signification may be summarised by saying that there is danger for a neutral in acquiring a ship from a country which runs the risk of being drawn into a war, that it is hazardous for a neutral to acquire a ship from a country actually at war. The measure of the danger naturally depends on the naval power of the enemy.

*What is enemy merchandise and what is neutral* is not determined by the origin or destination of the goods, by the nationality of the consignee, as held by some, or of the consignor as held by others, or of the person taking the risk, as a third opinion would affirm, but—according to Article 58 of the Declaration of London—solely by the character of the *owner*; is he enemy, the merchandise is enemy; is he neutral, the goods are neutral too.

*But who is enemy? who neutral?* This much-debated problem has unfortunately no more been solved in London than elsewhere. One school of thought regarded nationality, another domicile, as the determining factor, although it appeared to be the unanimous opinion that the property of joint stock companies must be considered enemy or neutral according to the domicile of the company. A national of a neutral State in a belligerent country, as also a national of a belligerent State in a neutral country, is thus only sure of the safety of his property when carried in a neutral ship.

*Goods can change ownership during the voyage*, for instance, by transference (endorsement) of Bill of Lading. Such a transfer will, according to the Declaration of London, Article 60, never be recognised, in so far as it transforms enemy goods into neutral goods after the outbreak of hostilities. Enemy merchandise remains such for the whole voyage, unless it previously belonged to a neutral, who, by reason of the bankruptcy of the enemy owner, before the seizure, exercised a legal right of reclamation over his former property.

On the other hand, however, the transfer under way of merchandise from neutral to enemy is to be recognised. The consequence of this is that, when circumstances do not seem to exclude such transfer, a cruiser stopping an enemy merchantman cannot know whether the merchandise comprised in the cargo is still neutral, or whether it has become enemy goods in the meantime. And how is the cruiser even to determine whether the merchandise was still neutral on embarkation? The question as to who was then the owner will in the most favourable event, be answered by the ship's papers with a name. Whether the bearer of this name really be the owner can only be answered by the Bill of Sale and the common law. Then the common law of the State of the captor enters into competition with that of the State of the captured ship, or with that of the State in which the purchaser is domiciled or to which he belongs, or finally with that in which the vendor lives or to which he belongs. Further, the ship's papers generally give just as little indication of the nationality or domicile of the owner as they do of his person; but even if—in an exceptional case—they do so, then—according to a decision of the well-known Judge, Lord Stowell—something has indeed been stated but not proved. An enemy would be sure to give himself out as neutral in the papers relating to his merchandise.

In view of the difficult position in which the Prize Court of the capturing State, and still more of the commander of the capturing vessel, find themselves as regards differentiation between enemy and neutral merchandise on board an enemy ship, it was not possible to avoid placing the *burden of proof* in general on the neutral claimant. Article 59 of the Declaration of London lays down: "If the neutral character of merchandise taken on board an enemy ship is not proved, it is presumed to be enemy merchandise."

The neutral who freights his merchandise in a ship of a belligerent flag must, therefore, expect that it will not only be seized with the ship, but also will be withheld after the ship has been brought in, until he has succeeded in proving that he is the owner and a neutral. No wonder if he prefers neutral ships for his consignments, which will probably cost him more for freight but less in insurance premiums.

Although the Declaration of London has thus defined the right of capture at sea in essentials, thus limiting the arbitrary action of the belligerent, the Hague Conventions have modified it in various directions. The Hague Agreement VI. gives place for hope that belligerents in future will, on the outbreak of hostilities, give to ships in their harbours, or to enemy ships running in without knowledge of the state of war, a period of grace and a free pass to their port of destination or to some other port designated. The belligerent, of course, has control of the period up to which he, in his own interests, can allow ships to proceed. In any case the convention makes it clear that such ships and the enemy merchandise in their cargo are never subject to seizure, but at most to a claim for compensation and to confiscation until the end of the war. Ships are, however, excluded from this privilege whose build shews that they are intended for conversion into warships.

Anything in the above applying to enemy ships after the outbreak of war must *a fortiori* apply to them before. Embargo, once so popular and now almost forgotten, appears to have hereby entirely lost its effect, and is perhaps finally dead and buried.

The Hague Convention XI. releases from confiscation vessels and their gear exclusively employed in coast fishery, and in the small local shipping trade as long as they in no wise participate in the hostilities.

This applies also to vessels fitted for religious, scientific and hospital purposes.

The Hague Convention XIII. protects merchant ships from belligerents in so far that a neutral Power must not allow a merchant ship leaving one of her harbours to be followed immediately by an enemy warship which was lying in the same harbour. Chase may only be given after 24 hours.

Although outside the scope of our task, it may finally be mentioned that the *treatment of the crew* of captured enemy



vessels is regulated by the Hague Convention XI. in a manner most favourable to them.

#### B.—NEUTRAL MERCHANTMEN AND THEIR CARGO.

According to the second paragraph of the Declaration of Paris, the neutral flag covers enemy goods excepting contraband of war. Merchandise, therefore, belonging to the cargo of a neutral ship cannot be seized because their owner is an enemy, much less can the ship in question be taken for this reason. A belligerent has only a right to a neutral ship and its cargo when a breach of neutrality has taken place. Such a breach may consist either in the ship carrying contraband, assisting the enemy in such a manner as to cause a breach of neutrality, or finally, in breaking blockade.

The regulations as to contraband and blockade apply equally to neutral and enemy ships, and will, therefore, be dealt with in the last section, while naturally it is only possible to proceed against neutral ships on account of aiding the enemy with unneutral service.

#### 1. UNNEUTRAL SERVICE.

If in supplying and forwarding contraband a violation of neutrality by the participants must be recognised, then certain other activities of neutral ships are at least as grave, if not graver, a violation of this obligation. The Declaration of London collects them under the heading of unneutral service to the enemy, and differentiates between trivial and serious cases.

The first-named group is comprised of offences which have hitherto often been included under the heading of conveyance of "conditional contraband," *i.e.*, persons or despatches. The only question which arises here according to Article 45 of the Declaration of London is whether a neutral ship transports:—

1. *Individual persons enrolled in the hostile forces* (hostile state officials, agents, reservists, recruits and volunteers are, therefore, not included) or
2. Apart from mails (Hague Agreement XI.) *news in the interests of the enemy, no matter whether in writing or not.*
3. A complete unit of hostile troops, or
4. Whether she conveys *persons who, during the voyage, assist the operations of the enemy by wireless messages.*

In cases 1 and 2, it is only unneutral service when the ship *really*, although not exclusively, performs the voyage for the purpose of such transport. The voyage must, therefore, be shown to be a deviation, although only a temporary one, from her usual employment or from the usual route of the vessel.

Neutral mail steamships keeping within the confines of their ordinary route run, therefore, no danger by transporting individual hostile military persons.

On the other hand, in cases 3 and 4, there is unneutral service directly either the owner, the charterer or the captain has knowledge of the quality or activity of the passengers in question. If the latter travel in uniform this is always presumption of such knowledge.

If a neutral ship is met, while guilty of unneutral service in the manner described above, it can be taken with the parts of its cargo belonging to its owner except when the captain was not yet aware of the outbreak of hostilities, or the persons in question had not been able to disembark after the captain had learnt of such outbreak—by signal, for instance.

Serious cases of unneutral service are those in which a neutral ship:—

1. Participates directly in the hostilities, or
2. Is under the orders or control of an agent put on board by the enemy government, or
3. Is chartered by the enemy government, or
4. Is at the time exclusively engaged in transporting troops or transmitting news in the interests of the enemy, by which it is not understood that the ship has troops or despatches always on board.

In the opinion of several Powers the following case must be added, in regard to which the Declaration of London could come to no decision, unanimity not being attainable, namely, when a neutral ship:—

5. Is, with the permission of the enemy government, accorded after the outbreak of war or shortly before it, on a route which was previously closed to ships of that flag, as, for instance, the coasting trade of most States, and the trade between the motherland and colonies in individual States.

If a neutral ship is met with under any of the conditions 1 to 5, it is to be regarded as an enemy; it can not only be seized with the parts of its cargo belonging to its owner, but the whole cargo is subject to seizure in so far as it is not proved to be neutral. The ship can be destroyed as an enemy ship, in short, the only right of a neutral ship remaining to it, is that its owner, in contra-distinction to the owner of an enemy ship, can *always* appeal against the seizure before the International Prize Court.

In the interest of neutral passenger ships, the Declaration of London lays down that every person found on board a neutral merchant ship, who is enrolled in the forces of the enemy, may be made a prisoner of war, even if the ship is not subject to capture. The belligerent will always make use of this right where the ship is not so subject, and thus spare

himself and the ship the trouble and delay occasioned by bringing her into port, in so far as this might be permissible. (Declaration of London, Article 47).

## 2.—TREATMENT OF NEUTRAL PRIZES.

The rights of belligerents over neutral ships and their cargo have been finally admitted by neutral Powers. It is therefore, easily understood that the latter, to protect themselves against arbitrary treatment, have only agreed thereto on certain conditions, which make it impossible for the belligerent to handle the neutral ship taken, as freely as an enemy vessel. The belligerent is, as we have already seen, only released from this duty in the case of neutral ships guilty of a serious breach of neutrality or of an invalid transfer from the enemy flag.

The belligerent may, on principle, not destroy a neutral ship taken, but must bring her into harbour for adjudication. (Declaration of London, Article 48).

In exceptional cases, however, a neutral ship subject to capture may be destroyed, when detaining her and bringing her in would expose the warship to danger or prejudice the result of the operations in which the latter is taking part. (Declaration of London, Article 49). Neutral ships captured on account of carrying contraband are, therefore (see consequences of carrying contraband, page 1023), never to be destroyed, when the contraband is less than half the cargo of the ship. All persons, ships' papers and other proofs must, of course, be transferred to the warship before destruction. (Declaration of London, Article 50).

It was feared that the belligerent would interpret the limitations as to destruction lightly, and thus make a rule of what should be an exception. In order to prevent this, the Declaration of London, Article 51, lays down that the captor—before the Prize Court enters into the question of the legality of the capture—must prove that he destroyed the ship under compulsion as above. If he fails to prove this, he must compensate all parties interested, no matter whether ship and cargo were capturable or not. If, on the other hand, he succeeds, then the interested parties can still appeal to the International Prize Court, but only after it has decided as to the legality of the capture. If it be then proved that either the ship or neutral merchandise in her cargo was not subject to confiscation, then the captor must likewise compensate the owners in question, while the owners of enemy goods sunk with the ship cannot count upon compensation. (Declaration of London, Articles 51-53).

An error on the part of the captor as to the confiscability of the ship destroyed, has, therefore, not such serious consequences as falsely assuming a condition of compulsion; in the latter case, the captor must answer for the whole ship, in the

former, he is at least not obliged to compensate for the enemy and neutral confiscable part of the cargo.

What, however, is the belligerent to do with a ship, the cargo of which is partly subject to seizure, the ship itself not being so subject and, therefore, not liable to destruction when the belligerent is unable to bring her in? This case, which can only occur when carrying contraband, could be settled by the captain voluntarily handing over the contraband to the belligerent. If this is not done, however, it would be impossible to ask the belligerent always to let the ship go free and stand by with folded arms while the contraband was conveyed to its enemy destination. In another quarter it was not wished to give the belligerent once for all the right to demand delivery of the contraband and to destroy it. (For the mere right of delivery could not help the captor, a warship having seldom room for the merchandise). The Declaration of London, Article 54, decides this question so that the belligerent in such cases can only demand delivery of the seizable parts of the cargo and proceed to destroy it in the presence of conditions which would justify the destruction of the ship in so far as the latter was subject to confiscation. That the circumstances were as stated above must be proved before the Prize Court. Should the Court not recognise the existence of such conditions, the captor must compensate the parties interested, and the same applies when the goods delivered or destroyed are proved to be not seizable whether neutral or enemy.

### 3.—CONVOY (DECLARATION OF LONDON, ARTICLES 61, 62).

A neutral Power can withdraw merchant ships of her flag from the operation of all measures taken by belligerents by having such vessels convoyed by one of her warships.

She thereby takes full responsibility as towards the belligerents, that the convoyed vessels in no wise violate neutrality, i.e., neither aid the enemy, transport contraband, nor attempt to break blockade. If such a convoy meets a belligerent warship, the commanding officer must give the commander of that warship on demand every information in writing as to the character of the vessels and their cargo, for which examination would otherwise be required. If the commander of the warship thinks the officer commanding the convoy is deceived, he must inform the latter of the reason of his suspicions. The latter must then probe the matter and protocol the result, a copy of which must be handed to the commander.

If the officer commanding the convoy thinks, in spite of this, that he can still take the responsibility for the innocence of the convoyed ships, and is, therefore, obliged to extend his protection to them, the belligerent has only the right of protest and the possibility of settling the matter through diplomatic channels.

If, on the other hand, the facts determined justify in the opinion of the officer commanding the convoy the seizure of one or more vessels, he must withdraw his protection from them. The right of convoy has been hitherto denied by several Powers. It has now been determined in a sense favourable to neutrals. There is no doubt that this is a proof of mutual confidence between the present and future signatories of the Declaration of London. All States are invited to concur, and no doubt is expressed as to the loyalty of any State in the world. The new regulation of the right of convoy means, perhaps, the first step of a further development. To-day the convoying warship offers a sufficient guarantee. Such guarantee could never be given by a certificate easily forged by a neutral Power. Perhaps sooner or later a detachment or officer or state official on board a mail steamer will also be considered a sufficient guarantee.

#### C.—ENEMY AND NEUTRAL SHIPS AND THEIR CARGO.

We have discussed above the rules of International Law applying exclusively to enemy or to neutral ships, and will in conclusion turn to those which apply equally to both categories.

##### 1.—CONTRABAND.

A neutral government may not itself supply a belligerent with arms, ammunition or the like. But, on the other hand, it is under no obligation to prevent the through transit or export of objects intended for warlike purposes (Hague Convention, Articles 6 and 7). The neutral Powers, on the one hand, not being inclined to undertake any such obligation, and the belligerents on the other having a justifiable interest in cutting off such supplies from their opponents, the right to seize contraband follows, that is the right of belligerents to seize and confiscate contraband whether it be enemy or neutral property, in enemy or neutral ship, and to bring in the ship in question and in certain circumstances to take possession of her. The basis of contraband law here sketched corresponds too nearly to the actual conditions to allow the numerous attacks to shake it; the right in question is recognised in principle as before by all the Powers. But hitherto the differences in opinion were all the greater when it came to deciding what can be contraband, in what circumstances contraband is to be treated as such, and what consequences ensue when it is consigned and transported. It is perhaps the greatest service rendered by the Declaration of London to have cleared up the legal uncertainties arising herefrom, and indeed, in a manner which, without sacrificing the justifiable interests of the belligerent does a full measure of justice to the needs of the neutral.

What are the objects that come into question as contraband? The old differentiation between absolute and conditional contraband has been upheld; the former comprises articles



exclusively used for warlike purposes, such as arms and ammunition, the latter those which can serve both peaceful and warlike purposes, as, for example, foodstuffs. The Declaration of London specifies in the so-called "*Absolute List*" in Article 22, and in the "*Conditional List*" in Article 24, the articles which are held to be absolute or conditional contraband in war, without requiring a special declaration by the belligerents. Every State is justified in proclaiming in a *Declaration* to the other Powers that it does not intend to regard this or that in either list as contraband, or that it intends to regard further articles as absolute or conditional contraband. Such additions, however, must always correspond to the above given definition of absolute or conditional contraband. In any given case the Prize Court has to determine whether this condition is fulfilled.

In order, however, not to give too much latitude to additions to the Conditional List, the Declaration of London in Article 28 has instituted a *Free List*, i.e., a list of articles which in no circumstances can be declared or treated as contraband. This List, which includes, *inter alia*, the raw material of the textile and metal trades, covers about one-third of the total imports of Germany or Great Britain. This list in no wise signifies that all articles not contained therein—clothing for women and children, for instance—may be now declared as conditional contraband; on the contrary, it only comprises articles which would come more or less into question for addition to the Conditional List, as, for instance, raw cotton, in view of the manufacture of guncotton, or saltpetre for gunpowder. It is here that the extraordinary signification of the Free List for peaceful commerce is apparent. A further Article lays down that objects intended for hospital use, and those belonging to the fitting out of the ship may never be treated as contraband; the former are subject to a right of requisition in the circumstances in which contraband may be treated as such, namely, confiscated.

These circumstances vary according to the nature of the contraband, whether absolute or conditional. The former is subject to confiscation when the captor is able to prove that its destination is enemy territory or occupied by him, or an enemy force, for instance, a hostile fleet. It makes, however, no difference whether the supply is to be made directly, *via* neutral harbours, or by land transport. Enemy destination is to be assumed without more ado, when the merchandise is unloaded in an enemy port, or the ship in question is only calling at enemy ports, or when she is to touch at a hostile port or to join a hostile force, before reaching the neutral port where the goods are to be disembarked. (Declaration of London, Articles 30 and 31). On the other hand, it is not expressly stated that articles of absolute contraband may on that account be treated as such, because, starting from a neutral port on a through Bill of Lading, they must perhaps pass enemy territory as goods in transit. Yet, in such a case, it might be hard to convince the

belligerent of the neutral destination, and he might prefer to confiscate the goods in transit temporarily. He could scarcely run any risk of being condemned to pay compensation when his suspicions were not justified.

It is clear that, now as ever, that in the consignment in war time of articles falling under the category of absolute contraband, the greatest precautions must be taken. It is not enough that the consignment is made to a neutral address, and that this is evident from the ship's papers and the description of the goods, but the freighter must rather pay attention to the whole transit route of the goods. The charterer also will be well advised, even when his ship touches at neutral ports only, to make sure that the absolute contraband has not only a neutral destination, but also that it passes through no territory of the belligerents as goods in transit.

Although the determination of the intention to import into enemy territory suffices to justify confiscation of absolute contraband, yet in the same decision as regards *conditional contraband* much more stringent conditions come into force:—

1. The Power seizing must be able to prove that the conditional contraband is destined for the use of the forces or of the administration of the enemy State, unless in the latter case the use of the articles in question appears to be excluded for the war then being waged. In the following cases, however, the burden of proof is transferred from the captor to the owner.

a. If the consignment is addressed to an enemy authority or to a firm resident in enemy territory, known to supply the enemy forces or administration with articles of the kind.

b. If the consignment is destined for a fortified place or for a base of the enemy forces. (This regulation does not apply in the case of merchant ships, which, of course, themselves may be contraband).

In these two cases the owner must, therefore, prove, in order to regain the contraband, that in spite of the suspicious circumstances, it was destined neither for the use of the enemy forces nor for the administration of the enemy State.

2. Conditional contraband must be freighted on a ship which is—even if not directly—under way to an enemy territory, a region controlled by the enemy, or to an enemy force, and the articles in question are not destined to be unloaded in a neutral port before reaching their enemy destination. The intention to disembark the goods in a neutral port *after* touching at the enemy port does not, however, free the contraband from seizure by the belligerent. If the enemy territory has no coast line, the condition attaching to (2) disappears. (Declaration of London, Articles 33-36).

It is seen that the conduct of the belligerent towards absolute contraband in certain circumstances, and always towards conditional contraband depends upon the route of the ship in

question. In order to prevent arbitrary assumptions on the part of the belligerent, the Declaration of London lays down that the *Ship's Papers* furnish absolute proof as regards the voyage, except when the ship has deviated from the prescribed route without sufficient reason. The ship's papers have the same value as proof, but only as regards conditional contraband, in regard to the place of disembarkation of the goods. The Prize Courts must, therefore, believe the statements of the ship's papers, as long as the captor is unable to prove these statements to be false. In this connection the danger should be pointed out which may arise in time of war, from the ship's papers not giving particulars of the route or of place of disembarkation of the goods, or by giving a general description such as "Channel," "Hamburg-Bordeaux," thus leaving open the possibility of touching at belligerent ports. (Declaration of London, Articles 32 and 33).

From the above it follows that conditional contraband is absolutely safe on neutral ships, without reference to its destination when such ships, according to their papers, and in fact, only touch at neutral ports, or disembark the contraband in neutral ports before touching at a belligerent one. Trade and shipping must greet with pleasure the great improvement made in the complete abolition of the *voyage continu* (continuous voyage) in the position of conditional contraband.

If we turn to the consequences of the consignment and transport of contraband we find that the regulations of the Declaration of London hold a middle course between the extreme opinions hitherto held. A ship transporting articles subject to confiscation as contraband can be brought in as long as it has contraband on board. (Declaration of London, Articles 37 and 38).

Legally confiscated contraband can be taken, and with other parts of the cargo belonging to its owner; the seizure of the ship transporting the contraband is admissible when the latter measured by value, weight, dimensions or freight dues, is more than half the cargo. If it is less than half the cargo, the neutral ship has only to bear the costs of the procedure before the national Prize Courts, and those occasioned by the maintenance of ship and cargo. (Declaration of London, Articles 39 to 42).

If a ship on being brought to has still *no knowledge* of the outbreak of war or of the declaration of contraband applying to its cargo, then only the contraband is subject to seizure, and even that must be compensated for.<sup>1</sup> The same applies when the captain knows the facts, but has not been able to disembark the contraband. The parties reclaiming must prove

<sup>1</sup> If an enemy ship is brought to and seized in these circumstances, the contraband, in as much as it is enemy goods, is of course subject to seizure without compensation.

their lack of knowledge if circumstances plainly point the other way. (Declaration of London, Article 43).

Finally, the Declaration of London contains a decision which, it is to be hoped, belligerents and neutrals will often apply in their mutual interests when the amount of contraband is small. A warship may abstain from bringing in a merchant ship not subject to seizure if the latter is willing to *hand over* the contraband. The belligerent may destroy the articles thus delivered. (Declaration of London, Article 44). This voluntary delivery does not relieve the captor from an adverse judgment of the Prize Court.

## 2.—BLOCKADE.

A belligerent is justified in cutting off *enemy* harbours and coasts, or those occupied by the enemy by declaring a blockade of all sea-borne traffic; merchant ships disregarding this traffic prohibition are guilty of breaking blockade, and are subject to confiscation, together with their cargo, in so far as it is not proved that the freighter at the time of embarking the goods neither knew nor was able to know of the intention to break blockade. (Declaration of London, Articles 1 and 21).

The right of blockade represents a considerable inroad into the rights of the neutral; the exercise of this right is, therefore, saddled with numerous conditions, which the Declaration of London was desirous of defining more exactly as the Declaration of Paris had only decided that a blockade is not legally binding unless it is effective, *i.e.*, that it must be carried out by a force sufficient actually to prevent access to the enemy coast. (Declaration of London, Article 2).

The next question is *in what circumstances may a ship be brought in for breaking blockade.*

These are as follows:—

1. The ship must either have run out from a blockaded port or must be on a *direct* course towards one. She must not be brought in on the grounds of having run into a blockade when she is under way to a non-blockaded port, whatever the ultimate destination of ship and cargo may be. (Declaration of London, Article 19).
2. The ship must not be captured before she has reached the blockade-circle, *i.e.*, the sea territory dominated by the warships entrusted with securing the effectiveness of the blockade. (*Rayon d'action de la force bloquante* or *du blocus*). (Declaration of London, Article 17). The breadth of the blockading circle and its position depends upon military and geographical conditions as well as on the number of ships at disposal. As, however, the blockader cannot place his ships arbitrarily, having to assure effectiveness and being forbidden to bar

access to neutral harbours and coasts (Declaration of London, Article 18), and as, further, the blockading circle represents an enclosed sea territory, limits are, therefore, set to too great extension on his part.

3. A ship that has attempted to break blockade inwards or outwards may be captured as long as it is pursued by a warship of the blockading Power, but not, however, after the blockade has been raised or the pursuit given up; the latter is not the case just because the ship reaches a neutral harbour. (Declaration of London, Article 20).

4. A ship can only be seized for having broken blockade if it has knowledge of the blockade—no matter from where—or if it can be supposed to have such knowledge. It rests with the claimant to prove lack of knowledge, as soon as the ship has left the port of a neutral Power, after the expiration of a suitable time since the proclamation of the blockade to that Power. (Declaration of London, Articles 14 and 15).

If a ship approaches a blockaded port *without knowledge* of the blockade or without it being possible to presume that it was known to her, then the blockader can send her back after sending an officer on board to announce the blockade by an entry in the ship's journal. If the ship afterwards attempts to break blockade, she is subject to seizure. Acquainting the commander of a convoy is binding on all the convoyed vessels. (Declaration of London, Article 16).

If, in the same circumstances, a ship runs out of a blockaded port, the same treatment is only then applicable when the enemy has made it impossible for the commander of the blockading forces to notify the local competent authorities of the blockade (Report on Declaration of London, Article 16). If a ship having once been specially informed of the blockade returns into the blockaded port, knowledge of the blockade is assumed for all ships running out later on. (II London Plenary Session.) (See 4 below.)

If a ship is seized for breaking blockade in accordance with the above presumptions, she can nevertheless claim to be released if the blockader has violated one of the conditions governing the right of blockade. The party reclaiming can appeal on one of the following grounds:—

1. That the blockade is *not effective*. According to Declaration of London, Article 3, the Prize Court must decide this on the special merits of each case. It must be remembered that a blockade is not raised by reason of the blockading force having temporarily withdrawn in consequence of bad weather. (Declaration of London, Article 4.)



2. That impartiality has not been shown to merchant ships of various flags in regard to the blockade. (Declaration of London, Article 5.)
3. That neither the blockading Power nor its Naval Administration has issued a Declaration of Blockade. The latter must contain :—
  - (a) The day on which the blockade commences.
  - (b) The geographical limits of the coast blockaded.
  - (c) The period of grace which must be granted to neutral vessels to run out. (Declaration of London, Articles 8 and 9.)
4. That the Commander of the blockading force has failed to notify the competent local authorities of the Declaration of Blockade, or that no mention was made of the period of grace (see 3 above). In this case neutral ships<sup>1</sup> running out of a blockaded port have a right to pass freely until the Commander has made good his omission. (Declaration of London, Articles 11 and 16.)
5. That the blockading Power has not informed the neutral Powers of the Declaration of Blockade; this objection, however, is only admissible in the case of a ship breaking blockade inwards, to which no special communication has been made.
6. That the blockade began later, or continued longer than the period stated in the Declaration; in this case all ships taken before the issue of a new Declaration must be set free. (Declaration of London, Article 10.)
7. That the ship was seized for breaking blockade before the commencement of the blockade as stated in the Declaration.
8. That the blockade of the ports, etc., in question is invalid because the blockade has been extended to them without observing the regulations as to declaration and publication.
9. That the blockade has again been put in force after having been raised without observing the aforesaid regulations. (Declaration of London, Article 12.)

Declaration of London, Article 13, lays down in the interests of neutral trade, that the voluntary raising and every limitation of a blockade must be communicated to the neutral Powers and local authorities. The neutral Powers must circulate the Declaration of Blockade in their territories, especially in their ports, while the local authorities are bound to inform the neutral consuls. (Declaration of London, Article 11.)

<sup>(1)</sup> This applies to enemy ships also; if taken, the neutral part of their cargo must go free.

If the authority in command of a blockading force decides that she is in distress, a neutral ship has the right of entering a blockaded place, and, assuming that she neither loads nor unloads cargo, of running out again freely unless the blockader himself assists her. (Declaration of London, Article 7.)

### III.—GENERAL REGULATIONS.

A belligerent may only exercise his rights over merchant ships at such places where warlike operations take place, i.e., on the high seas and in the territorial waters of the belligerent, in so far as the latter are not cleared by special international regulations. According to the Hague Agreement XIII., Article 3, a neutral Power is obliged to use every means at its disposal to set free a ship seized in its territorial waters as long as the ship is still there. If she has left, the Power can appear as plaintiff before the International Prize Court, if it has agreed to the Prize Convention.

The right of seizing merchant ships assumes the right of stopping and searching to determine the character of the ship and cargo and of the persons on board. A merchant ship ordered to stop by a blank shot from a warship of a belligerent Power must therefore obey. If, in spite of this, she continues on her course or makes off, she is not punishable, but the belligerent is thereby justified in using force to stop the vessel. It is only when the ship offers forcible resistance to the rightful exercise of the right of stoppage, search and seizure that it is doomed to the same fate as a ship directly participating in hostilities, except that in the former case the part of the cargo belonging to the captain is also seizable. (Declaration of London, Article 63.) (See Unneutral Service, pages 1016 and 1017.)

Hague Agreement XI. obliges the belligerent only to search neutral mail steamers in case of need, and then to do it as quickly and conveniently as possible. According to this Article, mails found at sea on neutral or enemy ships are inviolable, no matter whether they belong to neutrals or belligerents, and whether they are of private or official character. If the ship is seized, they are to be forwarded without delay by the capturing warship. In case of a breach of blockade, the mails alone are excepted which are destined for a blockaded port or come from one.

Article 64 of the Declaration of London lays down: "If the confiscation of the ship and of the goods is not confirmed by the Prize Court, or is cancelled without legal procedure, the parties interested have a claim to compensation, unless there were sufficient grounds for the confiscation of the ship and the merchandise." It must here be first observed that the decision as to whether only direct damage or indirect damage as well is to be compensated has been left to the Prize Court, and that compensation must naturally accompany the restoration. It is, however, a question here of compensating the owner for the

loss suffered by the illegal confiscation of his property. Whenever "sufficient reasons" are at hand for the seizure of the ship, no matter whether the ship herself or parts of the cargo are condemned by the Prize Court or not, no such case exists. The free cargo is then subject to all the disadvantages occasioned by the seizure of the ship; its owner can just as little claim compensation as the owner of a ship which is seized because perhaps one package of contraband was found on board.

"Sufficient grounds" are at hand when, on seizure, the captain of the ship has not produced the proofs of innocence which the captor might have expected from him, which proofs, however, were produced later on. "Sufficient grounds" are always assumed when ships' papers are thrown overboard, concealed or destroyed by a person on board; likewise when the captor finds duplicate, false or forged ships' papers, in so far as such irregularity is connected with circumstances which are likely to influence the decision as to the capture (*e.g.*, this would scarcely be the case with a forged bill of health).

If, on the other hand, seizure takes place without any fault on the part of persons on board, owners, freighters or charterers etc., if, for instance, the captor seizes a ship on agents' information, afterwards proved to be incorrect, "sufficient grounds" are not presumed to exist, and claims for compensation are justified.

Such claims must generally be brought before the Prize Courts of the captor. If the confiscation has been cancelled without legal procedure, which is permissible in some States, it then depends upon their laws whether and where the claims can be made. In this event, if the interested parties lose their case before the National Courts of the captor, the International Prize Court is not competent, and the diplomatic channel is the only one open.

The International Prize Court has been mentioned several times in the above. Although at present it only exists on paper, yet at last this matter will soon be taken up, the more so that the favourable course of the London Conference justifies the hope that this creation of the Second Hague Conference, on the initiative of Germany and England, will soon really enter upon existence. The Prize Court is to consist of 15 judges and 15 assistant judges, of whom the eight Great Powers nominate one of each, while the other seven judges' and seven assistant judges' positions will be filled alternatively by the remaining Powers. The contracting Powers of the Hague Agreement XIII. engage to submit to the decisions of the Prize Court.

The Agreement first lays down that the legality of taking—not that of the mere capture or temporary confiscation—of a merchant ship and its cargo, if neutral or enemy property, must be proved before a Prize Court, and firstly before that of the Power seizing. *Appeal* may be made to the International Prize Court against the decisions of the National Prize Court in the following cases, such appeal to be in the form of a written

declaration addressed to the National Court or the International Bureau at the Hague:—

1. When the decision of the National Court affects the property of a *neutral* Power or private person.
2. When this decision affects *enemy* property, and relates to:—
  - (a) Goods freighted on a neutral ship.
  - (b) *An enemy ship taken in the territorial waters of a neutral Power*, in case that Power has not made such capture the subject of diplomatic claims.
  - (c) A claim based on the contention that such *taking* constitutes a *violation* of a treaty in force between the belligerent Powers, or of one of the *legal regulations* issued by the belligerent Power seizing.

If the National Courts have not pronounced a definitive decision within two years after taking, the Prize Court can be directly appealed to.

Appeal may be made by:—

1. A *neutral treaty Power* when the decision of the National Court affects its property or that of its nationals, or when it is stated that an enemy ship has been taken in its coastal waters.
2. A *neutral private person* when the decision of the National Court affects his property, and when the treaty Power to which he belongs does not refuse the appeal or makes the appeal itself.
3. A *private person* belonging to an *enemy* treaty Power when the decision of the National Court affects his property and if the latter was either freighted on a neutral ship or was taken away in violation of the treaties or legal regulations mentioned above in (c).

The Prize Court must be guided in its decisions by the rules laid down in international treaties; failing these, by the generally recognised rules of international law; and failing these, by the general principles of justice and equity.

The Prize Court Convention has up to the present not been signed by Great Britain, Japan and Russia and nine other Powers represented at the Hague Convention. Since, however, almost the whole of the laws of naval warfare have been codified in the Declaration of London, thereby almost doing away with the danger of unforeseen decisions of the Prize Court, it is to be hoped that the convention will be signed by the Powers mentioned—which has occurred in the meantime in the case of Great Britain—and will soon be generally ratified.

The legal security of the merchant ship and its cargo in naval warfare will thereby receive a fresh bulwark, no whit worse than that erected for it by the Declaration of London.

## RASPLATA.

("THE RECKONING.")

By Commander VLADIMIR SEMENOFF, Imperial  
Russian Navy.

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Translated, by permission of the Author, by L. A. B.

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(Continued from July JOURNAL, p. 902.)

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### CHAPTER VI.

THE FEELING IN THE SQUADRON—THE ADMIRAL'S SILENCE—  
NEWSPAPERS FROM RUSSIA—THE IMPRESSION OF K——'S  
ARTICLES ON THE OFFICERS—THEIR DEMORALISING EFFECT  
UPON OUR SHIP'S COMPANIES—A VIEW ON THEM FROM  
MANCHURIA—TELEGRAM NO. 244 AND THE REPLY THERETO  
—THE DIFFICULTIES OF OUR STAY—A NIGHT IN NOSSI-BÉ.

WHEN I gave the short review of the general progress of the exercises and practices with which the squadron tried to fill in the gaps in its training during its stay at Nossi-Bé, but which unfortunately merely disclosed its want of preparedness for war to its fullest extent, and once more demonstrated the hopelessness of its existence, I purposely refrained from speaking of its inner life, of the spirit of its crews, although the notes in my diary contain rich material for this. I believe that if I had adhered strictly to their chronological sequence in reproducing these notes, I could not have given the reader a clear picture of the outer as well as the inner life in the squadron, although for us who took part in the voyage both conceptions were so intimately connected that I can, for instance, read the following lines without being in the very least in doubt as to how they are connected. "All yesterday, from early morning, torpedo running from my boats. Bad fittings, etc." (Here follow precise details of the practice.) "From 3 to 9 a.m. it poured.—Thank God, the Admiral was only slightly unwell; he is better to-day.—When at mass to-day the priest prayed: 'Grant us to die like Christians, without pain, without reproach, in peace. . . .' I should have liked to interrupt him, and to cry out: Don't pray for all that; we need only pray that we may die *without reproach*—that suffices. I was very glad to hear that Menshikoff's pamphlet, 'Russia in the Hands of the Re-organisation Committee,' had been styled improper, fantastic, idiotic, etc., in the squadron. When 'Russia stretches out her wounded arms,' it is no use speaking of plaster and bandages suitable for slight hurts, but one must try and keep the heart from receiving a deadly wound."



I fancy, however, that for the general public the reading of such notes, even when worked up, would necessitate a special interpreter.

As soon as it had become known that we had received orders to wait, the momentary enthusiasm which had been brought about by the bold idea of advancing instantly, irrespective of what might happen, melted away without having been turned to account. The stimulus was gone, and under the pressure of the absolute uncertainty of the future, this enthusiasm gave place to a state bordering on apathy.

Evidently this dangerous mood did not escape the Admiral's attention, and against it he employed the only means at his disposal: he kept the men so busily at work, that they had no time for much thinking. From the middle of January onwards the exercises and practices alternated with the taking in of coal and stores, and went on from morning to evening, even at night sometimes. This treatment proved to be wholesome. The general feeling improved. The irritating thought, "We are waiting here to no purpose," asserted itself less often. Still this expedient should not be abused; the forces of the human body are not unlimited, and in the relaxing climate of Madagascar these are more quickly used up than replaced. The reaction produced by physical exhaustion might easily have brought about utter demoralisation, if a pause had not been made at the right moment, to allow the mind and body to recover their strength.

The Admiral did not speak to anyone of his intentions and plans for the future. Lieutenant S—, who carried on the Admiral's secret correspondence, the only individual in the squadron who knew everything, was as mute as a fish.

"Look here," I said one day to S—, "I don't want to extract any secrets from you, but will you tell me one thing: why is he so silent? Would you also be as silent in similar circumstances?"

He reflected a while and then replied with a question:

"Have you ever received from superior authority an order which you did not consider capable of execution, and did you in consequence make representations, so far as was permissible by law, in the hope of influencing the decision?"

"That has happened to me."

"But when the affair was being dragged on, when you had not yet lost all hope, did you then consider it necessary or expedient to keep your subordinates informed of the course of your negotiations with the superior authority? If you spoke to these you would presumably hide nothing from them (otherwise you might as well have held your tongue), you would explain your views, and no doubt the greater part, if not all, of your subordinates (if you are the right kind of superior and not 'tumbled out of the moon') would then be on your side. Is it not so?"

"Let us assume that it is so."

"And if the superior authority, none the less, gave such orders as seemed to it best, in what light would your confidential communications then appear, seeing that they would undoubtedly have had a certain influence on the spirit of the forces confided to you?—As a criminal agitation, as an attempt to bring about a movement against the intentions of the superior authority, still worse—as an attempt to exert pressure on them, to force them into abandoning the enterprise projected by them!"

"It may be, still . . ."

"That is why he is silent. He still hopes that 'they' will understand him; but in vain. Hope is in vain, but not silence. I am not disclosing you any secret, I am only speaking of my own knowledge. We left Russia under the constant pressure of Russian society, which accused the Admiral of not wanting to start for the relief of Port Arthur. Do you remember? You yourself spoke of your conversation with Nelidoff on your way through Paris. Even he who was well informed, spoke in a deprecatory manner, connecting the name Zenobius Rojestvensky with the idea that the squadron could never sail. Do you recollect? You gave me his own words: 'Either he is ill, or he can't make up his mind!' The whole thing depended on his personal decision, for there was no one beside him capable of commanding the squadron. Dubassoff was too old. Tchooknin—the Black Sea Fleet rests on him alone. . . . We sailed. . . . I put my hands over my ears when you said that the commencement of the bombardment from the land side was the beginning of the end for the squadron. We were full of Stoessel's heroic reports. If we did not wholly believe them, at least we wanted to. In a word, we looked upon our squadron here as a strong strategical reserve, which was going out as a reinforcement for an active fleet, employed in the theatre of war, based upon a fortified, well-stocked naval port.

. . . With the fall of Port Arthur the last illusions disappeared. Our armada—this haphazard collection of ships, part new, but badly built and never properly completed, part old, and barely put in order—the armada which under the most favourable view only deserves the title of 'Reserve fleet,' became the active service fleet, with the task of overthrowing a victorious, active, real battlefleet. And what is more, the latter is based on numerous, admirably equipped ports; whilst we, before we can reach our only base, Vladivostok, must first vanquish our opponents. We, the weaker, both as regards numbers and armament, as well as equipment, and finally—what is the use of denying it?—also as regards the spirit of its crews—we still dare to hope? . . . But 'they' don't understand, or won't understand; 'they' still believe in miracles. That is why he is silent."

But though the Admiral was silent, though S— only spoke in parables, we were soon informed by the newspapers, which began to arrive from Russia, why we were waiting,

what we had been ordered to wait for.—We were to await reinforcements; and of what kind!—*Nikolai, Ushakoff, Senyavin, Apraxin, Monomak*—all the old tubs, old “war junks,” which figured in the lists of the Baltic Fleet. The very same ships which Admiral Rojestvensky had energetically refused when the Second Squadron was being got together, and when, with a bleeding heart, he decided, failing something better, to take the *Navarin, Nakimoff, and Donskoi*.

“That is not a reinforcement, it is simply so many logs tied to our legs!” exclaimed our hotspurs.

What appeared very strange to us all was the fact (quite incapable of any explanation) that the despatch of all these old “flat-irons and goloshes” did not appear to be due to an independent decision at headquarters, where so many were reposing themselves in peace, but as a concession to that mighty public opinion, which it now turned out was inspired by K—.

“Is it a case of the voice of Jacob?” S— growled out. “There is something not quite right here.”

“Surely he must know what the situation is,” others were saying. “He has either gone off his head, or he is being paid for this. . . . But whom is he doing it for?”

“Don’t ask Admiral Rojestvensky!” cried K—, addressing himself to Russian society generally. “Send off at once everything you can get. Don’t lose a minute, or it might be too late; understand me well—*too late*. . . . Can you conceive what terrible words these are, what disaster they spell?”

In the absurdity of his statements, K— went so far as actually to propose that absolutely useless, quite obsolete ships like the *Minin, Pojarsky, even Peter Veliki*, should be sent out to the war.

He said: “. . . in the ‘eighties’ the floating battery *Kreml* was sent out to the Far East . . . when it was a case of dire necessity, energetic men dared to do the seemingly impossible. . . .”

“Such examples could be cited by the thousand—Awake, you dreamers! let yourselves be shaken up, and grasp the fact—there is no other way out of it. You must realise that failing this, the possibility of losing the campaign will loom up dangerously near. Only dare to do it, and the seemingly impossible will be accomplished.”

“What noble words! How full of true patriotism! How is it possible not to believe them, since they come out of the mouth of an experienced seaman?”—Russian society could not say less.

“What an unworthy game! What infamous deception on those poor confiding landmen!” It was thus that we of the Second Squadron gave vent to our indignation.

(1) A serious blunder (or a clerical error) on the part of K—. The *Kreml* was never sent to the Far East. It had been intended to do so, but “they” thought better of it in time.—The impossible was simply recognised as being impossible.

Is it necessary to repeat even briefly all that with which K— filled the columns of the *Novoe Vremya*? These inspiring articles he even published in book form. (I am almost afraid of advertising it for him—however, it is all one now.) The [Russian] reader will surely still remember them, if not literally, still their sense. It is very remarkable, though true, that no one forgot their contents more quickly than the author himself, who, two years later, without pretending to be a prophet, but still speaking as one in authority, wrote in a semi-official work:—

“The squadron ought to have turned back from Madagascar. It was obvious that the further advance of the squadron was more than risky. There were practically no chances of success.”

Now it seems to me that the author of the article “After the Departure of the Second Squadron” ought not to have been permitted to write these words without some sort of explanation.

At that time, in the year of a bloody reckoning for the sins of several generations, when every honest, every truthful, word was priceless, he prophesied something very different. Basing himself on the system of coefficients of fighting value, he proved that the Second Squadron, as then constituted, “had some chance of success,” but that it was necessary to turn this chance into “certainty”; and he proceeded to show how this “certainty” might be attained by sending out reinforcements, to be made up of all the old “crocks,” such as were still to be found in the list of ships of the Baltic Fleet. He referred the public to the official *data* of the Naval Handbook and the traditional reports—“that everything was in excellent order,” and that the fleet was “fully prepared for war.” Whilst he called upon Russian society to demand from the Ministry of Marine the immediate despatch of all this naval rubbish to the seat of war, he did not even insist on these ships being thoroughly overhauled. (This, it was maintained, was *not* essential.) He wrote: “Let them go with whatever defects they may have, provided these still permit them to steam and to fight to some purpose.” I believe that not only the seamen, but even anyone quite inexperienced in seamanship, must see how strange such a proposal was. What is it—a ship which is not in order? What is not in order on board her?—Either the machinery or the armament. How can a ship “fight to some purpose” if either the one or the other of these is not in order?

K— knew full well, as did all the other officers, that Admiral Rojestvensky had categorically refused to accept these very ships when he was forming the Second Squadron; that was why, in anticipation of a possible protest, he called out: “Don’t ask Admiral Rojestvensky! Send off at once everything you have got—don’t lose a moment.”

What was the object of this press campaign? Whom—in whose interests was K—— serving? These questions have never been answered to the present day. He can hardly plead ignorance, or want of proper appreciation of the situation in extenuation; if so, his responsibility before the country is surely a very heavy one.

So as to avoid any unintentional betrayal of war secrets all the officers of the squadron had undertaken not to send any information to the press without having previously submitted it to the Admiral, and even to confine themselves in their letters home to purely personal matters, without touching on the situation of the moment or on future plans; and this was obtained, not by order (which might always have been circumvented), not under threat of heavy punishment (which could always have been easily avoided), but by their giving their word of honour to the Admiral, through their captain.

Hitherto, apparently, it had never occurred to any one to impose the work of a censor on the Admiral, overburdened as he already was with other work; now, however, articles poured in as if shaken out of a cornucopia. The contents of these were nearly all alike. They only differed in form, that is, in the more or less sharp criticism of K——'s productions, which were declared by some to be sheer nonsense, by others to be the outcome of ignorant conceit, whilst yet others stigmatised them as criminal, yes, even treasonable.

The Admiral found time to read all these articles (for him the expression "I have no time" did not exist). I even think that this proof of the general agreement of his officers with his views gave him a certain amount of satisfaction. The verdict he pronounced on them was uniformly favourable, even appreciative; but coupled with this was always the request that the article should not leave the squadron—for one thing, because such replies, belated as they were (by three or four months), were now of no avail to arrest the agitation which had been started, and would only show up our hand to the Japanese, who were already so well informed; secondly, because in the present state of public feeling in St. Petersburg probably not a single newspaper would be prepared to print the articles.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst K——'s articles provoked a unanimous outburst of anger against him, and those who inspired him, in the officers' messes, thus leading to still greater solidarity, the effect produced on the men was extremely unfavourable, not to say dangerous.

Newspapers were taken in in the squadron in great numbers. Any attempt at preventing the men from reading these articles, to keep them from reaching the "lower deck," would merely

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(1) The latter assumption was proved to be correct by the fate of an article written and signed by Admiral Fölkersam, which he had sent off without heeding the friendly advice of his older comrade. It was refused everywhere under various transparent pretexts.



have enhanced their interest, would have meant pouring oil on the fire. The only thing was to try and combat the evil by friendly talks on suitable occasions, not by any service methods. But in doing so even the most popular officers ran up against that distrust, reared up through centuries, never dying, at most only slumbering, which the uneducated man feels towards the "gentle folk who are all in league with one another."—The ships' companies became deeply affected by all this. "What's the meaning of this? *Us* they sent out, whilst they themselves—sit snugly round the fire. They themselves do not want to go out there. They want to leave all these ships unused? But aren't we also human beings?—No, my friends, think of your oath,<sup>1</sup> prove that you are faithful and true. We also have kissed the Cross. We are also the followers of Christ."

Such like remarks were often heard; of course not openly, but in the shadows of the night, when friends were discussing together in whispers.

These simple people could not help believing the words of a commander, who only a short time ago belonged to the staff of the Second Squadron, and who now furiously attacked the authorities who were able, but not willing, to send us "reinforcements." Since they looked upon him as belonging to the squadron, they believed that he had been sent home for the very purpose of demanding "reinforcements."

During my long, almost continuous service in close contact with our men I gained the conviction that, in some inscrutable but infallible manner they very quickly form an opinion on their Admiral, and that—be it said in their honour—in doing so they rarely go wrong.

It was thus at Port Arthur, for instance, when they said of Stark: "What are we to do with this old man? We'll wait for the right sort to come along." Makaroff was spoken of as "Little Grandfather," "Beardy," the "Head," "the right man to do the business"; of Alexeieff they said that "he was only there for show," and would not go into action himself"; of Vityeft that "he was brave when he met the Japanese, but did not hit it off with his own people." The most important moment in the gradual formation of this estimate is the one when they begin to speak of the Admiral simply as "our man," or "he"—that is, as soon as the conviction is reached that "our man will do the business." From that moment "our man" and "we" are inseparable conceptions, and every one of his decisions is considered admirable and irrevocable, as representing "our" interests, as opposed to those of the "superior authority"—a far distant, mysterious, but always unfriendly power, which has its own aims and interests, different from "ours," and whom "our man" is permanently forced to fight.

(1) [Sworn by the recruit on entering the service.]

(2) [In the Russian text "for show" is in English.]

In the present case K——'s articles produced amongst the crews the wholly erroneous, but firm conviction that "our man" had sent off the former to ask for reinforcements, but that "superior authority" was refusing them. At the same time, it was impossible for them, owing to that lack of clear conception which obtains in the masses, accustomed to judge by the tangible, rather than the intangible, to draw a sharp line between the partisans of "our man," for whom they would have gone through fire and water, and the followers of "superior authority," who did not deserve much confidence.

An officer to whom they had only just appealed in some personal matter of the most intimate nature, was suddenly suspected of being one of those who tried to justify the actions of that mysterious "superior authority," who was in agreement with the same, and they began to draw back from him and no longer believed his former explanations. There arose a certain feeling of unrest, of confusion. The men felt that somewhere something was not right, but they did not know where to expect friends and where enemies. This period was marked by outbreaks due to discontent on board several of our ships, even such, for instance, as the *Nakimoff*, which possessed a nucleus of older men (even men of the Naval Guards),<sup>1</sup> who had been serving on board since her last foreign cruise.

These disturbances were instantly put down by the Admiral's personal intervention, but all the same something, as it were, had snapped—had given way. Offences against discipline were more frequent. The hoisting of the "Jack" at the fore, accompanied by one gun,<sup>2</sup> became one of almost daily occurrence, and ceased to attract attention. The offences became more serious; often they were of a nature for which by the laws of war the death sentence was prescribed. The Admiral never confirmed a single one of these. Once the Judge-Advocate permitted himself to express the view that clemency which went too far might prove harmful, that once in a way an example should be made so as to deter the others. "Undue clemency? Oh, no; I don't belong to those who always feel compassion. I simply consider it an insane proceeding. How can I intimidate men ready to follow me to the death by condemning them to be hanged? Before going into action all prisoners are released from cells," and—who can tell?

(1) [A portion of the naval *personnel* of all ranks, the pick of the service rank as "guards," analogous to those of the army, and wear distinctive badges.]

(2) Hoisting the "Jack" [usually flown on the stem or bowsprit] at the fore truck and firing a gun signifies the assembling of a court-martial, the highest tribunal of an independent squadron. [This very old custom, which also still exists in the British Navy, dates from the time when all signalling was done by means of single flags, to which the firing of a gun drew attention.]

(3) This is laid down in the regulations.

—perhaps *they* will prove to be the heroes," the Admiral replied hotly.

Somehow or other this conversation, at which no one else had been present, was known all over the squadron the same day, and, oddly enough, the offences against discipline not only did not increase, but actually decreased.

Of course the actual words of the conversation did not become known, but only the sense of it, and this, too, was so embellished as to give the whole thing the character of a legend.

"Is it true, your honour," my servant asked me in his most confidential manner, "that 'our man' is going to let off all punishments before the fight? If anyone who has done wrong wants to make up for it by shedding his blood, he is not to be stopped?"

"Where did you hear this?"

"The men all say it on the lower deck."

"And what do *you* think of it?"

"What can I say? It is well known that 'our man' is going to do it. He says it, and then it's done. His word is enough."

These lines of mine were already in print (in the newspaper *Russ*), when I received information from a reliable source that K——'s tirade had been unanimously condemned by the officers of the army (on the Manchurian battlefields), as it had been by those of the Second Squadron.

This letter proves so clearly the agreement in the views of the "food-for-guns" (equally at sea and on land), it marks so clearly "his" connection with the heroes who sat in soft arm-chairs and never heard the whistling of the enemy's projectiles, that I venture to reproduce some extracts for the benefit of my readers, irrespective of style.

(The letter had evidently been written very hurriedly, and not intended for publication.)

"... The well-known articles by K—— produced indignation also in the army; many said they were treason against Russia, against our native country.

"The St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency was very active in circulating these articles by telegraph, and on all of us, his (K——'s) optimism, based on figures and coefficients, had a depressing effect. His hysterical shrieks for immediate reinforcements for the Second Squadron made us ask in wonderment what might be thought in St. Petersburg of this unusually improper behaviour of K——'s."

The Head of the Intelligence Department on General Kuropatkin's staff (Colonel Linda of the General Staff) often spoke with the head of the Naval War Section on the same staff (Captain Russin, I.N.), "on the necessity of representing to the Commander-in-Chief that it was most desirable to prohibit the appearance in print of K——'s criminal articles, as these

effusions, which described the condition of the Second Squadron, and proved by figures the Japanese superiority, had a discouraging effect on the troops, and (above all) opened the eyes of the Japanese. In collecting their intelligence the authoritative nature of the source whence the news emanated was of great significance, and however well the Japanese might be informed, K——'s indiscretions were simply a revelation to them."

Furthermore, the same Colonel Linda pointed out to Captain Russin that it was necessary "to hasten the voyage of the Second Squadron"; he considered that "the squadron remaining at Nossi-Bé and awaiting Nebogatoff's ships was simply criminal."

My esteemed correspondent ended his letter by saying: "I considered, and still consider, K——'s articles as a criminal offence."

I deem it my duty to cite here this voice from Manchuria, as a corroboration of my diary written in Madagascar.

On 17th February the Admiral had suddenly been taken so ill that he had to go to bed. In the squadron it was rumoured that this was the result of a telegram announcing the departure of Nebogatoff's division from Libau. It seemed as if the Admiral had had some kind of a stroke. Two days later he reappeared on deck, still thinner, with still more wrinkles in his face . . . and dragging his right foot. We looked at him anxiously, but felt reassured as soon as we heard his familiar, unchanged, powerful voice.

"He won't get ill. Perhaps . . . after the peace is signed." . . . That was the fleet surgeon's favourite dictum, which he now repeated.

Strictly in accordance with the terms of the orders on the subject Admiral Nebogatoff, who was sent out with his division to reinforce Admiral Rojestvensky, was only to come under the latter's orders on joining his flag; up to that moment he was absolutely independent, communicating only with the Naval General Staff, and receiving all necessary instruction from that source.

It actually happened sometimes (when the St. Petersburg people telegraphed too late, in the press of work), that the Admiral learnt the movements and intentions of his future junior flag officer from the telegrams of—the "Agence Havas." Incredible, but true! What a triumph for our organisation!

After 21st February, that is, after the *Oleg*, *Isumrud*, *Dnieper*, *Rion*, *Gromky*, and *Grosny* had joined us, the general irritation against this useless and, in the opinion of many, absolutely harmful waiting, became so pronounced that the Admiral was forced into breaking his silence, and reading out at a meeting of flag officers and captains (not all of these, only the senior ones) the text of telegram No. 244, which he had received in the middle of January, and his reply to it.

As was to be expected, none of those present kept this information to themselves. They all realised only too well how much all under their orders were suffering under the pressure of the uncertainty.—Well, perhaps not quite. This statement is inaccurate. Havas and Reuter's Agencies, Russian and French papers, gave, in general, quite a truthful picture of the situation of the moment and predicted with hardly a mistake the immediate future, so that, strictly speaking, there was no uncertainty—it was faith which was lacking. It was felt that some dispute was being fought out, that the Admiral was representing a definite view, but that St. Petersburg judged of the situation quite differently. When telegram No. 244 and the reply to it became known, this assumption was strengthened.

To my regret I am unable to give the actual text of the two telegrams. I can only give their contents.

Telegram No. 244 pointed out that after the fall of Port Arthur and the destruction of the First Squadron, a task of the highest importance devolved upon the Second Squadron: to obtain the command of the sea, and thus to cut off the enemy's army from all communication with its home. If, in the opinion of its commander, the squadron as at present constituted was not strong enough to fulfil this task, then without the slightest delay, and as soon as circumstances permitted, all fighting ships left behind in the Baltic would be sent out as reinforcements. Finally, the Admiral was asked for his plans and views.

Admiral Rojestvensky replied: (1) With the forces at his disposal he had *no prospect of obtaining the command of the sea*. (2) The old ships, in need of repair, and which, in part, had already been failures from their first completion, which it was intended to send out to him as reinforcements, *would not serve to strengthen the squadron, but to hamper it*. (3) The only plan which appeared to him feasible was to attempt to get through to Vladivostok with the best ships, and thence to operate on the enemy's lines of communications.

So far as I recollect, there were added a few words as to the unfavourable effect of the long stay in Madagascar, both as regarded physical exhaustion and the spirit of the men.

These telegrams were of great and decisive importance, as they not merely represented an exchange of views between the Admiral and the home authorities; they went much further—they contained a prescribed plan of operations and the straightforward reply of one thoroughly versed in naval warfare.

No further direct orders were received, but the final reply to the Admiral's representations appeared to be the information that Nebogatoff's division had sailed from Libau—a piece of news which nearly floored our chief.<sup>1</sup>

(1) It afterwards became known that about that time Admiral Rojestvensky had requested by telegraph to be relieved of his command, in view of his illness, and suggesting the appointment of Admiral Tchouknin as a successor, the latter being in good health and in every way a suitable man.—No result.



This explanation produced outwardly a certain amount of calmness. The discussions in the messes ceased. The "cursed questions," on the solution of which our brains had been racked, disappeared of themselves. There were no more riddles and assumptions. Everything was clear and simple.—It was *ordered* to be done. The case was now settled. . . . I did not like this calmness. It was not calmness but indifference. It was not the calmness of the warrior on the eve of battle, full of proud and bold determination, but the calmness of the innocent, unjustly condemned man on the eve of his execution—assuredly also full of proud and bold determination, but of a very different kind. . . . According to Lieutenant S—, who expressed himself in mysterious terms, the Admiral was still hoping that "they" would yet understand his report, realise that either they should concur or recall the squadron, seeing that in the altered circumstances he himself no longer believed in the success of the enterprise, and had only thought it possible to suggest a desperate attempt—in the faint hope of later on carrying out a guerilla warfare—in the place of a regular plan of campaign.

The people at St. Petersburg did not, or would not, understand this.

On 11th March the *Irtysk* arrived. The long-expected powder and shell she did *not* bring. Besides coal, the most important part of her cargo for us consisted of 12,000 pairs of boots. I beg the reader not to laugh. This is not meant as a joke. In our repeated coalings boots and shoes had been worn out so rapidly that by this time the greater part of the men were going about in self-made shoes, plaited out of hemp yarns.

On 12th March the telegram of the Havas Agency brought us the first news of the battle of Mukden—50,000 prisoners, 23 colours and 500 guns captured. Of course these telegrams were not accepted literally in the squadron. We were already accustomed to the Japanese, eager to acquaint the world with their successes, greatly exaggerating the results of their victories; still, we now felt that, even if these results had been magnified two or three times over, this was indeed a terrible defeat, almost meaning the annihilation of our army. . . . As is not to be wondered at, this event did not produce any very marked effect on the squadron—at least outwardly. The matter was hardly discussed. Generally speaking (I do not speak of individuals), everyone was so weary, that the mere act of thinking appeared too great an exertion. One saw the consequences of our two months' stay here, so trying owing to the uncertainty of the situation, the continuous exertions, which overtaxed the strength, the incessant nerve tension in this climate, which Europeans cannot stand for more than two or three years, notwithstanding every comfort which is to be found, even in the barracks. The result of a longer stay is anæmia, or rather, as the local doctors express it, thinning of the blood. The only remedy for this is—moving to some place in the temperate zone.

People who have had personal experience of the heat of Turkestan, Syria, Algeria, even the Sahara, may shrug their shoulders contemptuously and say: "What is a temperature of 90° F.? Surely nothing excessive!" But these 90° have to be endured night and day, with a corresponding degree of moisture which rises up to 98 per cent. That is the terrible thing. And there is no relief. The perspiration which breaks out of the pores, remains on the skin and runs down the body in drops. However much one rubs oneself down, one can never get dry. The worst is the sultriness, muggyness. One breathes air saturated with steam. One breathes hot fog, as in a Turkish bath.

On 13th March I went to bed in my cabin with the scuttle open. The electric fan was working at full speed. Towards midnight I woke up in consequence of a curious feeling, which I was already familiar with—want of breath. One can literally get no air. One opens one's mouth like a fish thrown up on the beach; one fills one's lungs to their utmost capacity; but all the same only gets little air. There is a violent throbbing at the temples. General weakness, lassitude, and the one idea: nothing really matters, only no movement, no additional exertion! The sky is completely overcast, and there is not the slightest movement in the air. Oh, if only a thunderstorm or shower of rain would clear the air. However, till then. . . I snatch up anything at hand—a blanket, an indiarubber air-cushion (ordinary pillows, which are always damp, only give one a headache), and hurry on deck, on to the afterbridge, which is given up to the officers for the night. It is a weary progress. One stumbles on the ladders; arms and legs do not seem under proper control; the head is heavy. Thank heaven! up on the bridge at last. A breath of air seems to come across from the port side. Over to that side then. Thick, heavy clouds are hanging down low. There is an impenetrable fog. Although familiar with the locality, one stumbles over something, which utters an angry exclamation. One pays no attention, and does not take it amiss to be sworn at, for who would not swear if trodden upon? Arrived at the place selected, the port foremost 6-pounder, I throw down my blanket, prop my cushion against the gun pedestal, and begin to settle down.

"Steady there—confound it all!"

"Beg pardon; afraid I kicked you."

"No, never mind, but just move along a bit."

I recognised Lieutenant S——'s voice.

"So you've come up too?"

"The cabin was unbearable; I was nearly suffocated."

"It's a little better up here."

When I had got somewhat accustomed to the darkness I saw that he was stretched out on his stomach, his head resting on his arms. There was a dead silence all round. But here it was better than in the cabin. I felt somewhat relieved. My eyelids dropped, and I was gradually nearing sleep and happy oblivion.

Suddenly S—— began to speak in his nervous, abrupt manner.

"Look here. . . . These people at St. Petersburg seem to have made up their minds, and now they no longer take anything into consideration. We have to go on with the whole 'armada,' with all the lame ducks and the cripples who have joined us.—We are going out to our destruction—our inglorious destruction. Luck! Success! . . . That only happens in fairy tales. Fools are the lucky ones. And that because the wise ones are more stupid than they themselves. . . . Fairy tales always end like that. I know that in your Port Arthur time you hated that maxim of 'being careful and risking nothing,' but here there is something to risk, and a good deal more. What we are now supposed to undertake is not a question of risking, it is sheer madness. Worse than that—a crime."

"But if 'for us'—understand me well, 'for us'—there is no other way out of it? . . . Let us leave the squadron out of count. Let us consider yourself personally. Supposing it were left free to everyone to return to Russia—would you be one of those to do this? Let us assume that you are right. It may be that the squadron is condemned to go to the bottom to no purpose. Its destruction may be held to prove to the world that we had not possessed a fleet, but something in the nature of stage 'property.' This collapse may be the ruin of Russia.

. . . . Those who refused to take part in this bloody atonement, those who acted with deliberation and thoroughly logically, who did not go to certain destruction, they—I don't know what they would do, but I ask you, if you were to return home now at once, would you have the moral courage by and by to face those who returned later, after escaping safe and sound from the great sacrifice, the holocaust, which, of course, they were unable to avert, but of which they were not prepared to be the victims?"

"Oh, for goodness sake, hold your tongue!"

"No, I won't hold my tongue. If in the course of a gambling game, which started unluckily for him, the player were to stake his last gold coin on a card, in hopes of still winning, could one expect it to disappear, to fall under the table? No, it must remain honestly on the card. It does not decide its own fate—the gambler does that. The responsibility rests with the gambler."

"Ha, ha!" S—— laughed nervously. "But our squadron is a base coin! You beat me in similes and plays upon words, but this time you must allow me to follow this up. If in these circumstances the gambler stakes again, and fortune turns his way and he begins to win, then—all right. But when the card is turned and the gold coin is found to be counterfeit, won't there be a great scandal? You say the gamblers are responsible? That may be so. But the worst of it is that in this case the gamblers will keep in the background. The bad coin will be trodden into the dirt, but not those who made it, not

those who staked it on the card. The false-coiners will take care of that themselves. I know them well. If history ever occupies itself with this affair, then all the odium will be put upon us."

"That is all very well and quite logical," we suddenly heard in Lieutenant B——'s hoarse voice, "but to say so aloud is not only useless, but even harmful. The heroes who sit in their comfortable armchairs, the St. Petersburg strategists, who elaborate the plan of operations for the squadron, *they* won't hear us. We are 'food-for-guns.' Let us become reconciled to our parts. There is nothing gained by wallowing in one's grief. Things are unbearable enough without this."

A pause. Then S—— began once more, but in a lower voice, without any excitement, in an almost listless tone:

"Do you remember your telling us that Makaroff had called after you: 'To go down is not hard and not bad, but to die uselessly is stupid'? Do you recollect that thirty-six years ago the well-known Lieutenant Semetchkin said in one of his lectures: 'That death in itself is nothing terrible, we need not waste any words about it. But to die for nothing is awful. For one's native country one gives one's life gladly and cheerfully, but to give it cheaply, uselessly, for an inadequate price, is intolerably hard.' Thus he spoke thirty-six years ago, and it exactly applies to our case now. During the general *Mélée* one gets knocked over by some cheap shell, uselessly, senselessly. . . . Either one clings for a few more hours with all one's remaining strength to a piece of floating wreckage, and waits to see if the victorious enemy is gracious enough to pick one up, or . . . even worse, one is gradually choked to death in the inside of the ship, which is bottom up. How hideous! How awful!"

It was hard to have to listen to this. I tried to joke.

"Well, if merely for the sake of appearances you prefer to die mounted on a war-horse, with a flag in your hand, you ought to have joined the cavalry instead of the Navy."

"Naturally," called out Lieutenant W—— (gunnery officer) out of some corner. "It is simpler in our case. But as regards the unpleasant moments, there is always one means of hastening the solution of the problem, if in a tight place—a Browning [revolver] in one's pocket."

"You either cannot or will not understand me," S—— continued after a short silence. "There is no object in indulging in fine speeches. You are simply trying to shake off disagreeable thoughts. But one can't shake them off. Ten thousand Russian men—perhaps even more—between the ages of twenty and thirty are going to be led—not into battle, but to the sacrificial altar. They don't realise it, but *you* understand it. They trust us, but *you*—are you going to be quite open with them? Of course not. . . . What good would it do? We lead them into the darkness. We—their guides—don't dare tell them the truth, for fear of demoralising them. . . .

True, the majority of us will not be called upon to answer, either them or the country—for in this world they will not be asked any questions . . . but when they demand an answer from us on the day of reckoning . . . what shall we say then?"

"Tell them that they had to die just the same as we. But the culprits, the traitors—these will be judged by God," came in a young voice out of the darkness somewhere.

I at once recognised it as being that of young Prince Z—, a sub-lieutenant. Somewhere not far off there was a sound as if the butt-end of a rifle was being moved from one spot to another.

There was a sigh, something sounding like "O Lord, O Lord!"

"Stop, the sentry hears," called out B— angrily in English.

Again a long silence. From the shore there came the penetrating smell of rotting plants. A thunderstorm was apparently approaching, but it seemed to hesitate, as if waiting for something. Only quite far off, on the horizon, the sheet lightning lit up the heavy clouds from time to time.

"Strange thoughts, foolish thoughts," S— began once more, slowly, as if half asleep, the words coming out one by one.

"Possibly they may be due to the weather. . . . We have come 12,000 miles. . . . We have yet 6,000 to go. Where to?—to the shambles. . . . Have you seen calves, with their legs tied together, piled in heaps on a cart being driven into the town? Well, they are no longer able to do anything of their own free will; they have no 'Browning' in their pockets, as W— said. . . . On the other hand, I can understand that French marquise on the scaffold praying to the executioner for 'one minute more.' Evidently her life had been so beautiful that even minutes appeared precious to her. . . . But we?

. . . We are neither calves nor marquises—we, for some reason or other, are made to bear this punishment, though, after all, it is all the same—only the end. . . . Sometimes it seems quite tempting. . . . But is it worth going so far? . . ."

A sudden flash of lightning lit up nearly the whole sky, and after a peal of thunder the long expected rain poured down in streams. There was movement everywhere on the upper deck. One heard restrained exclamations of joy, the tramp of many bare feet—the men were making the most of this fresh-water shower-bath, so anxiously hoped for. The flashes of lightning, which penetrated the rain awnings with a kind of bluish light, showed up in the darkness groups of men, who were crowding together clear of the awning, naked, half naked, standing, sitting, huddled together here, scattered there; some had their arms raised high, others stretched them out; the figures were in every variety of strange attitudes, like ghosts,



suddenly seized upon by some wild, fantastic dance. . . . "A regular witches' Sabbath, isn't it?" W—— called out to me.

I turned round to the side from which the voice had come, and made him out in the next flash of lightning, in Adam's costume, but as important as ever, sitting on the gunwale of one of the steamboats.

"Very much so. You especially are excellent. May I ask what part you are playing?"

"Naturally not that of Faust," came in his mocking voice out of the darkness. "I assume that in the present circumstances Mephistopheles would not pay a stiver for my soul."

(To be continued.)

## JUDGING DISTANCE AND RANGE FINDING COMPETITIONS.

Examples showing how such exercises are carried out at the Austrian Army School of Musketry.

Translated from *Streffleurs Militärische Zeitschrift*, March, 1910.)

THE Austrian musketry regulations prescribe that prize competitions in judging distance at medium and long ranges, under conditions approximating as closely as possible to those which would obtain in the field, are to be instituted by officers commanding battalions.

Prizes of 5s., 2s. 6d. and 1s. 8d. are to be awarded to the three best judges of distance in a company, even when the mean error exceeds 12 per cent.

Similar prize competitions are to be instituted for the encouragement of men trained in range finding.

The following sketch of the method of procedure adopted at the Austrian School of Musketry is merely intended to show how such exercises may be carried out.

### *Judging Distance.*

A selected officer is detailed to make the necessary arrangements and to superintend the competition.

The preparatory arrangements include:—

1. The selection of suitable ground, which should be unknown to the men, and of varied character, so as to admit of distances being judged both up and down hill. In one direction at least it should be possible to see to the extreme range of the rifle.

2. The selection of points from which the judging is to be done. These should be at least fifty yards apart, and the direction of the objects judged upon should be divergent and such as not to admit of comparison with other objects already judged.
3. The accurate measurement of the ranges—6 or 8 for each practice—preferably on a large scale map or plan, or by repeatedly taking the range with instruments, chains, or ropes not more than 50 yards long.
4. The selection of the markers<sup>(1)</sup> positions. The markers will be so distributed that there shall be 4-12 men under a reliable non-commissioned officer (if possible provided with a field glass) for each distance. They will remain concealed until the time comes for them to act in accordance with the superintending officer's instructions (e.g., firing, or showing themselves, with or without signal flags, advancing a few paces, moving to a flank, or taking up a given frontage—the estimation of which forms part of the programme—etc., etc.). Every non-commissioned officer in charge of markers must know:—
  - a. The exact point to be taken up.
  - b. Where the signal for the commencement of the practice will be made.
  - c. The order of the successive practices.
  - d. The signal for his own party of markers to show themselves.
  - e. Where it will be displayed.
  - f. The point where the men judging distance will stand.
  - g. His own duties, how his men are to show themselves; whether they are to fire, and if so, how many rounds, etc., etc.
5. Drawing up a programme of the whole exercise. The specimen programme given below, together with a sketch map, facilitates the work of the superintending officer and shows at a glance, for the information of the commanding officer or others present, what is being done.

The sketch should be as simple as possible, with only sufficient detail for identification. The features of the ground

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(1) i.e., the men upon whom the range is judged.



Serial No. of Range Judged.	Dis- tance Range in yds.	Flag Signal.	Position.	Time (minutes)	Markers.				No. of Rounds Fired.	Remarks.
					N.C.O.'s	Men.	Batteries.	Guns.		
I.	1,200	1. White flag waved. 2. Black and yellow flag.	Lying ...	1	1	2	4	—	10	Men run forward about 50 yds., from Mh, carrying figure targets; they then show themselves as <i>lying down</i> under cover.
II.	$\frac{1,600}{150}$	Red and white flag waved.	Kneeling ...	1	1	6	6	—	30	The frontage (150 yds.) to be judged.
III.	950	Red and white flag.	Lying ...	1	1	4	—	—	20	Men run out about 15 yds., down hill from brushwood, then lie down and fire.
IV.	1,100	Red and white flag.	Lying ...	1	1	—	—	—	—	Waves a red flag.
V.	1,800	1. Black and yellow flag waved. 2. Red and white flag waved.	Kneeling ...	1	1	5	10	—	—	The men march one behind the other, at intervals of about 5 yds. Each man carries a pole with five figures on it, turned towards the judging distance squad. (Intended to represent a force marching to a flank.)
VI.	2,200	1. Red, white and green flag. 2. Blue and red flag. 3. White with black spot flag.	Standing ...	1 1/2	1	4	—	2	2	Representing a section of artillery.
VII.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
VIII.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
		TOTAL ...	—	—	6	21	20	2	60	2

Date..... 19 .....

(Signed) .....

Lieut.



The distances should be various, though in cases where the nature of the ground or conditions of light, etc., are specially deceptive, two equal distances may be given in immediate succession; but they must be in different directions.

With well chosen positions, the differences between the various estimations of the distance will often be very marked; if the causes of error be pointed out and explained, it will be very instructive to all concerned.

It is also desirable to estimate distances in the vicinity of the object or target, *e.g.*, the distance between the latter and a flag (say) 200 yards behind it.

For distances up to 1,200 yards, one flag slowly waved to and fro will suffice to ensure the object being seen. Beyond that distance, up to 2,000 yards, two flags should be waved; and for distances exceeding 2,000 yards three stationary flags may be used. Parti-coloured flags are the best.

The judging distance practices will be carried out either lying down or kneeling, except at very long ranges. The superintending officer must ascertain beforehand that the men can see the object when in the prescribed position.

As to the time to be allowed for judging distance the following limits are suggested:—

800 - 1,000 yards	...	...	...	...	1 minute
1,000 - 1,500 "	...	...	...	...	"
1,600 - 1,900 "	...	...	...	...	"
2,000 - 2,200 "	...	...	...	...	1 1/2 "
2,300 - 2,600 "	...	...	...	...	1 1/2 "

6. The superintending officer will also have to prepare the returns, showing the results and classification of the various practices. For this purpose the following form is recommended:—

# RETURN Showing Results of Judging Distance Competition.

..... Regt.

Com- pany.	Rank.	Name.	Figure of Merit for the Year.	Distances Judged.								Total Percent- age of Error. <sup>†</sup>	Mean Percent- age of Error.	Order of Merit. <sup>‡</sup>	Remarks.
				I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	VII.*	VIII.				
				Actual Distances (in yards).											
				1,200	1,600	950	1,100	1,800	2,200	150	—				
				(a) The man's estimate.				(b) Percentage of error.							
1	Cpl.	N. N.	12	(a) 1,400 (b) 17%	(a) 1,700 (b) 6%	(a) 800 (b) 16%	(a) 1,000 (b) 9%	(a) 1,800 (b) —	(a) 2,500 (b) 14%	(a) 150 (b) —	—	62	10	2nd	2nd Prize.
2	Pte.	X. Y.	11	(a) 1,300 (b) 8%	(a) 1,600 (b) —	(a) 1,000 (b) 5%	(a) 950 (b) 14%	(a) 1,500 (b) 17%	(a) 2,400 (b) 9%	(a) 200 (b) 33%	—	53	9	1st	1st Prize.

NOTES.—\* Length of frontage.

† Exclusive of error in estimation of frontage.

‡ The classification is computed on the mean percentage of error. Where this is equal in the case of two or more competitors, the tie is decided by the estimation of frontage (e.g., VII. in the present example). If this also is equal, the mean figure of merit for the year will decide the point.

Dated..... 19 .....

(Signed).....

Leut.


*Method of carrying out the Competition.*

The following method is that made use of at the Austrian Army School of Musketry.

The superintending officer marches off with the markers so as to ensure that all shall be ready (non-commissioned officers and men thoroughly acquainted with their orders, and all in their proper positions, etc.) before the party judging distance arrives on the ground.

The party on arriving at the point whence the first judging is to be carried out, will be drawn up as indicated on the following sketch.

Sketch 2.



The men judging will be handed judging distance "slips" (forms or cards) previously prepared for them, and the method of carrying out the competition will be briefly explained.

A = Superintending officer.

B = Men judging distance, in line, 1-2 yards apart. If necessary there may be a second line, a couple of yards in rear of the first, so arranged that the men can see through the intervals of the line in front.

C = Other officers and men.

D = Signaller with flag.

E = The direction in which the object (markers) will appear.

The signal for the commencement of the practice will then be given. The "markers" appear and the superintending officer notes the time; as soon as the time allowed has elapsed he blows a whistle, the signal flag is lowered, the men turn about, and each man then writes down his estimation of the distance on the "slip" Marked No. 1 (men unable to write will give their distance verbally to the officer, who will write it down for them). If estimation of frontage is ordered in addition to the distance, it will be written below the latter with a line between (like a fraction).

The "slips" will then be collected, the markers signalled to, and the party will move to the next position, where the same procedure will be repeated.

After the collection of "slips" for the last distance, the officer will inform the men what the actual distances were—adding any explanations that may be desirable. The estimations are then entered in the proper form, the percentage worked out, and the three men with best results receive prizes.

The above sketch does not pretend to go into minute details, but is merely an attempt to indicate a method in which such competitions may be conducted. The keener and more efficient the superintending officer, the better and more instructive will be the whole exercise.

#### *Rangefinding Competition.*

Owing to the difficulty of a large number of men taking the range simultaneously at the same place, the number of competitors must be limited to, say, two men per company (in a battalion competition).

The two men would be selected by means of preliminary "heats," etc.


The competition should be carried out during the period of regimental training; the date (but not the place) being notified beforehand, so as to admit of the best men being selected and entered for it.

The following example of such a competition is based upon the assumption that five ranges will suffice, that all of them will exceed 1,000 yards, and that there are not more than 16 competitors.

**Sketch 3.**

**Programma**

for the Rangefinding Competition .....19..



Date ..... 19... Signature of Superintending officer.

It will often be hardly possible to avoid the use of flags, when the object selected is difficult to find. But the range will be taken to natural objects and not living ones.

At each station (I-V), there will be an officer in charge, provided with a specially tested and reliable rangefinder.

The competitors, provided with measuring tapes, will be drawn up in the vicinity of the first station (I), but in such a way that they are unable to see what is going on at the actual spot.



The superintending officer sends the first man to station I, and directs him to take the range to village A. The officer in charge notes the result (in the form given below<sup>1</sup>) and then sends the man on to station II.; calling up the second competitor to take the range at I., and so on.

When the first man has taken all five ranges, he will be sent on (from V.) to some pre-arranged point, from which he will be unable to communicate with the other competitors coming after him. When all the competitors have taken the range, the officer in charge of the station will hand his form, duly completed, to the superintending officer. Finally, the correct distances will be communicated to the men.

A few minutes might perhaps be saved by allowing 2 or 3 competitors to take the same range simultaneously; but it is not a desirable arrangement. The men would be liable to get in each other's way, and supervision would become difficult.

The classification of results is based upon: (a) accuracy; (b) rapidity; and (c) suitability of procedure to field service conditions.

The evaluation of these factors is worked out by forfeiture of marks as follows:—

- a. By computation of the percentage of error, according to the formula given in Table 5 of the Musketry Regulations. Each 1 per cent. counts as 1 point (forfeited).
- b. One point for each quarter of a minute (exceeding the first minute) which elapses from the moment when the instrument is first put to the eye. For example:  $1\frac{3}{4}$  minute would represent 3 points (forfeited).
- c. Where the range taker acts as if on service, in a manner suited to the ground, *e.g.*, lying down or kneeling when establishing his base, crouching or creeping, as the case may be, there will be no deduction (o); whereas 1 point will be forfeited for any shortcoming in this respect.

(1) Specimen Form.

Station I (II-V.)

Name of Competitor.

Time Range.

Suitability of  
Procedure to  
Field Service  
conditions.

(Names to be entered previously, by the Superintending Officer.)

Date ..... 19...

(Sd.) Officer in Charge.

The following is an example of such a computation, where the actual distance was 1,500 yards:—

Range Given.	Percentage of error.*	Time.	Suitability of Procedure.	Total.
1450	3	1	0	4
1450	3	6	0	9
1450	3	6	1	10
1500	—	1	0	1
1500	—	6	0	6
1500	—	6	1	7
1600	7	1	0	8
1600	7	6	0	13
1600	7	6	1	14

\* Computed in accordance with Musketry Regulations.

The total of the points (deducted) determines the order of merit. In the case of "ties," the final result is decided by the values assigned to (a) accuracy; (b) time; and (c) suitability of procedure, in the order named.

The following specimen return to be filled in by the superintending officer from the reports of officers in charge of stations, will show the detailed and final result of the competition.

# RETURN

Showing the results of the Range-Finding Competition, carried out on the ..... 19 .

Station.	Actual Distance.	Sergt. N. or M.					Corporal N. N.					Private N. N.					Lee-Corpl. N. N.				
		Range Taken.	Percentage of Error.	Time.	Suitable Proceedure.	Total.	Range Taken.	Percentage of Error.	Time.	Suitable Proceedure.	Total.	Range Taken.	Percentage of Error.	Time.	Suitable Proceedure.	Total.	Range Taken.	Percentage of Error.	Time.	Suitable Proceedure.	Total.
I. ...	1,900	2,000	5	4	—	9	1,900	—	5	1	6	1,700	11	3	—	14	2,000	5	4	—	9
II. ...	2,200	2,100	5	4	1	10	2,100	5	5	—	10	2,100	5	4	—	9	1,900	14	3	—	17
III. ...	1,150	1,100	4	3	—	7	1,200	4	4	1	9	1,100	4	3	1	8	1,100	4	4	1	9
IV. ...	1,700	1,600	6	5	—	11	1,800	6	6	1	13	1,700	—	4	—	4	1,900	12	5	—	17
V. ...	1,300	1,400	8	4	1	13	1,400	8	4	—	12	1,300	—	3	1	4	1,250	4	4	—	8
Totals ..	...	—	28	20	2	50	—	23	24	3	50	—	20	17	2	39	—	39	20	1	60
Order of Merit ...						3.					2.					1.					4.

Dated..... 19 .  
 (Signed).....  
 Superintending Officer.

## WAR AND THE ARME BLANCHE:

### THE GENERAL STAFF'S VIEWS ON MR. CHILDERS'S BOOK.

IN this book Mr. Erskine Childers maintains, and claims to have proved, that for mounted troops in modern war the *arme blanche* is "as dead as the dodo." The essential points of the theories he advances are—that the rifle is always the master of the sword; that although the latter may be of use on some occasions, those occasions are very few, and that even then the rifle can be used instead of the sword, with better results; that it is as impossible for mounted troops to become efficient in the use of both rifle and sword as it is for a man to serve two masters; and that the only way to ensure the efficient training of our cavalry in the use of the rifle is to deprive it of lance and sword altogether. Mr. Childers favours bold offensive action, but always with the object of overwhelming the enemy by fire and never with the object of using cold steel. Cavalry charges he believes in, but not the charge as now understood; in his view cavalry should charge to "within 5, 10, 50, or 100 yards" of the enemy, and then shoot him down, either from the saddle, or dismounting to fire. In the term "cavalry" he would include all mounted troops, maintaining that all should be armed alike and act on the same principles. Fire from the saddle should be freely used, even, it would appear, when moving at speed, as in pursuit.

Mr. Childers bases his views mainly on the experiences of the South African War, but he quotes the Russo-Japanese War in confirmation, and he claims that the American Civil War and the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71 also illustrate the truth of his contentions. The fact that a decided majority of the leaders of military thought throughout the civilized world are believers in "the terror of cold steel" is an argument to which he attributes no importance. He is quite satisfied that their judgment is misled either by the glamour of cold steel, or by a mistaken belief that the South African War was abnormal, a view with which he is in entire disagreement.

Before discussing Mr. Childers's theories, it will be well to consider the value of the evidence on which they are based. It has been claimed that his arguments are historically correct. This claim cannot be admitted. He quotes historical facts, certainly, but the deductions he makes from them are his own.

Facts, as a great lawyer has said, "cannot lie, but they can and often do deceive." The point which the reader of "*War and the Arme Blanche*" has to decide is whether, in this case, they have deceived Mr. Childers or those who differ from him. Judging by the official training manuals, the ruling military authorities of every civilized nation are numbered amongst the believers in cold steel. Amongst them are many able, earnest and experienced soldiers, by no means all cavalrymen. They have as deep a knowledge of historical facts as Mr. Childers has. They have even more at stake to induce them to weigh deductions carefully, since they may be called upon to act on them at any moment. They have more practical knowledge of human nature in war to guide them in drawing conclusions from history, and human nature in war is a consideration on which the practical applicability of all military theory depends. Remembering that it is deductions from facts that are in dispute, and not the facts themselves, we cannot think that any impartial reader will be prepared to follow Mr. Childers in throwing the opinions of such men aside as being biassed and worthless. We claim no infallibility for them, but neither do we concede any to Mr. Childers. We cannot agree that Mr. Childers has established his charge of undue bias in favour of the sword, and we cannot see that he is any less open to a charge of undue bias in favour of the rifle. Having said so much as to the value of the evidence to be weighed, we may now turn to the matter in dispute. A careful perusal of "*War and the Arme Blanche*" leaves us under the impression that the difference in opinion between Mr. Childers and our Training Manuals is by no means so great as he seems to think it is. His views on the value of vigorous offensive methods and on the combination of fire power with mobility are, up to a certain point, in agreement with "*Cavalry Training*." No one is likely to deny—"Cavalry Training" certainly does not do so—that the general principles of fire action are the same for all mounted troops, although the degree of skill with which they may be able to employ those principles must be expected to vary with the duration and thoroughness of the training they have undergone. No one can deny that favourable opportunities for the use of the *arme blanche* are not numerous in modern war as compared with the number of opportunities for using the rifle.

Mr. Childers is not one of those who consider it impossible for cavalry to charge home, under favourable conditions, in the face of modern rifle fire; and he clearly recognizes the need to charge home in order to force a decision. So far, therefore, no great principle seems to be in dispute. The first real point of difference that we can find between Mr. Childers and "*Cavalry Training*" is his statement that when cavalry has charged home it will always find the rifle a more effective weapon than cold steel. The next is the statement that cavalry cannot be trained to efficiency in both rifle and sword. If the first of these two statements be true it is unnecessary to examine the



second, since there would obviously be no further need for the sword if the rifle is always more effective at close quarters. If the second theory be true, we agree that the rifle is so much more generally useful than the sword that the latter should be abandoned in its favour. These two questions are, therefore, worthy of very close consideration. A decision on the first of them seems to depend a good deal on the value of fire from the saddle. If it is really possible effectively to use the rifle from the saddle at close quarters, we can believe that cavalry would soon throw away sword and lance in war. If it is not possible, then mounted cavalry without a steel weapon has no adequate means of offensive action at close quarters or of self-defence if surprised when in motion.

Turning to such facts as we have at our disposal we cannot find that the efficacy of saddle-fire has been established. It was used in the American Civil War. It was also used by both sides in South Africa. In both wars its use appears to have been exceptional, while its material effect is stated by those who experienced it in South Africa to have been very slight, although the Boers who used it had had exceptional training, and were probably greater adepts than town-bred soldiers could ever become. The most claimed for it by British officers who used it is that it may sometimes have a useful moral effect.

To fire from the saddle at the halt and in motion would necessitate the prolonged and habitual training of the horse as well as of the cavalry-soldier, and we can find no grounds for a belief that such fire would prove effective, except, perhaps, in the case of individuals in special circumstances. The difficulty in shooting with any degree of accuracy from a horse moving at speed requires no explanation. The difficulty in shooting from a horse pulled up short from a charge and under fire—since the enemy must be presumed to be resisting—does not seem likely to be less.

For these reasons it seems to us that cavalry, charging on the principle advocated by Mr. Childers, must dismount to fire on reaching close quarters. When the enemy is sufficiently accommodating to leave cover close to him unwatched and unguarded, to which the cavalry can gallop, and behind which the horses can be left, this operation is feasible. If he does not do so—which we take to be the normal case—it seems to us that it would be more difficult for cavalry to pull up and dismount in the open, under close rifle fire, than to charge home, led by its officers. It is worthy of note that troops using a rifle cannot be so led. Further, it seems to us that this pulling-up and dismounting at the last moment—even if men could be got to do it which we doubt—would be likely to prove a very costly proceeding, and that the enemy, if he could be given a choice, would prefer to meet such a manœuvre rather than a charge home with cold steel.

In considering the question of weapons, it is not sufficient to confine our investigations to the original attack. We must

also consider possible counter-attack. For instance, Mr. Childers's analysis of the Boer charge at Roodewal is incomplete. He considers what might have been the value of the steel weapon and a knee-to-knee formation to the Boers, and he concludes that they would have been useless. We agree. The failure of the Boers on this occasion must be attributed to the absence of any moral ascendancy over the enemy. The surprise failed; they had no numerical superiority, and there was no fire preparation except the totally insignificant saddle-fire during the charge itself.

Grenfell met the attack by fire; but if his force had been armed with sword or lance, and trained to rapid manoeuvres combined with cohesion, it is an interesting speculation whether he might not have gained better results by means of a "shock" counter-attack. It seems to us that Grenfell's most effective reply to the Boers would have been to meet them by fire from a portion of his force till their attack faltered, and then to clinch the matter by a charge of the remainder with the *arme blanche*.

This is one of the examples quoted by Mr. Childers. It seems to us to show the value of a training in which various tactical methods and various weapons can be utilized and combined. It provides also an example of the failure of Mr. Childers's method, and affords an opportunity of illustrating how an effective use can be made of the *arme blanche* against that method when wrongly applied.

We will next consider an example of the success of Mr. Childers's proposed methods, namely, Bakenlaagte; but before doing so we desire to say a few words as to certain conditions on which the chances of success of any method of attack seem to depend.

Mr. Childers is emphatic in his view that it is not necessary or even desirable for the form of offensive which he advocates, to depend on covering rifle fire or artillery support, to enable the objective to be reached. He disclaims the need for any such assistance for his charges, and bases this belief on the invulnerability to rifle fire of the horseman moving at speed.

Here we are in direct conflict with him. We believe that charges against riflemen, whether made as he proposes or with cold steel, can only be successful, in the face of opposition which is not altogether insignificant, if the conditions allow the attack a certain moral ascendancy. This moral ascendancy may result from surprise or overwhelming numbers, but where these conditions are absent it can only be obtained by establishing superiority of fire as a preliminary step. The mere movement at speed aided by saddle-fire is, we contend, insufficient to produce it.

We believe, further, that when once sufficient moral ascendancy has been gained the nature of the weapon with which cavalry is armed will not affect the chances of its being able to charge home. The question at issue is as to the most effective means of obtaining good results after charging home.

On this point Bakenlaagte seems to offer some evidence. On the British side there was a harassed rear-guard which had been withdrawing for many hours in the face of vigorous attacks, and was, in addition, facing a cold driving rain. On the Boer side we have the arrival of reinforcements at the critical moment in sufficient strength to give it an overwhelming numerical superiority. The arrival of these reinforcements was quite unknown to the British till the charge actually took place, so that a certain element of surprise was introduced.

For the details of the action we must refer the reader to the *Times* History of the War and the map contained in that work. According to the author of this account, Botha initiated his charge at the very moment that he saw the British rear-guard rise and mount in order to withdraw from Ridge A to Gun Hill. The moment was admirably chosen, and the circumstances all contributed to increase the *moral* of the attack while reducing that of the British rear-guard.

As to the opposition encountered, we read that Greatwood's and Lynch's detachments of the Buffs (infantry) were overwhelmed between Ridge A and Gun Hill, the Boers "dropping a few men to disarm their prisoners." It is a small point, but we doubt whether this slight weakening of the attacking force would have been necessary if these detachments had been ridden over, say by a lancer brigade.

The description of the remainder of the charge is worth quoting in full—"With scarcely a check the charge continued; it caught, swallowed up and captured both the covering sections of Scottish Horse and mounted infantry, and ended finally in the hollow at the foot of Gun Hill. This was dead ground both from Ridge B and Gun Hill, and here the Boers flung themselves from their ponies and pressed on foot up the hill, firing and shouting as they came."

No account could illustrate more clearly the essential difference between cavalry action and that of mounted riflemen. The Boers, in the full tide of success, judged it necessary to dismount at this critical moment. The result was that they were obliged to enter into a fire struggle which lasted 20 minutes before the hill was captured. We are told that during that time "no reinforcements reached the hill," and that the only counter-attack attempted during the action was an effort made by two companies of the Buffs under Major Eales, after the hill had been captured, when the conditions were entirely unfavourable; but it is easy to conceive what a difference the 20 minutes' delay to the attack might have made in the results of the day.

We claim that a cavalry force as ably led would not have dismounted at the foot of the slope and afforded the enemy the opportunity to recover his initial disadvantage. We are told that the dead ground reached to within 30 yards of the British firing line. We do not believe that a charge of disciplined cavalry which had reached the foot of the slope would have pulled up, or could have been stopped by fire in the last 30 yards.

We must remember the absolutely overwhelming numbers and the elation of the initial success. In our opinion cavalry handled on the principles inculcated in Cavalry Training would have ridden over the hill inflicting many casualties on the British on the way; the original line would have swept on to the farm at Nooitgedacht, and spread consternation and havoc amongst the convoy, while the supporting squadrons dealt with any resistance that might be left in the defenders of the hill. In fact, a partial success might have been turned into a complete victory.

Our conclusions from the facts of Bakenlaagte are that the success was due to causes other than the armament of the Boers and the formation in which they charged, and that the limitations in the measure of the success is evidence in favour of the *arme blanche* and of the methods laid down in Cavalry Training.

It may be claimed that if the Boers, armed as they were, had not halted they would have gained a complete success. The reply seems to us to be that they would not have halted if they had been armed with steel and trained to depend on it under such conditions.

In fact, the example we have just quoted illustrates an important virtue claimed for the *arme blanche*. The tendency of human nature under fire is to seek cover and hold on there, since to rise from it increases the danger. This tendency works in two ways when both sides are under heavy fire; just as the defending side inclines to hang on in its trenches, so the attacking side tends to remain under cover and to seek to shoot the enemy out of his position without exposing itself. If proof of this tendency under modern conditions is required, a study of the operations in Natal for the relief of Ladysmith will afford it.

The chief reason why infantry soldiers are given a bayonet is to foster in them the desire to close with the enemy. They are taught that this must be their object, and that the primary use of fire is to assist their forward movement in the direction of the enemy with a final bayonet charge in view. The actual amount of killing done by the bayonet in modern war has been comparatively small. After South Africa many theorists recommended its abolition. Yet deeper thinking has led to the conclusion that the moral effect of the bayonet is out of all proportion to its material effect, and not the least important of the virtues claimed for it is that the desire to use it draws the attacking side on. This theory has been accepted by those best qualified to judge by experience of human nature in war. There seems to be a great similarity of thought between those who favoured the abolition of the bayonet and those who desire to deprive cavalry of the *arme blanche*. We also think there would be a similarity in the results. To take the sword from cavalymen would be, to some extent, to take away their desire to close—to encourage them to seek for effect by long-range fire. It might constitute



a serious obstacle to the realization of Mr. Childers's methods of charging.

This encouragement of an offensive spirit is one effect of a steel weapon. What is its effect on the enemy? Is the "terror of cold steel" really a myth? On this point let us examine, for example, the battles of Wœrth and Gravelotte. Time and again the Germans held on to the ground they had won under a devastating fire. Time and again they fled before French bayonet charges, without awaiting them. Are foot soldiers charging with bayonets more terror-inspiring, or more difficult to stop by bullets, than charging cavalymen, who believe in their ability to charge home?

Mr. Childers may not agree in the value of examples taken from a war which was fought before the introduction of the magazine rifle, but if the magazine rifle is to be upheld as a nerve soother where cold steel is concerned we must not ignore the effect of the same weapon in producing nerve tension when in the hands of the enemy. We hold that this attribute of the magazine rifle will in reality tend to maintain if not to enhance the terror of cold steel in the battles of the future. In fact, we look to the magazine rifle to produce the situations in which the fear of cold steel will give us the victory. This is indeed the basis of all modern tactics.

Although we maintain that the *arme blanche* is by no means obsolete, it must be admitted that Mr. Childers's contention could be upheld as to the impossibility of training cavalry to the efficient use of both rifle and cold steel, there would be a strong case against the retention of sword or lance. The arguments given in the foregoing pages refer more particularly to the battlefield, on which the results of all military operations are decided. Even on the battlefield, however—still more in the operations preceding the battle—it cannot be denied that for one opportunity of using cold steel effectively there will be many of using the rifle. For this reason there can be little doubt that, if cavalry cannot be made efficient in both weapons and must be restricted to one, that one should be the rifle.

Mr. Childers maintains that experience shows that cavalry cannot be trained to both weapons. He appeals to history. Has history spoken definitely on this problem? In what campaign, up to date, has cavalry been employed that had been carefully trained in the use of both weapons? We are not aware of one. The Boers were not trained in the use of the *arme blanche*. Our own cavalry in South Africa had not been seriously trained in the use of the rifle. It was armed with an inferior firearm, and had fired a few rounds with it annually, but rifle shooting and rifle tactics held a very different position in its training, and in its regard, to what it holds now.

Mr. Childers quotes the American Civil War. In his reference, however, to this war, he omits to mention that, although a rifle was added to the equipment of the United States cavalry soldier shortly after the war commenced, the sword and



revolver for use at close quarters were not discarded, and that this equipment, as a result of the experience gained in the American Civil War, has been retained ever since.

It would be out of place here to discuss the merits and defects of the breech-loading pistol in addition to or in substitution for the *arme blanche*, as the main point is whether the mass of the cavalry employed in that war was trained at all before the war.

It is useless to claim that history has given a final verdict on this problem. So far as history has spoken, its voice appears to us to be in favour of the possibility of cavalry being trained to use both weapons, *i.e.*, the rifle and the *arme blanche*. Our cavalrymen, trained to *arme blanche* work, adapted themselves, with considerable success, to the use of the rifle in South Africa. Although there seems to be a good deal of popular misapprehension on the point, cavalrymen used the *arme blanche* freely in the American Civil War, and it appears that the use of it tended to increase as the war went on; they also used the rifle with considerable efficiency.

We believe that cavalry which is capable of using either weapon, as occasion may demand, will be more useful in war than cavalry which can only use one of the two. We believe that the possibility of becoming efficient in both must remain a matter of opinion until cavalry which has been carefully trained to both has been fully tried in war. And we believe, meanwhile, that the opinion of experienced cavalry officers on training is a safer guide to follow than the opinion of Mr. Childers. Their opinion is that regular cavalry can be trained to both. It must be remembered that our present peace training aims at producing dash, cohesion and discipline, combined with an offensive spirit and good horsemanship; and that, even if Mr. Childers proves correct in his views, the time spent in inculcating these qualities cannot be said to have been thrown away, unless it can be proved that the training in fire tactics has been neglected in consequence to a dangerous extent.

The truth seems to be that the real difficulty of the problem lies less in training the men to be capable of using both sword and rifle than in educating their officers to judge rapidly which weapon to employ at any given moment. No doubt errors of judgment must be expected in this matter, as they must be expected in all operations of war; but we cannot afford to abandon a valuable weapon for that reason. Moreover, it does not seem to us that there will be much—if any—more difficulty in judging when to charge with the *arme blanche* than there would be in judging when to undertake the style of charge that Mr. Childers recommends.

The judicious selection of opportunities for, and the skilful execution of a charge undoubtedly call for much previous study, thought, and practice; but, so far as our regular cavalry is concerned, the necessary attention can, and will, be given to the problem. Professional officers, and men who serve for 7 or

8 years with the colours, have both the time and the opportunity to learn. It is different with our mounted troops other than regular cavalry, however. There can be no reasonable doubt that neither the officers nor the men composing these troops can learn the use of both rifle and *arme blanche* in their short peace training. This being so, it seems obvious that they should train in peace with the rifle only, that being far the more generally useful arm.

It may be argued that it is illogical to claim that the *arme blanche* gives additional power to cavalry, and then to recommend that mounted troops, other than cavalry, should be armed with the rifle only. The reply to such a contention is that yeomanry and similar bodies of troops, who train only for a few days in the year, cannot be expected to meet highly-trained regular cavalry on equal terms, however we arm them; and matters cannot be equalised by any increase in the number of weapons they carry. On the whole they will stand a better chance armed with one weapon which they have acquired some skill in using, than if they had more than one, were unskilful with each, and lacking in judgment as to which to use. Moreover, there are other factors which considerations of space forbid the discussion of here, such as the nature of the country that yeomanry are primarily intended to fight in, the nature of the duties that would be allotted to them in war, and the possibility of arranging for them to work with regular cavalry, thus combining fire power with the sword. Moreover, if time were available after embodiment, it would be possible to equip yeomanry with the sword and to instruct them in its use.

The combination of the power of the two weapons seems to us the ideal to aim at and we cannot agree that it is beyond our reach.

It may be that there is sometimes a tendency to favour training with the steel weapon at the expense of training with the firearm. We agree that this is unsound, but we do not agree that it is necessary to take away sword and lance altogether in order to correct this tendency, and we think that in proposing such a remedy Mr. Childers has rushed into the extremes that he complains of in others.

## NAVAL NOTES.

### THE KING.

His Majesty the King, accompanied by the Queen, the Princess Mary and Prince George, arrived at Portsmouth from London at 5 p.m. on Thursday, the 21st ult., where they were received by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the Hon. Sir A. Curzon-Howe, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., C.M.G., and other naval and military officials, and at once embarked on board the Royal Yacht, which was lying in readiness alongside the railway jetty. The ships in harbour were dressed with masthead flags, and a Royal salute was fired by the *Victory* and other ships as the Royal Standard was broken on board the *Victoria and Albert*. Later their Majesties, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiral Superintendent, visited the old fitting loft, which has been set apart as a museum, where have been collected and arranged a number of articles of interest, including relics of Portsmouth's relations with the Navy for hundreds of years, a few of the models dating back to the days of Cromwell.

The next forenoon the King, accompanied by the Queen and the Royal Children, inspected the gunnery establishment on Whale Island, where he was received by Captain R. G. Tupper, C.V.O., R.N., in command of the school, a visit being paid to the rose garden before leaving, where was a tree planted by the Queen, when as Duchess of York she visited the island in 1898. As a memento of his present visit, the King planted another tree, in which he was assisted by Princess Mary and Prince George. Leaving the Gunnery School, a visit was next paid to the *Vernon* torpedo school ship, where the Royal party was received by Captain R. S. Phipps Hornby, and a careful inspection of the many things of interest was made, among them being an old torpedo which, fired from the *Glatten* 30 years ago and lost, was recently recovered by a fisherman in the Solent and is now retained in the *Vernon* as a relic. On leaving the *Vernon* their Majesties landed at the dockyard, where they were received by Rear-Admiral Tate, the Superintendent, and after inspecting the works at the new lock, they paid a visit to the new battleship *Orion*, now nearly ready for launching. In the afternoon, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiral-Superintendent, a further tour of inspection of the Dockyard was made, after which a visit was made to the Royal Naval Barracks, where they were received by Commodore C. G. F. Cradock, C.B., M.V.O., and the officers. After going round the canteen, gymnasium, and the physical training school, their Majesties passed on through the warrant officers' quarters and some of the men's living rooms, and they then proceeded to the officers' quarters, where they took tea, first inspecting the guard of honour, formed of the barrack cadet corps, which was drawn up on the lawn. After tea the Queen and Princess Mary, accompanied by Lady Curzon-Howe, drove to the Royal Seamen's and Marines' Orphan School, an Institution in which Her Majesty has always taken the greatest interest, while the King visited the new gymnasium and swimming bath.

On Saturday forenoon their Majesties, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, paid a visit to the submarine depot at Fort Blockhouse, where among other things they witnessed the method of using the

new life-saving apparatus; the King then went on board Submarine C 36, which he inspected, after which their Majesties witnessed the lifting of a submarine on to the floating dock. A visit was next paid to Haslar Hospital, and after an inspection of the various wards, where the King and Queen conversed with many of the patients, and to the Museum, a short tour was made in the grounds. In the afternoon their Majesties proceeded in the Royal Yacht to Cowes, where the usual moorings were taken up. The following message was received by the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth from the King:—

"The King wishes to express the pleasure it has given him to visit Portsmouth and inspect your command. He desires that you will convey to all concerned his satisfaction with the high state of efficiency in the various establishments that he has been able to see and with the zeal displayed by both officers and men."

On Sunday forenoon they landed and drove to the Royal Naval College at Osborne. On arrival, their Majesties, who were received by Captain Christian and the officers, proceeded at once to the Nelson Hall, where about 450 cadets, including Prince Albert, were drawn up for inspection. The King and Queen then attended Divine service, which was held in the Nelson Hall, the sermon being preached by the Bishop of Guildford. In commemoration of his visit, the King planted an oak tree in the grounds. Later in the day a visit was paid to the Osborne House Convalescent Home for Officers and Barton Manor.

On Monday, the 25th, the King was to have proceeded to Mount's Bay for his inspection of the combined fleets, which had assembled there for the purpose at the conclusion of the manœuvres, but owing to the bad weather prevailing in the Channel, the Royal Yacht remained at her moorings off Cowes, and the King and Queen did not disembark.

*The Visit to the Fleet.*—Owing to the exposed nature of the anchorage in Mount's Bay and the bad weather which set in the ships of the combined fleet, under the supreme command of Admiral Sir W. May, had to put to sea on the Sunday evening, and they anchored at Torbay on the Monday morning, where they were moored in eight lines disposed from East to West in the Bay. The combined fleet was composed as follows:—

#### HOME FLEET.

##### FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON.

First-class battleships.—*Dreadnought* (Flagship of Admiral Sir W. May, G.C.V.O., K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief), *Bellerophon*, *Temeraire*, *Vanguard*, *Collingwood*, *St. Vincent* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral F. C. D. Sturdee, C.V.O., C.M.G.), *Superb*, *Agamemnon*, *Lord Nelson*.

Attached cruisers.—*Dido*, *Isis*.

##### SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON.

First-class battleships.—*King Edward VII.* (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir A. B. Milne, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.), *Dominion*, *Britannia*, *Africa*, *Hibernia* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O.), *New Zealand*, *Hindustan*, *Commonwealth*.

Attached Cruisers.—*Juno* and *Talbot*.

**THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON.**

First-class battleships.—*Bulwark* (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir G. Neville, K.C.B., C.V.O.), *Hannibal*, *Cæsar*, *Magnificent*, *Jupiter* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral F. E. E. Brock), *Victorious*, *Illustrious*, *Prince George*, *Mars*.

**FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*Indomitable* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. C. J. Colville, C.V.O., C.B.), *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Defence*.

**SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*Shannon* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral R. S. Lowry), *Cochrane*, *Warrior*, *Natal*, *Achilles*.

**THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*King Alfred* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. A. C. Galloway), *Roxburgh*, *Sutlej*, *Carnarvon*.

Second-class cruiser.—*Vindictive*.

**FOURTH CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*Leviathan* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. M. Farquhar, C.V.O.), *Berwick*, *Donegal*, *Essex*.

**MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.**

First-class battleships.—*Ezmouth* (Flagship of Admiral Sir E. Poë, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.), *Cornwallis*, *Duncan* (Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir G. A. Callaghan, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.), *Russell*, *Swiftsure*, *Triumph*.

**SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*Bacchante* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., F.R.S.), *Lancaster*.

**ATLANTIC FLEET.**

First-class battleships.—*Prince of Wales* (Flagship of Vice-Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., &c.), *Implacable*, *Formidable*, *London* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Colin Keppel, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.), *Queen*, *Venerable*.

**FIFTH CRUISER SQUADRON.**

First-class armoured cruisers.—*Drake* (Flagship of Rear-Admiral F. T. Hamilton, C.V.O.), *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*.

Second-class cruisers—*Doris*, *Venus*.

In addition to the foregoing there were the various repair and depôt ships, the protected cruiser *Ariadne* and the gunnery tender *Theseus*, the hospital ship *Maine*, first and second destroyer flotillas, with their attendant ships, the *Boadicea* (flagship of Commodore Charlton), the *Bellona*, *Foresight*, *Skirmisher*, *Blake*, *Blenheim*, *Adventure*, and *Pathfinder*, and the submarine flotilla. The weather having cleared, the Royal yacht left Cowes in the morning of Tuesday, 26th, escorted by



the armoured cruisers *Achilles* and *Cochrane*, and anchored in Torbay at half-past 4 in the afternoon. The intention was that the whole fleet should proceed to sea the next morning for tactical exercises, the fleet for the purpose being divided into two, the "Red" and the "Blue," the latter under the command of Admiral Sir E. Poë, to weigh at 5 a.m., so as to make a good offing. At 10 a.m. the *Dreadnought*, with the King and Queen on board, was to weigh with the "Red" Fleet, and both fleets having got into touch with each other, an engagement was to follow. Unfortunately Wednesday morning proved most unsuitable for carrying out the proposed programme. At 6 a.m., when the "Blue" Fleet should have been under weigh, a thick fog overhung the Channel with a steady drizzle falling, so there was nothing to do but countermand the orders.

About 8 o'clock the drizzle ceased, and the fog lifted somewhat, and a little before 9 the King went on board the *Dreadnought*, and shortly afterwards started on a tour of inspection, visiting the *Ezmouth*, *King Edward VII.*, *The Prince of Wales*, *Bulwark*, and *Bellerophon*. The weather in the meantime continued to clear, and at 11 o'clock the signal was made for the Fleet to unmoor. A little before 1 o'clock the "Blue" Fleet, which was composed of the following vessels, weighed:—

**Battleships**—*Ezmouth*, *Illustrious*, *Swiftsure*, *Cornwallis*, *Duncan*, *Russell*, *Queen*, *Prince of Wales*, *Implacable*, *Venerable*, *London*, *Victorious*, *Bulwark*, *Cæsar*, *Triumph*, *Magnificent*, *Mars*.

**Cruisers**—*Berwick*, *Donegal*, *Essex*, *Devonshire*, *Drake*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Argyll*, *Bacchante*, *Lancaster*, *Carnarvon*, *Leviathan*, *Sutlej*, *Doris*, *Venus*, *Vindictive*.

To this fleet also were attached the Second Torpedo Flotilla and its attendant vessels, the *Bellona*, *Foresight* and *Skirmisher*.

An hour after the "Blue" Fleet had put to sea, the cruisers of the "Red" Fleet weighed and stood out to look for it. Shortly afterwards the "Red" Fleet, which was under the command of Admiral Sir W. May, also weighed. The "Red" Fleet was composed as follows:—

**Battleships**—*Dreadnought*, *St. Vincent*, *Vanguard*, *Collingwood*, *Temeraire*, *Jupiter*, *Superb*, *Bellerophon*, *Lord Nelson*, *King Edward VII.*, *Hibernia*, *Africa*, *New Zealand*, *Dominion*, *Commonwealth*, *Hindustan*, *Hannibal*, *Britannia*.

**Cruisers**—*Indomitable*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, *Defence*, *Hampshire*, *Rozburgh*, *Hogue*, *Shannon*, *Achilles*, *Cochrane*, *Natal*, *Antrim*, *Warrior*, *King Alfred*, *Dido*, *Juno*.

With this fleet were the First Torpedo Flotilla and its attendant ships, the *Boadicea*, *Adventure*, and *Pathfinder*. At first the outermost ships of the columns led, but as soon as all were under weigh the signal was given to reverse the order of the line, the *Dreadnought* and *King Edward* taking up their positions at the head of their respective columns. His Majesty was on board the *Dreadnought*, which was flying the "Royal Standard." Unfortunately the fog again settled down, and the exercises were put an end to, the *Dreadnought* returning with several of the ships, but many of the others did not find their way back until quite late. The King returned to the Royal yacht as soon as the anchorage was reached.

Friday morning opened fine, and the signal was made from the flagship for steam for 14 knots by 9.30. Shortly before that time the King, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught, went on board the *Dreadnought*, on which the Royal Standard was immediately broken, and the fleet weighed and stood out to sea, followed by the Royal yacht, so that the Queen and Royal children could witness the firing. The main purpose of the cruise on this occasion was to enable the King to see battle practice carried out under the conditions recently prescribed. Two battle practice targets, 90 ft. long by 30 ft. high, were towed out with the ships by the *Talbot* and *Isis*. The firing commenced shortly after 11 o'clock, by which time the ships in the combined fleet were well away to sea, and engaged in minor evolutions. The firing took place at a range of about 7,000 yards—approximately five miles—and by the aid of powerful glasses his Majesty was enabled to witness the excellent practice made, the target being towed past the *Dreadnought* at a speed unknown to those in the firing ship. The results of the firing were signalled to the *Dreadnought* from the marking ship, and at the conclusion of the practice his Majesty warmly complimented Admiral Sir William May and the gunnery officers and men who had taken part in the firing. The "cease fire" signal having been made, orders were given by wireless for the fleets to rejoin the flag of the Admiral of the Fleet.

The results of the *Dreadnought's* firing show that over 50 per cent. of hits were recorded. This included 18 direct hits out of the 40 rounds fired, which in view of the unfavourable state of the weather, for a thick drizzle had again come on, may be considered satisfactory.

The spectacle of the fleet's return, as witnessed from the high land, was very imposing. When the mass of ships were sighted in the offing they were smothered in smoke. As the horizon cleared, it was seen that there were eight columns of ships, with eight ships in each column, 64 in all, arranged in the lines as they had been disposed throughout the week in Torbay, each line being led by its proper flagship. The ships kept station with admirable precision, and the majestic spectacle of between four and five square miles of battleships and big cruisers proceeding at about 14 knots in perfect formation amply rewarded those who had journeyed to positions commanding the entrance to the bay. Exactly at 2.30 the signal was made from the *Dreadnought*, which was still acting as the Royal Flagship, to anchor and remoor in their order, and on the signal being hauled down 64 anchors dropped as one into the water, and the second anchors being let go similarly by signal some three minutes later, the fleet was soon moored as before.

It may be as well to point out that the firing was carried out under battle practice conditions, and not a gunlayers' test such as was carried out before King Edward in the *Dreadnought* in 1907, when nine bullseyes were made out of the 12 rounds fired. That was a notable performance, but the firing before King George was a far higher display of the battle organisation of the ship, as it was a fair test not only of the handling of the vessel, but also of the capacity of those responsible for the judging of the distance of the rapidly moving target, of the transmitting the range to the guns, and of the laying of the guns themselves. The King appears to have been greatly pleased with the performance, and warmly congratulated the officers and men.

Saturday was fine, and during the forenoon his Majesty inspected the *Drake*, *St. Vincent*, and *Hindustan*, besides witnessing the sailing regatta for the boats of the fleet, which was to have taken place the previous day had the weather permitted. There were more than 200 boats of every class competing, all entered and steered by officers. The course, about nine miles, was twice round the fleet, starting from a point off Paignton and finishing on a line drawn between the Royal yacht and the *Dreadnought*. The race was sailed under good conditions, as the day was fine and bright, the water smooth, with a brisk sailing breeze. The result was as follows:—

"The 30-foot cutter of *Defence*, No. 1; the 30-foot cutter of *Venus*, No. 2; the 32-foot pinnace of *Natal*, No. 3; the 36-foot pinnace of *Bulwark*, No. 4; the 36-foot pinnace of *Invincible*, No. 5, and the 36-foot pinnace of *Black Prince*, No. 6."

At half-past two their Majesties left the Royal yacht and proceeded to the landing stage en route for London, the fleet dressing with masthead flags and firing a Royal salute. Before leaving the King sent the following message to the Commander-in-Chief, which was communicated to the fleet by signal:—

"It has given His Majesty great pleasure to have seen the combined Fleets, and he wishes to express his high appreciation of the excellent state of efficiency in which he has found them, and of the keen spirit displayed both by officers and men. His Majesty congratulates you on your magnificent command."

The Commander-in-Chief made the following reply:—

"The officers and men of the combined Fleets are highly honoured by Your Majesty's most gracious message. They will always remember with pride the unique occasion on which the King inspected the Fleets at sea and led them into harbour."

The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

Rear-Admirals—S. H. Carden to be Rear-Admiral in Atlantic Fleet; R. H. S. Stokes to be Admiral Superintendent of Devonport Dockyard. Captains—M. L'E. Silver to *Topaze* and command of Fourth Destroyer Flotilla; W. H. D'Oyly to *Blake*; B. H. Fanshawe to *Terror* and charge of Naval Establishments, Bermuda; W. H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O., to *Gloucester*; T. O. Napier, M.V.O., to *Bellerophon*; H. Evans-Thomas, M.V.O., to command of R.N. College, Dartmouth; C. M. De Bartolomé to *Indomitable*; F. L. Field to *Duncan* and as Flag Captain; G. H. Baird to *Shannon* and as Flag Captain; T. L. Barnardiston to *Ariadne*; G. P. Hunt to *Newcastle*; P. Vaughan Lewes, D.S.O., to *Cæsar*; A. F. Everett to *King Edward VII.* and as Flag Captain; R. H. Anstruther, C.M.G., to *Cornwallis*; R. W. Bentinck to *Bristol*; C. H. Morgan to *Liverpool*; M. R. Hill to *Glasgow*; M. H. Hodges to *Doris*; A. Hayes-Sadler to *Hannibal*; F. C. Tudor to *Excellent*; H. L. Heath, M.V.O., to *Superb*; B. M. Chambers to *Majestic*. Commanders—A. B. Barker to *Imogene*; H. Lynes to *Cadmus*; H. R. Veale to *Clio*; A. Lowndes to *Alacrity*; L. C. Woolcombe to *Latona*.

**Home.****THE CRUISERS OF THE "TOWN" CLASS.**

**Steam Trial.**—The first of the cruisers of the *Town* Class has completed her trials, and the results are very satisfactory. Of this class five were laid down between February and April of last year in various private yards, and all of these, named after towns, will have completed their trials shortly, and be in commission within 18 months of the laying of the keel of the first. Four more were laid down early this year. These ships are 430 ft. long between perpendiculars, 47 ft. beam, and at 15 ft. 3 in. draft displace 4,800 tons. Their designed power is 22,000 shaft horse-power, to give a speed of 25 knots.

The first vessel tried, the *Glasgow*, built by the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company (Limited), Glasgow, developed 22,500 S.H.P., and the speed on the measured mile averaged 25.8 knots, a speed which was maintained practically for the whole of the eight hours' full power trial. On this test the boilers, which work under the closed stokehold system of forced draught, were using oil and coal, and the rate of consumption was equivalent to 1.61lb. per S.H.P. per hour—a good average result. The other steam trial was a 30 hours' run, divided into two parts—an eight hours' test at about eight-tenths the full power, and a 22 hours' run at about two-thirds the full power. The mean power developed on the former was 18,220 S.H.P., and the speed realised 24.9 knots, and on the latter 14,055 S.H.P., the speed being 23.7 knots.

The coal consumption on these trials was at the rate of 1.57lb. and 1.61lb. respectively per S.H.P. per hour. These rates of consumption are very favourable, especially the latter—a point of interest, since these vessels are the first cruisers without separate cruising turbines. Instead there is introduced an extension at the high pressure end of the turbines for use only at low cruising speeds. The turbines, of course, are of the Parsons type, manufactured at Fairfield, and there are two high pressure and two low pressure ahead turbines, one on each of the four shafts, and the same arrangement of astern turbines. The machinery on each side of the centre line thus exactly corresponds—an arrangement which makes the ship as easy to manoeuvre as a twin-screw vessel, although there are four screws—one on each shaft. The *Glasgow* has also passed through her gun trials. The ordnance includes a bow and stern 6 in. gun, five 4 in. guns on each broadside, two Maxim guns on the bridge, with two submerged torpedo tubes. An interesting feature of the class is that two are being fitted with Curtis turbines by Messrs. John Brown and Co. (Limited) of Clydebank, and the comparison of results, when these vessels are tried, will be specially interesting.—*The Times*.

The following are the principal appointments which have been made:—

**Rear-Admiral.**—M. A. Cros to be Chief of the Staff of the 1st *Arrondissement Maritime* (Cherbourg). **Capitaine de Vaisseau.**—F. M. L. De la Croix de Castries to *Duguay Trouin*, and command of the Cadet-Training School. **Capitaines de Frégate.**—M. I. de Fauque de Jonquières to *Vaucluse* (for special hydrographic Mission to Madagascar); R. L. Jeannot to *Magellan*; H. E. Caillot to *Kersaint*; M. I. Delahet to *Cécille*; I. A. E. Rousse to *Lance*, and command of Calais-Dunkerque Submarine Flotilla.—*Journal Officiel de la République Française*.

## France

*Tercentenary of the birth of the Marquis Duquesne.*—Grand fêtes took place at Dieppe on the 17th and 18th of last month to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the birth of Abraham, Marquis Duquesne, who was born on the 17th July, 1610, at Blangy, close to Dieppe. The Minister of Marine, Vice-Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, was present at the commemoration, which included among other ceremonies a pageant representing the State visit made by Duquesne to the town in 1666.

Abraham, Marquis Duquesne, was one of the most distinguished naval officers in the history of France. Born in a stirring seaport, the son of a distinguished naval officer, he naturally turned to the sea. Like many other distinguished seamen of those days, he first went to sea in the merchant service, obtaining his first distinction in naval warfare by the capture of the island of Lerins from the Spaniards in May, 1637. About this time his father was killed in an engagement with the Spaniards, which raised his hatred of the national enemy to the pitch of a personal and bitter animosity. During the next five years he sought every opportunity of inflicting defeat and humiliation on the Spanish Navy, and he distinguished himself by his bravery in the engagement at Gattari (1638), the expedition to Corunna (1639), and in the battles of Tarragona (1641), Barcelona (1643), and the Cape de Gatte.

The French Navy having little to do during the minority of Louis XIV., Duquesne, who was a Protestant, obtained permission to offer his services to the King of Sweden, who gave him a commission as Vice-Admiral in 1643, and in this capacity he defeated the Danish fleet near Gothenburg, and thus raised the siege of the city, and on the Danes renewing the attack with increased forces under the command of King Christiern in person, he again defeated them—their Admiral being killed and his ship captured. Peace being concluded between Sweden and Denmark in 1645, Duquesne returned to France. The revolt at Bordeaux in 1650, backed up as it was by aid from Spain, gave Duquesne an opportunity for gratifying his hatred of the Spaniards, and at the same time serving his country. He fitted out at his own expense a squadron with which he blockaded the mouth of the Garonne and compelled the city to surrender. For this service he was promoted and received a gift of the castle and Isle of Indre, near Nantes. Peace with Spain was concluded in 1659, and Duquesne was next employed for some years in endeavouring to suppress piracy in the Mediterranean.

On the revolt of Messina from Holland, he was sent to support the insurgents, and had to fight the combined fleets of Spain and Holland, which were under the supreme command of the celebrated De Ruyter. After several engagements, in which the advantage was generally on the side of the French, a decisive engagement took place off Catania on the 20th April, 1676, when the Dutch fleet was totally defeated, De Ruyter himself being mortally wounded. The greater part of the defeated fleet was afterwards burnt in the harbour of Palermo, where it had taken shelter, and the French thus secured the undisputed command of the Mediterranean. For his important services Duquesne received a letter of thanks from Louis XIV., and was created a Marquis, the estate of Bouchet being also bestowed upon him. His last achievements were the bombardment of Algiers (1682-83), in order to effect the deliverance of the Christian captives, and the bombardment of Genoa in 1684.



**France.**

On the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Duquesne was deprived of his commission, but he was specially exempted from banishment. He died at Paris on the 2nd February, 1688.

**New Constructions.**—The programme of new construction which is to be completed in 1919, has been published and comprises 92 new vessels of all classes, namely, 16 battleships, 6 scouts, 20 torpedo vessels, and 50 submarines.

**Battleships.**—Commencing with 1910, two new battleships are to be laid down each year up to and inclusive of 1916, then one in 1917 and one in 1919. Of these ships 1 of the 2 for 1910 will be an augmentation to the strength of the fleet, the other replacing the *Brennus*; in 1911 both ships will be augmentations; in 1912 the 2 ships are to replace the *Carnot* and *Charles-Martel*; in 1913 1 will be an augmentation, the other will replace the *Jauréguiberry*; in 1914 the 2 ships are to replace the *Bouvet* and *Masséna*; in 1915 the 2 ships are to replace the *Charlemagne* and *Saint-Louis*; in 1916 both ships will be augmentations; in 1917 1 to replace the *Gaulois*; in 1918 none; in 1919 1 to replace the *Suffren*; total, 6 in augmentation of the fleet and 10 to replace obsolete ships.

**Scouts.**—Of the 6 scouts, 2 are to be laid down in each of the years 1917, 1918, 1919; up to 1917 the large cruisers of the *Waldeck Rousseau* type will be available as scouts. From 1910 to 1916 none are to be laid down; in 1917, 2 to replace the armoured cruisers *Marseillaise* and *Jurien de la Gravière*; in 1918, 2 to replace the armoured cruisers *Jules Ferry* and *Amiral-Aube*; in 1919, 2 to replace the *Victor Hugo* and *Léon-Gambetta*; total, 6 to replace obsolete ships.

**Torpedo vessels (sea-going destroyers).**—In 1910, 8 additional new ones are to be laid down; in 1911, none; in 1912, 3 to replace the *Baliste*, *Bétier*, and *Arquebuse*; in 1913 and 1914, none; in 1915, 2 to replace the *Claymore* and *Obusier*; in 1916, none; in 1917, 3 to replace the *Pierrier*, *Stylet*, and *Tromblon*; in 1918, none; in 1919, 4 to replace the *Carquois*, *Trident*, *Mortier*, and *Fleuret*; total, 8 in augmentation and 12 to replace obsolete vessels.

**Fleet for Foreign Service.**—Large or medium-sized cruisers, from 1910 to 1919, none to be laid down.

**Submarine Defence Fleet.**—In 1910, 1 submarine of 700 tons, in augmentation; in 1911, 1 of 700 tons, in augmentation; in 1912, 1 of 400 tons and 3 of 700 tons, in augmentation and 6 to replace the *Français*, *Algérien*, *Follet*, *Castor*, *Loutre*, and *Souffleur*; in 1913, 4 of 700 tons, in augmentation; in 1914, the same; in 1915, 3 of 700 tons in augmentation, and 3 to replace the *Dorade*, *Otarie*, and *Phoque*; in 1916, 2 of 700 tons in augmentation, and 3 to replace the *Méduse*, *Ludion*, and *Najade*; in 1917, 7 to replace the *Bonite*, *Thon*, *Oursin*, *Truite*, *Alose*, *Anguille*, and *Grondin*; in 1918, 8 to replace the *Sirène*, *Triton*, *Silure*, *Espadon*, *Aigrette*, *Cigogne*, *Émeraude*, and *X*; in 1919, 4 to replace the *Opale*, *Rubis*, *Oméga*, and *Saphir*; total, 19 submarines in augmentation and 31 to replace obsolete vessels.

**Ready for Commissioning.**

**Battleships.**—1910 and 1911, none; in 1912, the 6 ships of the *Danton* class, an augmentation to the strength of the fleet; in 1913, 1 as augmen-

**France.**

tation and 1 to replace the *Brennus*; in 1914, 2 as augmentations; in 1915, 2 to replace *Carnot* and *Charles Martel*; in 1916, 1 as augmentation and 1 to replace *Jauréguiberry*; in 1917, 2 to replace *Bouvet* and *Masséna*; in 1918, 2 to replace *Charlemagne* and *Saint-Louis*; in 1919, 2 as augmentations.

*Scouts*.—None up to 1919.

*Torpedo vessels (sea-going destroyers)*.—1910 and 1911, none; in 1912, 8 additions; in 1913, none; in 1914, 3 to replace *Baliste*, *Bélier*, and *Arquebuse*; in 1915 and 1916, none; in 1917, 2 to replace *Claymore* and *Obusier*; in 1918, none; in 1919, 3 to replace *Pierrier*, *Stylet*, and *Tromblon*.

*Fleet for Foreign Service*.—Large or medium-sized cruisers, from 1910 to 1919, none.

*Submarine Defence Fleet*.—In 1910, 3 submarines of 700 and 8 of 400 tons in augmentation; in 1911, 11 of 400 and 1 of 300 tons in augmentation; in 1912, 7 of 400 and 1 of 700 tons in augmentation; in 1913, 1 of 700 tons in augmentation; in 1914, 1 of 400 and 3 of 700 tons in augmentation and 6 to replace the *Français*, *Algérien*, *Follet*, *Castor*, *Loutre*, and *Souffleur*; in 1915, 4 of 700 tons in augmentation; in 1916, 4 of 700 tons in augmentation; in 1917, 3 of 700 tons in augmentation and 3 to replace *Dorade*, *Otarie*, and *Phoque*; in 1918, 2 of 700 tons and 3 to replace *Méduse*, *Ludion*, and *Natade*; in 1919, 7 to replace *Bonite*, *Thon*, *Oursin*, *Trite*, *Alose*, *Anguille*, and *Grondin*.

**Strength of the Fleet in the Years between 1910 and 1919 (inclusive).**

Years.	I. Battle Fleet.			II. Foreign Service.	III. Submarine Defence Fleet.	
	Battleships.	Scouts.	Seagoing Destroyers.	Cruisers.	Coast Defence Destroyers.	Submarines.
1910	16	10	44	10	100	45 + 11 = 56
1911	16	10	44	10	100	56 + 12 = 68
1912	16 + 6 = 22	10	44 + 8 = 52	10	100	68 + 8 = 76
1913	22 + 1 = 23	10	52	10	100	76 + 1 = 77
1914	23 + 2 = 25	10	52	10	95	77 + 4 = 81
1915	25	10	52	10	85	81 + 4 = 85
1916	25 + 1 = 26	10	52	10	60	85 + 4 = 89
1917	26	10	52	10	60	89 + 3 = 92
1918	26	10	52	10	45	92 + 2 = 94
1919	26 + 2 = 28	10	52	10	45	94

Thus the establishment to be reached in 1919, taking account of the obsolete ships to be replaced and the additional vessels to be provided, will be as follows:—Battleships, 28; scouts or vessels employed as such, 10; sea-going destroyers, 52; cruisers for foreign stations, 10; coast-defence destroyers, 45; submarines, 94.

It is also to be noticed that the armoured cruiser disappears under the new scheme; no more will apparently be built, and those in existence will be employed for scouting duties with the squadrons or on foreign stations.—*Projet de Loi sur la Constitution de la Flotte*.

**United States.**

*Changes in Navy Regulations.*—New Regulations issued under date of 29th March, 1910, provide for important changes in the administration of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. Heretofore the entire fleet, which, in the case of the Atlantic Fleet, comprises sixteen battleships and a number of auxiliaries, has been the administrative unit, and the commander-in-chief was charged with almost all the details of administration, which occupied a large part of his time. The fleet was sub-divided into divisions of four ships each, with a rear-admiral in command of each, but the division was a tactical organisation only, and not an administrative entity.

The changes now made relieve the commander-in-chief of the details of administration, and will permit him to give more of his attention to the more important functions of his office; they give to the division commanders authority and administrative powers in such measure as to train them in the habits of responsibility, and to fit them to succeed readily to the chief command to which they are eligible. At the same time, the authority of the commander-in-chief and his responsibility for the efficiency of the fleet is in no way diminished, but he will exercise a co-ordinating and supervisory authority over the divisions as units, instead of over single ships, as was the case. The principle underlying these changes is the delegation of details to subordinates and the training of subordinates in habits of responsibility.

The commanders of divisions will be given an opportunity to cruise with their divisions on detached service and to drill and exercise the divisions separately during certain periods each year, while for certain other periods the entire fleet will be concentrated for target practice, fleet exercises and manoeuvres under the direction of the commander-in-chief.

It is contemplated that one period in each year of the divisional cruising will be in foreign waters. These cruises will be of about three months' duration, and will be so planned that attractive ports will be visited. It is expected that these foreign cruises will do much to promote the contentment and interest of the *personnel*, without in any way interfering with the serious work of training the divisions and the fleet to the highest practicable efficiency. The Department recognises the principle that contentment goes hand in hand with efficiency, and believe that the best results may be obtained by making the work of the fleet as pleasant and interesting as possible.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

*Battle Practice, 1909.* — The following is the result of the battle practice, 1909, held by the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. The standings are made up by combining the various battle efficiencies in the day, night and torpedo battle practices. The following is the standing of the fleets, squadrons, divisions, flotillas, and of vessels (singly):—

*Fleets.*

1. Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral Uriel Sebree, Commander-in-Chief; Lieut.-Commander D. W. Knox, fleet ordnance officer 29-922
2. Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Seaton Schroeder, Commander-in-Chief; Lieut.-Commander Ridley McLean, fleet ordnance officer ... 21-678

## United States.

## Squadrons.

1. First Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral Uriel Sebree ... 29 136
2. Third Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral Giles B. Harber ... 28 698
3. Second Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Richard Wainwright ... 19 862
4. First Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Seaton Schroeder ... 19 440

## Divisions.

1. Second Division, First Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral E. B. Barry ... 30 224
2. Second Division, Third Squadron, Pacific Fleet ... 30 173
3. First Division, First Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral Uriel Sebree ... 28 049
4. First Division, Third Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Rear-Admiral Giles B. Harber ... 27 346
5. First Division, First Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Rear-Admiral Seaton Schroeder ... 25 930
6. Scout Cruiser Division, Atlantic Fleet, Commander H. B. Wilson ... 20 780
7. Fourth Division, Second Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Captain S. P. Comly ... 20 240
8. Third Division, Second Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright ... 19 480
9. Second Division, First Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, Captain Hugo Osterhaus ... 12 951
10. Armoured Cruiser Division, Atlantic Fleet, Captain W. A. Marshall ... 12 919

## Flotillas.

1. Third Flotilla, Pacific Torpedo Fleet, Lieutenant C. S. Kerrick ... 35 943
2. Second Flotilla, Pacific Torpedo Fleet, Lieutenant Frank McCommon ... 29 142
3. First Flotilla, Pacific Torpedo Fleet, Lieutenant J. G. Church ... 27 672
4. Torpedo Flotilla, attached to Third Squadron, Pacific Fleet, Lieutenant H. H. Michael ... 23 863

The divisions below of the Atlantic Torpedo Fleet did not fire any guns, but the standing below is the torpedo standing only:—

1. Third Division, Lieutenant J. O. Richardson ... 37 026
2. Second Division, Lieutenant W. G. Mitchell ... 21 839
3. First Division, Lieut.-Commander F. N. Freeman ... 19 224

## Vessels Competing for the Battleship Pennant.

The Vermont again won the pennant, and the Tennessee and Maryland were star ships, standing respectively 2 and 3. Star ships are those vessels attaining 85 per cent. of the final merit of pennant winners in their respective classes.

## United States.

*Vessels Competing for the Cruiser Pennant.*

1. Albany, pennant winner 55-039	5. Chattanooga .....	25107
2. Charleston .....	6. Cleveland .....	24896
3. Salem .....	7. Denver .....	24163
4. Galveston .....	8. Birmingham .....	12002

NOTE.—In 1908 the Albany won the cruiser trophy, and in 1909 the Charleston won this trophy.

*Vessels Competing for the Gunboat Trophy.*

1. Dixie, pennant winner ... 60-833	5. Callao .....	29902
2. Prairie, star ship .....	6. Villalobos .....	29180
3. Wilmington .....	7. Helena .....	18294
4. Yankton .....		44144

NOTE.—In 1908 the Wilmington won the trophy and battle pennant, and in 1909 she won the trophy again.

*Vessels Competing for the Torpedo Pennant.*

1. Perry, pennant winner ... 48-849	8. Truxtun .....	26377
2. Goldsborough, star ship... 46-464	9. Lawrence .....	25421
3. Paul Jones, star ship ... 46-617	10. Preble .....	20987
4. Chauncey .....	11. Barry .....	20642
5. Hull .....	12. Bainbridge .....	16623
6. Whipple .....	13. Hopkins .....	5116
7. Dale .....		27393

NOTE.—In 1906 and in 1908 the Perry won the trophy.—Army and Navy Journal.

## MILITARY NOTES.

## THE KING.

By a Special Army Order of the 1st July, 1910, the new appointment of Aide-de-Camp General to the King has been created. The number is limited to four General Officers on the Active List, who will hold the appointment for four years, subject to eligibility to extension, but will vacate it on retirement. The holders of these appointments will not be entitled to pay. Retired General Officers will be eligible for the appointment of extra Aide-de-Camp General.

The King has approved of the undermentioned appointments :

*To be Aide-de-Camp General to His Majesty:—*

General Sir W. G. Nicholson, G.C.B.  
 Lieut.-General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien, K.C.B., D.S.O.  
 Lieut.-General Sir A. H. Paget, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.  
 Major-General J. S. Ewart, C.B.



*Inspection of the Aldershot Command.*—His Majesty spent the week from Monday, the 11th ult., to Saturday, the 16th, at Aldershot, during which he watched the troops performing the ordinary duties incident to brigade training and visited the various camps, military hospitals, etc. Accompanied by the Queen, His Majesty, who wore the undress uniform of a Field Marshal, drove from London by motor-car, arriving at the Royal Pavilion at Aldershot a little after four on the afternoon of the 11th; here they were received by the Duke and Duchess of Connaught and Lieut.-General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien, Commanding the Aldershot District, with his staff. An hour after his arrival the King mounted and, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, rode to Rushmoor, where he inspected the camp of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General F. Hammersley, C.B. The Brigade is composed of the 1st East Yorkshire, 1st Worcestershire, 1st West Kent and 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, and the camp of each battalion was visited by the King in turn, after which he inspected the Army balloon factory.

On the next forenoon the King, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and the Headquarter Staff of the Aldershot Command, witnessed field operations in which the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades were pitted against each other. The Queen, with whom was the Duchess of Connaught, motored over to the scene of operations and without alighting saw the movements of the troops from various vantage points. In the afternoon their Majesties motored to the East Cavalry Barracks, and visited "C" Squadron stables of the 19th Queen Alexandra's Own Royal Hussars, where a party of the regiment were on parade, dismounted for inspection. The Cavalry Club was next visited, then the recreation establishment of the 3rd Prince of Wales' Dragoon Guards and the Sergeants' Mess of the Royal Horse and Field Artillery at Waterloo Barracks, after which one of the new Q.F. 5-inch howitzers was shown. Proceeding next to the Maida Barracks, their Majesties watched a squad of men of the 1st Gordon Highlanders at physical drill in the gymnasium, after which a visit was paid to the swimming bath where they witnessed a water polo contest between teams representing companies of the Gordons, followed by an exhibition of diving by men of the regiment.

On the Wednesday forenoon His Majesty, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and his staff continued his tour of inspection, passing through the Wellington Lines, where the 1st Battalion (Princess Victoria's) Royal Irish Fusiliers are quartered in the Salamanca Barracks. The battalion was in line under arms with fixed bayonets, and the King rode slowly round the troops, passing on then to the Corunna Barracks, where he next inspected the 4th Battalion the Royal Fusiliers, City of London Regiment, which was drawn up on parade. His Majesty then rode over to the Ash ranges, where he witnessed the 5th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General C. R. Simpson, engaged in field firing. The Queen, accompanied by the Duchess of Connaught, also motored out to the ranges and witnessed the practice. On returning from the field firing, their Majesties visited the Army Service Corps lines and the Model School, and then visited the Cambridge Hospital. In the afternoon they drove over to the Staff College at Camberley, and afterwards visited the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, where the cadets were inspected.

## United States.

*Vessels Competing for the Cruiser Pennant.*

1. Albany, pennant winner 55-039	5. Chattanooga 25-107
2. Charleston 33-883	6. Cleveland 24-896
3. Salem 29-558	7. Denver 24-163
4. Galveston 26-442	8. Birmingham 12-002

NOTE.—In 1908 the Albany won the cruiser trophy, and in 1909 the Charleston won this trophy.

*Vessels Competing for the Gunboat Trophy.*

1. Dixie, pennant winner 60-833	5. Callao 29-902
2. Prairie, star ship 52-850	6. Villalobos 29-180
3. Wilmington 50-915	7. Helena 18-294
4. Yankton 44-144	

NOTE.—In 1908 the Wilmington won the trophy and battle pennant, and in 1909 she won the trophy again.

*Vessels Competing for the Torpedo Pennant.*

1. Perry, pennant winner 48-849	8. Truxtun 26-377
2. Goldsborough, star ship 46-464	9. Lawrence 25-421
3. Paul Jones, star ship 46-617	10. Preble 20-987
4. Chauncey 30-793	11. Barry 20-642
5. Hull 28-503	12. Bainbridge 16-623
6. Whipple 28-136	13. Hopkins 5-116
7. Dale 27-393	

NOTE.—In 1906 and in 1908 the Perry won the trophy.—*Army and Navy Journal*.

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Major-General J. S. Ewart, C.B.

*Inspection of the Aldershot Command.*—His Majesty spent the week from Monday, the 11th ult., to Saturday, the 16th, at Aldershot, during which he watched the troops performing the ordinary duties incident to brigade training and visited the various camps, military hospitals, etc. Accompanied by the Queen, His Majesty, who wore the undress uniform of a Field Marshal, drove from London by motor-car, arriving at the Royal Pavilion at Aldershot a little after four on the afternoon of the 11th; here they were received by the Duke and Duchess of Connaught and Lieut.-General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien, Commanding the Aldershot District, with his staff. An hour after his arrival the King mounted and, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught and Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, rode to Rushmoor, where he inspected the camp of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, commanded by Major-General F. Hammersley, C.B. The Brigade is composed of the 1st East Yorkshire, 1st Worcestershire, 1st West Kent and 3rd Battalion Rifle Brigade, and the camp of each battalion was visited by the King in turn, after which he inspected the Army balloon factory.

On the next forenoon the King, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and the Headquarter Staff of the Aldershot Command, witnessed field operations in which the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Brigades were pitted against each other. The Queen, with whom was the Duchess of Connaught, motored over to the scene of operations and without alighting saw the movements of the troops from various vantage points. In the afternoon their Majesties motored to the East Cavalry Barracks, and visited "C" Squadron stables of the 19th Queen Alexandra's Own Royal Hussars, where a party of the regiment were on parade, dismounted for inspection. The Cavalry Club was next visited, then the recreation establishment of the 3rd Prince of Wales' Dragoon Guards and the Sergeants' Mess of the Royal Horse and Field Artillery at Waterloo Barracks, after which one of the new Q.F. 5-inch howitzers was shown. Proceeding next to the Maida Barracks, their Majesties watched a squad of men of the 1st Gordon Highlanders at physical drill in the gymnasium, after which a visit was paid to the swimming bath where they witnessed a water polo contest between teams representing companies of the Gordons, followed by an exhibition of diving by men of the regiment.

On the Wednesday forenoon His Majesty, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and his staff continued his tour of inspection, passing through the Wellington Lines, where the 1st Battalion (Princess Victoria's) Royal Irish Fusiliers are quartered in the Salamanca Barracks. The battalion was in line under arms with fixed bayonets, and the King rode slowly round the troops, passing on then to the Corunna Barracks, where he next inspected the 4th Battalion the Royal Fusiliers, City of London Regiment, which was drawn up on parade. His Majesty then rode over to the Ash ranges, where he witnessed the 5th Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General C. R. Simpson, engaged in field firing. The Queen, accompanied by the Duchess of Connaught, also motored out to the ranges and witnessed the practice. On returning from the field firing, their Majesties visited the Army Service Corps lines and the Model School, and then visited the Cambridge Hospital. In the afternoon they drove over to the Staff College at Camberley, and afterwards visited the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, where the cadets were inspected.

On Thursday forenoon, the King and Queen witnessed the Cavalry and Artillery exercising in the Long Valley. The troops engaged were the 7th and 19th Hussars and the 3rd (Prince of Wales's) Dragoon Guards, with the 8th Brigade Royal Artillery, consisting of the A., M., and Q Batteries, R.H.A. On their return to the Royal Pavilion, their Majesties inspected three hundred Boy Scouts, who had with them the gun won in open competition by the Marlborough Lines troop—all the lads in which are the sons of soldiers—at the Crystal Palace last year. The Queen, accompanied by the Duchess of Connaught, also visited the Louise Margaret Hospital, an institution for the wives of soldiers and their children, where she spent an hour. The hospital was opened by the Duchess of Connaught, and named after her, during the Duke of Connaught's term of command at Aldershot. In the afternoon their Majesties and the Duke and Duchess of Connaught motored over to Weaver Down, near Longmoor Camp, where the 1st Infantry Brigade was engaged in an attack on a marked position. An excellent view of the operations was had from the Holly Hills, up the steep sides of which a roadway had been cleared for the Queen's motor-car. The King mounted his charger and rode through the troops as they lay under cover of Woolmer Forest waiting for the order to advance. The attacking force consisted of the 1st Scots Guards, the 1st Irish Guards, the 1st Cameron Highlanders, and the 122nd Battery R.F.A., with the 1st Battalion Norfolk Regiment in reserve. The troops, covering a line about a mile in length, crept gradually up the base of the hills, finally carrying the position.

Friday forenoon their Majesties witnessed field operations by the 6th Infantry Brigade, near Broxhead Common, before doing so, however, they found time to inspect many of the lines and institutions of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in Bordon Camp. In the afternoon their Majesties inspected the Marlborough Lines and then the Royal Engineers, under the command of Colonel Cowie, and next watched for a short time the Royal Army Medical Corps sports, which were being held on the Army Athletic Grounds. The new limbered field-kitchen was next carefully examined, after which His Majesty inspected the 28th Brigade, R.F.A., finishing his day's work by inspecting the Irish Guards.

Saturday forenoon their Majesties visited the School of Cookery and the field kitchens; returning to the Salamanca Barracks, the First Fusiliers were next inspected, after which a visit was made to the Field Stores Depôt and the Army Veterinary Schools, and finally to the Connaught Hospital. In the afternoon their Majesties returned to London, but before leaving His Majesty caused his appreciation of what he had seen at Aldershot to be communicated to the troops. His message, embodied in a special order issued by Sir H Smith-Dorrien, was as follows:

"The King is glad to have had the opportunity of visiting Aldershot and seeing the daily life and work of the troops in the command, especially at the present advanced stage of the annual course of collective training. His Majesty was struck by the physical fitness of all ranks, and by the evident zeal and keenness to reach the necessary high standard of war efficiency. The King wishes to express his satisfaction with all he has seen, both in the field and in barracks."

**Home.** The following are the principal appointments which have been made:

**Major-Generals**—H. Cook, C.B., to be Colonel of the Dorsetshire Regiment; W. P. Pulteney, C.B., to Command 6th Division (Irish Command). **Colonels**—Neil D. Findlay, C.B., to Command Royal Artillery, 1st Division (Aldershot Command), with temporary rank as Brigadier-General; H. M. C. Heath, C.B., to Command 11th Infantry Brigade, 4th Division (Eastern Command), with temporary rank as Brigadier-General; E. J. Cooper, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., to Command the Troops in North China, with temporary rank as Brigadier-General; the Hon. O. V. G. A. Lumley to have charge of Cavalry Records, York District; F. R. F. Boileau to be General Staff Officer 1st Grade, 3rd Division (Southern Command); F. F. Hill, D.S.O., to Command No. 11 District (Irish Command); F. L. Banon to be an Assistant Adjutant-General at the War Office; E. H. Armitage to have charge of Royal Horse and Royal Field Artillery Records; C. G. Henshaw to be an Assistant-Director at the War Office.

**Territorial Force.**—Colonels—H. H. Couchman, D.S.O., to Command South Western Brigade (Wessex Division); R. C. B. Lawrence, C.B., to Command 1st South Midland Mounted Brigade (Southern Command).

**Indian Army**—Colonel—R. Wapshare to be Commandant Indian Cavalry School with temporary rank as Brigadier-General.

**Reorganisation of the Ballooning Troops.**—The Aerostation **France.** troops comprise, at the present time, one battalion of 4 companies attached to the 1st Regiment of Engineers at Versailles and two companies created last December which are attached to the 20th and 6th Battalions stationed at Toul and Verdun.

With the view to the duties of these special troops being properly carried out, a Decree of 5th April of the present year places them as regards instruction, mobilisation, promotion and discipline, under the authority of the Colonel or Lieut.-Colonel of the special Engineer Staff who may be in command of the regiment.

Similarly the two balloon companies of Toul and Verdun are grouped under the command of a Major of the special Engineer Staff under the orders of the Colonel or Lieut.-Colonel before mentioned.

As far as regards administration, the ballooning units continue to be subject to the Colonel and Administrative Council of their regiment.

**Instruction of Staff Officers as Observers in Balloons.**—Staff officers or regimental officers with staff certificates, told off at their own request to perform the duties of observers in balloons, will go through a probationary course of six weeks with the balloon battalion at Versailles, during which they will make ascents in spherical balloons in order to obtain the certificate of military aeronaut.

Those officers who obtain their certificate will then undergo a second term of training for one month, during which they will be exercised in making observations in a dirigible balloon.

Finally, after the autumn manoeuvres these officers will undergo at Army Headquarters a week's military instruction in all matters connected with the service of observation.



## France

*Courses of Instruction in Field Works for Infantry Officers.*—Up to 1906 infantry regiments detached, in turn, every three years, a captain, or, failing one, a lieutenant to go through a course of field engineering organised for four weeks every year in each of the six regiments of Engineers.

In 1906, a Ministerial Circular abolished these courses and laid down that each infantry regiment should send annually a lieutenant to go through a six weeks' course in one of the Engineer regiments.

Last January, however, the courses of field engineering were re-established as they were before 1906. They will be organised every two years, in place of every three, in the different Engineer regiments, and will last for three weeks. Every infantry regiment will send a lieutenant to attend the course. The programme of instruction includes a series of practical lectures on field fortification, the crossing of water courses and on explosives, accompanied by practical work in the same subjects.

*Subsidies for Freight Automobiles.*—The Army Estimates for 1910 provide a first credit of £12,000 for distribution as subsidies to the owners of freight automobiles complying with certain conditions which are laid down.

These premiums, which include one of right of purchase—P.A.—and one for maintenance—P.E.—that may be allotted during each of the three years which follow the grant of the purchase subsidy, have been fixed at the following rates by a Ministerial Decree of the 22nd April last:—

1. *Freight Wagons.*—For a minimum load of 2 tons, £80 P.A.; £40 P.E., with increases respectively of £6 and £2 for each 4 cwt. 103 lbs. of load in excess.

2. *Freight Tractor Wagons:*—

- (a) For a minimum load of 2 tons carried on the tractor, £80 P.A., £40 P.E., with the same additional allowances as above.
- (b) For a minimum total weight drawn by a tractor of 4 tons 7 cwt., £40 P.A.; £20 P.E., with additional allowances of £4 and of £2 for each 9 cwt. 94 lbs. of load in excess.

3. *Trains.*—For a minimum total useful weight of 7 tons 17 cwt., £240 P.A.; £120 P.E., with additional allowances respectively of £8 and £4 per 9 cwt. 94 lbs. of load in excess.

The subsidised vehicles may neither be sold nor employed out of France during the four years following on allotment of the purchase premium. Models for which the constructors are anxious to obtain a certificate of fitness for subsidies are submitted to the examination of a Commission consisting of one of the Assist-Heads of the General Staff (President), an officer, a mine engineer, and a representative of the automobile industry, this latter in a consultative capacity.

Among the endurance tests which the vehicles submitted must satisfy is a 25 days' run, with daily stages of at least 62 miles.

Vehicles conforming to one of the types which have been accepted as suitable are submitted by their owners, in view of receiving a subsidy, to a local committee, composed of three officers and a representative of the

**France.**

service of mines, who, after a minute inspection of the automobile, subject it to a day's test run, the minimum length of which must be at least 62 miles. The same test is imposed each year for the maintenance subsidy.

In Germany it is also recognised that requisitioning can alone furnish the number of heavy freight automobiles which will be necessary at the time of mobilisation. The subsidies that the military authorities in that country allotted to the owners of vehicles was no less than £46,950 in 1908, and £50,000 in 1909.—*Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires.*

**Mounted Scouts.**—It is now practically settled that in time of war each French infantry regiment will have a group of mounted scouts on the Russian system. They are to carry a carbine, but no sword, and the under-officers will have a revolver. This decision is criticised, and it is pointed out that arming these men as infantry proved a mistake during the Russo-Japanese war, when their patrols necessarily had to fall back as soon as they came in contact with even smaller bodies of cavalry. In practice the Russians gave their mounted infantry scouts swords, and even lances, and although they do not exist in peace it is now recognised that they must have the cavalry arm in future in order to have some means of self-defence without dismounting. The same view is held in the French Army.—*Army and Navy Journal.*

**Organisation of Machine Gun Sections.**—After long and numerous trials, Italy has finally adopted the organisation of machine gun sections, each section to consist of two Maxim guns, carried on pack animals.

The 26 Alpine battalions, the infantry or Bersaglieri regiments and cavalry regiments are each to be provided with a two-gun section, attached for administrative purposes to a company or squadron, but depending directly on the commander of the regiment (or battalion) in all matters concerning instruction and employment. According to reports in the Italian Press, nearly sixty of these units were constituted during the summer of last year in the Alpine battalions, the Bersaglieri regiments and the infantry and cavalry regiments which took part in the autumn manoeuvres of the Vth and VIth Army Corps in Venetia.

1. **Composition of the Infantry Machine Gun Section.**—The section will be commanded by a lieutenant assisted by a non-commissioned officer and a bugler. It is divided into two parts: the working section and the reserve, the working section in its turn being sub-divided into the firing section and the ammunition echelon.

- (a) **The Firing Section:** 2 non-commissioned officers (captains of guns), 6 gunners, 4 drivers, 4 mules (2 for guns, 2 for ammunition);
- (b) **The Ammunition Echelon:** 1 corporal in charge of the echelon, 6 drivers, 6 mules (with ammunition);
- (c) **Reserve:** 1 corporal in charge, 4 drivers, 2 mules (spare), 1 two-mule ammunition wagon, 1 two-mule provision and baggage wagon;

Total, 26 men and 16 mules.

**Italy.**

The firing section and section commanders are alone constituted in time of peace.

For armament, the drivers are supplied with carbines, and the gunners with revolvers.

As regards tools, the section is supplied with a set, carried partly by the men and partly on the mules.

The ammunition supply consists of a total of 30,000 rounds, of which 6,000 are with the firing section, 18,000 with the ammunition *échelon* and 6,000 with the reserve.

The following data regarding the *matériel* are available: weight of the gun, 66 lbs.; weight of tripod, 44 lbs.; weight carried by gun mule, 2 cwt. 40 lbs.; weight carried by ammunition mule, 2 cwt. 106 lbs. (3,000 rounds); rapidity of fire, 450 shots per minute; width of sweep of fire 400 millèmes.

2. *Mountain Section.*—The machine gun units attached to the troops intended to operate in mountainous regions have a slightly different organisation to that given above.

The ammunition *échelon* is provided with 8 mules, which carry 24,000 rounds.

In the reserve the ammunition wagon is a cart of the Alpine type, drawn by 2 mules, which carries 8,000 rounds, while the provision and baggage wagon is replaced by 4 mules. The mountain section is thus supplied with 38,000 rounds.

3. *Cavalry Machine Gun Section.*—The organisation is very similar to the horsed machine gun section of the Swiss Army; guns and ammunition are carried by *bât* horses led by troopers, so that the section can follow the cavalry at any speed. With this end in view, the weight carried by the *bât* horses has been reduced to about 1 cwt. 86 lbs. Each *bât* horse only carries six cartridge belts—that is, 1,500 rounds.

The composition and sub-division of the section are the same as in the infantry. The section is commanded by a lieutenant, assisted by a non-commissioned officer, a trumpeter, and an orderly.

The *Firing Section* is composed of 2 non-commissioned officers or corporal-majors (captains of guns), 12 troopers (6 gunners and six drivers), 20 horses (14 saddle and 6 *bât*).

*Ammunition Echelon:* 1 corporal in charge of *échelon*, 4 drivers, 9 horses (5 saddle and 4 *bât*).

The *Reserve* is composed of 1 corporal in charge, 1 ammunition wagon, 1 provision and baggage wagon, 1 led *bât* horse.

The total effective is, therefore, 26 men and 40 horses.

The *Firing Section* is alone constituted in time of peace. All the *personnel* are armed with sabre and revolver.

The *Ammunition* is divided equally between the three *échelons*—6,000 rounds to each, 18,000 rounds in all.

4. *Tactical Employment of Machine Guns.*—A provisional regulation for machine gun sections appeared at the end of last year, regulating

**Italy.**

the instruction, working and tactical employment of these units. The principles do not differ materially from the French regulations for machine gun units. The section is considered first and foremost as a reserve fire at the disposal of the commander of the regiment, to be employed above all against living objects in full view, especially at the critical moments of the battle.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères.*

*The Two Years' Service.*—Last June General Spingardi, the Minister of War, undertook to lay before the Chambers a new Law establishing two years' service. Budgetary exigencies, however, compelled him to bring the law into effective being before it was voted.

In effect the new Law provided a budgetary effective for 1909-1910 (1st July, 1909, to 30th June, 1910) of 225,000 men.

The permanent effective consists already of 38,000 men. The new recruiting Law of 15th December, 1907, while, on the one hand, doing away with a certain amount of expenditure, has, on the other, caused a sensible increase in the numbers of the contingents. The class called up in 1908 (class 1888) has thus given 120,000 men of the 1st category and 20,000 of the 2nd, these last being called up for three months only. This class has alone absorbed 120,000 +  $\frac{20,000 + 3}{12}$  that is (120,000 + 5,000) 125,000 days' pay which, added to the 38,000 days' pay of the permanent contingent (making a total of 163,000), has only left 20,000 days' pay (225,000 — 163,000) to be divided between the oldest class (1887), and the class to be summoned to the Colours (1889) at the end of 1909. In these circumstances it is clear that it would not be possible, without exceeding the credits allowed by the Budget, to call out the "1889" class if at the same time the "1887" class is also to be kept under arms.

The Minister of War has therefore decided, acting under the provisions of the Law of 21st March, 1907, to send to their homes the whole of the contingent of the class "1887," which had completed their second year of military service by the end of last year.

Certain other additional measures have also been taken. The calling out of the "1889" class was postponed until the 15th November, instead of taking place on the 15th October, the date in 1908 on which the "1888" class were summoned.

In the Cavalry and Horse Artillery half only of the men allotted to these arms were incorporated in November, the remainder being left at their homes, on provisional leave, to be called out definitely during the spring of the present year. If this measure becomes permanent during the new Two-Years Law, the Cavalry will have the advantage of always having, out of the contingent of the two classes incorporated, three-fourths of its effective strength immediately available for mobilisation. On the other hand, under the new conditions there will be considerable difficulty to be overcome if the necessary instruction to be given to the Cavalry and Horse Artillery units is to be efficiently carried out.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Étrangères.*

**The Netherlands.** *The Army Estimates for 1910 (Home Army).*—The Estimates amount to 28,687,096 florins (£2,386,424), for an effective total strength of:—

	<i>Officers.</i>	<i>Men.</i>
Active Army	1,912	22,476
Reserve	569	95,077
Reserve Cadre	—	914
Landweer	371	42,435

Total ————— 2,852 160,902

Compared with the Estimates for 1909 there is an increase of 1,419,239 florins (£118,270); the principal causes being the increase in the pay of the subaltern cadres, the calling out of the *Landweer* in 1901,<sup>1</sup> construction of new barracks at Venloo, etc.

It is to be noted that the War Department only pays two-thirds of the Budget of the Gendarmery. The Budget for the Department of Justice is charged for 1910 with 720,367 florins (£60,030) for the maintenance of this arm.

The Budget provides for the creation of two more cyclist companies (two having been already formed last year, at Bréda (6th Regiment) and at Assen (1st Regiment), and for two mounted detachments of machine guns intended for the 1st and 2nd Divisions.

*The Estimates for the Dutch Indies for 1910.*—The Budget provides for a total expenditure of 34,588,678 florins (£2,882,390), showing an increase over 1909 of 697,811 florins (£58,151), for an effective total of 36,695 officers and men, of whom 13,472 are Europeans.

The Budget for the East Indies includes two kinds of quite distinct expenditure, viz.: expenditure incurred in Holland and that incurred in the Indies.

The expenses in Holland amount to 6,630,889 florins (£552,574), an increase of 192,923 florins (£16,077), arising for the most part for the construction of barracks and of a hospital at Nimèguen for the Colonial Reserve.

The expenses in the Indies amount to 27,957,789 florins (£2,329,815), an increase of 504,888 florins (£42,074), due principally to the extension of the topographical service, to new constructions, and to an increase in the pay of lieutenants.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.*

*Manœuvres.*—There will be no grand manœuvres this year, but the following will take place:—

1. *Cavalry Manœuvres.*—Towards the middle of September Cavalry manœuvres will take place in North-East Brabant. Four regiments of Hussars (16 squadrons), four cyclist companies, the 2nd Machine Gun Groups, and two Horse Artillery batteries, will take part in them.

<sup>1</sup>The *Landweer* is only called out in those years when no grand manœuvres take place. Four classes have been called out this year, from the 8th to the 19th (1905, 1906, 1908, 1909), for six days in March, April, and May.



**Netherlands.**

2. *Fortress Manœuvres*.—From the 16th to the 27th August fortress manœuvres will be carried out along the "new water line." The defending force will include the garrisons, which will be placed on a war footing, of the works of Waalsche Weltering, Korte Uitweg, Honswijk, Spoel, Everdingen, and of the Water Lunette "Aan de Snel," that is five battalions, one cyclist company, two field batteries, two machine gun sections, and a howitzer battery.

The attacking force will be comprised of five battalions, a *peloton* of Hussars, three field batteries, two machine gun sections, and a group of Fortress Artillery.

Detachments of bridging companies, pioneers, with a telegraph and a telephone brigade, will be attached to each force.

From the 22nd to the 27th August three companies of *Landweer* Fortress Artillery will take part in the manœuvres.

*Reconnaissances*.—In addition, during the summer reconnaissance cruises will take place in the canals, rivers, the Amsterdam lake positions and the "new water line" by means of coast defence vessels and decked boats armed with 60 mm. quick-firing guns.

For the manœuvres will be called out also the classes of 1903 and 1904 from the 12th to the 22nd September, and the "1909" class from the 16th August to the 20th September. The men of the "spring levy" and those of the active Army, doing four months' training, will also take part.

It is intended during the manœuvres for the first time to make use of mobile wireless telegraphy posts. In view of this two non-commissioned officers and a certain number of corporals of Engineers have been going through a course of special instruction at the wireless telegraphy station at Scheveningen.

*Calling Out of the Landweer*.—This year in all the branches of the *Landweer* (48 battalions of Infantry, 44 companies of Fortress Artillery, five companies of Engineers, and two bridging companies), four classes (those of 1905, 1906, 1908, and 1909) will be called out for six days. The effective strength will be about 30,000 men of from 30 to 35 years of age.

The active Army will lend from its cadres both officers and non-commissioned officers to make up any shortage in the *Landweer*. Each company is to have one captain, two lieutenants, one sergeant-major in structor and a sergeant for 30 men.—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères*.

*Hiring of Horses for Artillery Exercises*.—The military authorities have, by way of trial, called on private owners for the hire of 50 draught horses, which will be placed at the disposal of the Field Artillery during the annual training which batteries and groups of batteries carry out for three weeks at the camp of Oldebroek.

The horses, which will be fed and stabled at the expense of the State, must be from five to 15 years' old. They will be valued by two civilian experts on the days of their arrival and departure. The owners will receive a sum of 2s. 6d. for each day of hiring.—*Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires*.

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## MILITARY NOTES.

## Netherlands.

*Distribution of the 1910 Contingent.*—The 17,000 men of the 1910 contingent (exclusive of the 400 men allotted to the Navy) has been distributed as follows :—

Arms and Services.	For a complete period of training of 8½ months (Foot Troops) or 18 months (Mounted Branches).	For a reduced period of training of 4 months (Foot Troops only).	Total.
Infantry and Hospital Service ...	8,538	4,380	12,918
Cavalry ...	583	—	583
Artillery (Field) ...	1,136	—	1,136
„ (Fortress) ...	990	650	1,640
„ (Armoured Forts) ...	150	—	150
Bridging Train ...	95	—	95
Torpedoists ...	188	—	188
Engineers ...	270	170	440
Total ...	11,900	5,200	17,100

—*Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires.*

*The Amsterdam Fortifications.*—A further sum of £280,000 is still required before the fortified position of Amsterdam is completed. This year only £40,000 is to be expended, so that at this rate seven years will elapse before the work is finished. Although the progress is somewhat slow, the position is already sufficiently strong to offer a stubborn defence, and the work of construction is arranged to keep this end in view. The Minister of War holds the opinion that the improvement of the coast defences is the most important object, and must be first carried through, and all experts agree with him, as the greatest danger is that which menaces from the side of the sea.—*Revue Militaire Suisse.*

*The Manœuvres of the 2nd Army Corps.*—The forthcoming Autumn Manœuvres of the II. Army Corps will take place in Switzerland. Bernese Jura between the 29th August (for the Artillery from the 26th) and the 10th September.

In addition to the Staffs and the II. Corps there will also take part in the manœuvres, the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the 4th Regiment of Cavalry and the Balloon Company.

A Cavalry Division will be constituted under the command of Colonel Lenz. It will be composed of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, with the 1st Mounted Machine-Gun Company; the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with the 2nd Mounted Machine-Gun Company, and the 4th Cavalry Regiment.

The first week will be principally devoted to daily marches of 18½ miles; the foot troops and the artillery will effect a crossing of the Jura where there are no roads.

The artillery will commence its firing practice on the 29th August.

**Switzerland.**

A day's rest will be granted to the troops on Sunday, the 4th September, and on the evening of this day the manœuvres proper will commence. The general theme of the manœuvres has been drawn up by Colonel Will, the Commander of the II. Army Corps, and is as follows:—A division from the West has reached Swiss territory by the Besançon-Maiche route as far as Saignelégier; the offensive movement of this division is protected by a flank column which operates from Montbéliard towards Porrentruy. An army assembled on the Aar moves a division from the East on Saignelégier, by way of Bienne-Tramalan, which is charged with the duty of driving back the enemy's division. A Cavalry Division covers the right flank of the division.

On the morning of the 9th the troops will regain their points of assembly and will then be de-mobilised.

*The Fortifications.*—In the session of last April the Federal Assembly voted, without any modification, the credits demanded by the Federal Council in its message of the 11th March, 1910, relative to putting the fortifications into a proper state of defence. This message laid before the Chambers and the country the views held by the Swiss Military Department on this important question, which for some years past has excited the most lively discussion in the press. It gives the reasons which led to the adoption, starting from 1870, of the system of barrier forts (*forts d'arrêt*) in the mountains, in preference to the proposals for entrenched camps on the Swiss plateau, and once more opposes the suggestions in favour of that solution which has already been rejected. This latter, in effect, would tend to bring into favour defensive tactics and "such a method of carrying on the war," says the message, "in a manner which accords neither with nature, nor with the history of our people and our army, and still less with the spirit in which the instruction of our officers is carried out to-day."

After having shown that, from 1886 to 1910, the amounts devoted to the fortifications represents only 6.2 per cent. of the military expenditure of the Confederation, the message points out the necessity of maintaining the existing fortifications in such a condition as will enable them to resist the latest methods of attack. The evolution of fortification, like other branches of military science, still continues. Moreover, its influence upon the discipline and instruction of the Army is not a *quantité négligeable*; so that the money which has been expended on it has not been wasted.

In conclusion, the Federal Council demands a credit of £220,000 in order to carry out the following works:—

"The bringing up-to-date and completion of certain old works, which include the providing of some redoubts at Bellinzona and the completion of a flanking gallery at Saint Maurice.

"Completion of close defence works (*défence rapprochée*) and cover against assault, including the provision of machine-guns and searchlights.

"Completion of quarters and magazines.

"Construction of railways and means of communication."

The round sum of £220,000 is thus divided:—

For the Saint-Gothard ... ..	£192,000
For Saint Maurice ... ..	£28,000

—*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.*

**Switzerland.**

*The Report of the Military Department for 1909: Recruiting and Strength of the Army.*—The renewal of recruiting for the Infantry on a considerable scale, which began in 1907, continued in 1909, without, however, reaching the numbers of the preceding year. The number of recruits in 1906 was 10,433, which was the lowest on record; in 1907 the number was increased to 12,655; in 1908, to 14,065; and in 1909 the number was 13,598. The total number of recruits was 20,055 out of 31,428 examined, a percentage of 63·8; the preceding year the total was 20,057 out of 32,774 examined, a percentage of 61·2. The conditions of recruiting have been made less severe, which is explained, among other causes, by the proposed reorganisation of the Army, which will allow of the employment of a class of recruit less fit for marching than the picked soldiers in general, but still capable of rendering useful service in other ways.

In the special arms there has been an increase of recruiting for the horse batteries, without doubt in view of the future groups of howitzers, which are to be formed, and in the Engineers, whose numbers are also to be increased. The Army, however, is still behind in the matter of troops of communication, which presumably will not be overlooked in the coming reorganisation.

*Effective Strength.*—The strength of the Army on the 1st January was as follows:—

	Men
Staffs of the Army and Army units ... ..	1672
Active Army: Infantry .. .. .	95,570
Cavalry .. .. .	5,242
Artillery .. .. .	15,368
Engineers .. .. .	5,681
Fortress .. .. .	3,416
Medical Service .. .. .	5,597
Veterinary .. .. .	520
Commissariat .. .. .	1,836
Train .. .. .	5,180
Auxiliary Services .. .. .	810
	<hr/> 140,664
Landwehr: Infantry .. .. .	49,584
Cavalry .. .. .	4,063
Artillery .. .. .	5,484
Engineers .. .. .	2,404
Fortress .. .. .	900
Medical Service .. .. .	2,249
Veterinary .. .. .	298
Commissariat .. .. .	562
Train .. .. .	843
Auxiliary Services .. .. .	34
	<hr/> 68,543
Landsturm: Infantry .. .. .	52,621
Cavalry .. .. .	1,103
Artillery (Gunnery, Train, &c.) .. .. .	8,299
Engineers .. .. .	2,489
Medical Service .. .. .	1,229
Commissariat .. .. .	447
	<hr/> 66,538
Total of Trained Men .. .. .	<hr/> 277,397

## NAVAL AND MILITARY CALENDAR.

JULY, 1910.

- 11th (Mon.) His Majesty, accompanied by the Queen, arrived at Aldershot on a 5 days' visit of inspection.
- 12th (Tu.) Naval Manœuvres: War declared at midnight.
- 16th (Sat.) King and Queen concluded visit to Aldershot.
- " " 150th Anniversary of the gallant exploit of the 15th Hussars (at that time known as Elliott's Regiment of Light Dragoons) at the battle of Emsdorf, when they pursued the French and forced a body of some 2,500 officers and men to lay down their arms, capturing at the same time 9 pairs of Colours, 6 guns, and all the enemy's arms and baggage.
- 17th (Sat.) Fortieth Anniversary of the Declaration of War between France and Prussia.
- 18th (Mon.) Naval Manœuvres ended.
- 21st (Th.) His Majesty inspected Australian Cadets in the Garden of Marlborough House, and later, accompanied by the Queen, proceeded to Portsmouth and embarked on board Royal Yacht for a visit of inspection of Fleet and Naval Ports.
- " " 50th Anniversary of Garibaldi's defeat of the Neapolitans at Melazzo, Sicily.
- 22nd (Fri.) Launch of the Third Class Cruiser *Blonde* at Pembroke.
- 23rd (Sat.) King and Queen proceeded to Cowes in Royal Yacht.
- " " Centenary of the Battle of the Coa.
- 26th (Tu.) King and Queen left Cowes and arrived at Torbay.
- 27th (Wed.) His Majesty went to sea on board H.M.S. *Dreadnought* with the Fleet for tactical manœuvres.
- " " 200th Anniversary of the defeat of the Spaniards at Almenara by General Stanhope (War of the Spanish Succession.)
- 28th (Th.) His Majesty proceeded to sea on board H.M.S. *Dreadnought* with the Fleet and witnessed battle practice with *Dreadnought's* 12-inch guns.
- 29th (Fri.) His Majesty visited several ships, witnessed Fleet boat-sailing Regatta and returned to town in the afternoon.
- 30th (Sat.) 50th Anniversary of signing of Convention with Garibaldi, by which Neapolitans agreed to evacuate Sicily (retaining the citadel of Messina).

## FOREIGN PERIODICALS.

### NAVAL.

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC.—*Boletín del Centro Naval*. Buenos Aires: May, 1910.—"The Centenary." "Celestial Maps and the Composition of Observation Programmes." "On the Defence of Military Harbours."



"Electrical Laboratory of the Fleet." "An Opinion of Admiral Fournier."

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Mittheilungen aus dem Gebiete des Seewesens*. No. 8. Pola: August, 1910.—"Contributions to the Question of the Practical Ascertaining of the Ship's Resistance and the Degree of Efficiency of the Propellers." "Nitro-Cellulose Powder for Naval Purposes." "The Latest French Battle-ships of the *Jean-Bart* Class." "The Results of the Steam Trials of the Brazilian Battleship *São Paulo*." "The English Naval Estimates for 1910-11." "The Arrangement and Fitting of Reserved Rooms on Board French Warships for the Medical Service." "Time Signals, from the Norddeich Wireless Telegraphy Station."

BRAZIL.—*Revista Marítima Brasileira*. Rio de Janeiro: May, 1910.—"The Battleship *Minas Geraes*." "The New *Riachuelo*." "Report of the Navy." "Modern Destroyers: their Essential Characteristics." "The Brazilian Navy." "The Russian Navy in 1909."

CHILE.—*Revista de Marina*. Valparaiso: April, 1910.—"25th May, 1810-1910." "Four Words on Explosive Projectiles." "Notes on the Calculation of Probabilities." "The Prism Astrolabe." "High Tension Condensers." "Reserve of Guns." "Systematic Preparation for Battle." "School of Cookery."

FRANCE.—*Revue Maritime*. Paris: June, 1910.—"The Compensation of Liquid Compasses." "Notes on Port Etienne and the Bay of Lévrier." "Official History of the Russo-Japanese Naval War" (*continued*). "The Heavy Artillery of the *Dreadnoughts*." "A Naval General Staff."

*La Marine Française*. Paris: July, 1910.—"The German Danger." "Everybody's Opinions: Two Naval Policies." "The Lesson of the *Pluviôse*." "The Conventions of the *Messageries Maritimes*."

*La Vie Maritime*. Paris: 10th July, 1910.—"The Naval Programme." "The Naval Manœuvres." "Corvette-Captains." "Italy's Naval Strength." "The *Pluviôse*." "The French Submersibles." "International Maritime Law (according to the Declaration of London)." "Internal Combustion Motors." 25th July.—"The Internal Economy on Board Ships." "The New Distribution of the Naval Forces." "The Navy and Aviation." "Our Seamen at the Review of the 14th July." "The Commissariat." "A Salvage Dock." "The French Navy in 1870."

*Le Yacht*. Paris: 2nd July, 1910.—"The Administrative Reform of the Navy." "Yachting Notes." "The Salvage of Submarines." "The New Submersible SC. 1." "The Naval Manœuvres." 9th July.—"Our Naval Recruiting." "Yachting Notes." "The German Armoured Cruiser *Von der Tann*." "After the Naval Manœuvres." 16th July.—"Reflections on the Naval Manœuvres: The Second Phase." "Yachting Notes." 23rd July.—"Our Naval Recruiting" (*concluded*). "Yachting Notes." "Corvette-Captains." "The Spanish Navy: The Programme of January, 1908, and its Execution." 30th July.—"Navigation Lights." "Yachting Notes." "The Future Russian Battleships." "The Port of Saint-Nazaire: Important Improvements."

*Le Moniteur de la Flotte.* 2nd July, 1910.—“After the Manœuvres,” “The Estimates for 1911.” “The Borda and Duguay-Trouin.” “The Navy in Parliament.” 9th July.—“Torpedo Mechanics.” “The Navy in Parliament.” “The *Pluviôse.*” 16th July.—“Aviation in the Navy.” “The Navy in Parliament.” 23rd July.—“Aviation in the Navy.” “Apropos of the *Pluviôse.*” “Promotion amongst the Men.” 30th July.—“Aviation in the Navy.” “The Pay of Officers.” “The Personnel of the Wireless Telegraphists.” “The Budget for 1911.”

GERMANY.—*Marine Rundschau.* Berlin: August, 1910.—“The Torpedo-Boat.” “Political Parties in the United States.” “Trafalgar: Over the last Word.” “Piracy and Pirates in History” (concluded). “The Ventilating Fittings of the Gunnery-Ship *Drache*” (concluded). “The French Manœuvres, 1910” (concluded).

ITALY.—*Rivista Marittima.* Rome: July-August, 1910.—“On the Extension of the Territorial Water Limit of our Colonies and our Protectorate with regard to the Traffic in Firearms.” “Modern Heavy-Calibre Artillery.” “Air Craft in Naval War.” “The Ship is the Guardian of the Public Safety.” “The Navy at the VIIth Italian Geographical Congress.”

PORTUGAL.—*Revista Portuguesa, Colonial e Marittima.* Lisbon: April, 1910.—“English Colonisation” (continued). “Considerations on the Administrative Divisions of Angola.” “The Province of Angola” (continued). “The Island of San Thomé and Native Labour.” “Genealogical and Biographical Data of some Fayal Families” (continued).

*Annaes do Club Militar Naval.* Lisbon: May, 1910.—Has not yet been received.

SPAIN.—*Revista General de Marina.* Madrid: July, 1910.—Has not yet been received.

#### MILITARY.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.—*Danzer's Armee-Zeitung.* Vienna: 7th July, 1910.—“People's Heroes.” “Loyalty to Principles in Hungarian Politics.” “Reminiscences.” “Our Officers in Macedonia.” 14th July.—“Blumenau.” “Our Weakness.” “The Russo-Japanese Convention.” “The Position of the Officer in the State and in Society.” “School Suicides.” “The Army Musketry School.” “The Boemches Dirigible Balloon.” “Military Geography.” 28th July.—“Reminiscences of Feldzeugmeister Freiherr von Kuhn.” “Turkey and the Triple Alliance.” “A Sacrifice to the Coloured Coat.” “Field-Marshal Graf von Haeseler.” “An Italian Criticism on the Moral Value of the Italian Army.” “Condition and Duties of the Italian Air Fleet.”

*Streffleur's Militärische Zeitschrift.* Vienna: July, 1910.—“Army Inspector Lieut.-General von Frank.” “The Commanding Generals in Prag from 1621 up to the present time” (continued). “The Investment of Czestochowa in 1809.” “Lessons of the Russo-Japanese War for the

employment of Field Artillery in Field War." "The Technical Troops at Melilla." "Joint Practice Run of the Austrian, German, and Saxon Volunteer Automobile Corps." "Communications from the Army Musketry School: Tactical Maxims on the Employment of Machine-Gun Detachments."

*Kavalleristische Monatshefte.* Vienna: July-August, 1910.—"Mounted Action." "What is the Most Useful Armament of Modern Cavalry?" (continued). "Once More Lance or Sabre." "The German Cavalry in the Close and Battle Scouting on the Morning of the 18th August, 1870." "The Cavalry Corps Dwernicki in the Russo-Polish War of 1831." "The Individual Seat and its Effects on Horse Breaking-In." "Races, Horse-Breeding and Equitation." "Temperament and Character of the Horse." "The History of Horse-Racing." "The International Horse Show at Olympia." "The Royal Hungarian State Studs at Bâbolna and Forgáras." "Remounts in England." "Tactical Problems for the Cavalry Officer."

*BELGIUM.—Bulletin de la Presse et de la Bibliographie Militaires.* Brussels: 15th June, 1910.—"The Grand French Manœuvres of the Bourbonnais in 1909: General Considerations." "The Battle of the Future" (continued). "The Swedish Army" (continued). 30th June.—"The Grand French Manœuvres of the Bourbonnais in 1909: General Considerations (concluded). "The Battle of the Future" (continued).

*FRANCE.—Journal des Sciences Militaires.* Paris: 1st July, 1910.—"Evolution of Infantry Tactics and Progress of Armament" (continued). "The Army School" (continued). "The Automobile and the Army" (continued). "Education and Instruction of the Infantry" (continued). "About the New Decree on the Internal Economy of Regiments" (concluded). 15th July.—"The Communication between Artillery and Infantry." "Officers to Complete to War Footing." "Education and Instruction of the Infantry" (concluded). "The Army School" (continued). "Evolution of Infantry Tactics and Progress of Armament" (continued).

*Revue d'Infanterie.* Paris: June, 1910.—"The New Manœuvre Regulations in the Japanese Army" (concluded). "The Imperial German Manœuvres in 1909" (concluded). "The Japanese in Manchuria" (continued). "The Chaouïa and its Pacification" (continued).

*Revue de Cavalerie.* Paris: June, 1910.—"Evolution of the Ideas on the Rôle and Employment of Cavalry." "Again the Regulations of 1910." "The Regulation of the 25th May, 1910, on the Internal Economy of Regiments." "The Motor Cycle in Conjunction with the Horse." "Acroasa Africa."

*Revue de Artillerie.* Paris: May, 1910.—"Artillery Draught Horses" (concluded). "The Pointed Ball Cartridges in Spain" (continued).

*Revue Militaire Générale.* Paris: June, 1910.—"The Spaniards in Morocco" (concluded). "Solution of Tactical Problems." "Studies of the 18th August, 1870."

*Revue d'Histoire.* Paris: July, 1910.—"The Campaign of 1908-1909 in Chaouïa" (continued). "The Manœuvre of Pultusk" (continued). "The

Campaign of 1813: The Preliminaries." "The War of 1870-1871: The National Defence in the Provinces" (*continued*). "Fragment of the Memoirs of Guy Louis Henri de Valory" (*concluded*). "Unpublished Letters of Napoleon I."

*Revue Militaire des Armées Etrangères.* Paris: July, 1910.—"The Budget of the German Empire for 1910." "The Swedish Army in 1910" (*continued*).

GERMANY.—*Militär-Wochenblatt.* Berlin: 2nd July, 1910.—General von Bernhardt's "Reiter-dienst." "Nauticus for 1910." 5th July.—General von Bernhardt's "Reiter-dienst" (*concluded*). "Military-Technical Review: Aviation in the first half year of 1910." "More about the Russian Army." 7th July.—"The Military Education of the French Youth: The Supply and Training of Reserve Officers in France." "Religious and Social Tendencies in the English Army and Navy." "The Army of the Blue King: The Soldiers of the Elector Max II. Emanuel of Bavaria, 1682-1676." 9th July.—"Health Reports." "The Military Education of the French Youth: The Supply and Training of Reserve Officers in France" (*concluded*). "The Acceptance of Two Years' Service in Italy." "The Latest Advance of the French Expeditionary Corps from Casablanca." 12th July.—"Practice in Night Attacks." "More Observations on the Organisation of the German Cavalry." "The Reorganisation of the Belgian Artillery." "Tacto-Kinetics." 14th July.—"The 50th Year Jubilee of General von Bock u. Polach." "The Battle at Tannenberg on 15th July, 1410." "Struggle of the Teutonic Order against Poland." "Practice in Night Attacks" (*concluded*). 16th July.—"The General Staff's Work on the Seven Years' War." "Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' and General Sir John French's opposite views on Cavalry." "An old Weapon of War and its New Use." 19th July.—"Queen Luise of Prussia: In Remembrance of the Day of her Death, 19th July, 1910." "The General Staff's Work on the Seven Years' War" (*concluded*). "Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' and General Sir John French's opposite views on Cavalry" (*continued*). 21st July.—"Field-Marshal Lord Roberts' and General Sir John French's opposite views on Cavalry" (*concluded*). "A Triumph of Prussian Drill in South America." "The New Army Organisation in Switzerland." 23rd July.—"The Unemployed Regiment von Schöning at the Battle of Preussische-Eylau on 8th February, 1807." "The Front Strength of Cavalry at Manœuvres and in War." "Airships in War." 26th July.—"News from the French Army." "The Unemployed Regiment von Schöning at the Battle of Preussische-Eylau on 8th February, 1807" (*concluded*). "Airships in War" (*concluded*). 27th July.—"The New Russian War Schools." "The Abolition of the 'Kolasi and Cavalry Jübaschi Wehili' Rank in the Turkish Army." 28th July.—"Sham Undertakings and Sham Fights." "The Seizure of Bosmont and the Village of Andelnan before Belfort on the 13th-14th December, 1870." "Training of Youth and Militarism in Italy." 30th July.—"Bonaparte's Conduct of War in the Light of Modern War Philosophy." "Sham Undertakings and Sham Fights" (*concluded*). "The Chinese Soldier."

*Artilleristische Monatshefte.* Berlin: June, 1910.—"The Further Development of Field Artillery." "The Artillery Duel." "An Artillery

Firing Exercise Fifty Years Ago." "The Field Battery with 12 Wagons in Practice." "On the Right Management of Field Artillery." "The Method of High Angle Fire Computation." "On the Fire Angles of Howitzers and Mortars."

*Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine.* July, 1910.—"On the Co-operation of Infantry and Field Artillery." "On Small War." "A New Method of School Shooting." "The Prussian Fighting Position at Belle Alliance." "The Artillery in Naval Battle."

ITALY.—*Rivista di Artiglieria e di Genio.* Rome: April, 1910. "The Calculation of the Resisting Power of Circular Vaulting." "The Use of Field Artillery with Small Detachments." "Special Range Tables for Coast Artillery." "On the Method of Harnessing our Mobilisation Vehicles."

*Revista Militare Italiana.* Rome: 16th June, 1910.—"The Finger on the Ulcer: About Initiative and Co-operation." "Bersaglieri Cyclists or Bersaglieri with Bicycles." "The Military Supply Service in Prussia with regard to the Peace Administration of the Army (continued)." "The Psychology of the Masses in Modern Wars." "The Armies of the European Powers." "Military Character According to the Opinions of Napoleon." "The Jubilee of the One Thousand." "Questions of Discipline and Command (continued)." 

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SPAIN.—*Revista Técnica de Infantería y Caballería.* Madrid: 1st June, 1910.—"Evolution of Military Law among Modern Nations" (continued). "The Infantry in the French Army" (continued). "Infantry Battle Communications." "Machine Gun Sections in the English Army." "The Grand Manœuvres in France and Germany last Autumn." 15th June.—"To Our Subscribers." "Evolution of Military Law among Modern Nations" (continued). "The Infantry in the French Army" (continued). "Machine Gun Sections in the English Army" (continued). "The Grand Manœuvres in France and Germany last Autumn" (continued). 

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*Revista Científico-Militar y Biblioteca Militar.* Barcelona: 10th June, 1910.—"Lessons from the Riff War." "On the Tactics of Field Artillery." "Pay in the Roumanian Army." "Night Fighting and Manœuvres." "Promotions in the Austrian Army." 25th June.—"Lessons from the Riff War" (continued). "The Employment of Field Artillery in Small Columns." "New Literature." "Extension of the Front in Battle." "Aerostation in the German Army." 

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SWITZERLAND.—*Revue Militaire Suisse.* Lausanne: July, 1910.—"The Organisation of the Army" (concluded). "The Co-operation of Infantry and Artillery." "With the Sappers." 

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UNITED STATES.—*Infantry Journal.* Washington: July, 1910.—"The fencelessness of the Pacific Coast." "Professional Reading for Infantry Officers." "The Training of the Personnel Charged with the Service of Information and Communication for Field Artillery." "Cleaning and Caring for the Musket." "Organisation and Equipment of the Army of Northern Virginia in January, 1863." "The Japanese Infantry Drill Regulations." "Looking Forward." "Baggage of Officers in the Field."



*Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association.*—Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : July, 1910.—“The Battle of Kelly’s Ford.” “Watering, Feeding, Grooming, &c.” “The Horse Supply of Russia and their Remount System.” “A Criticism of our Cavalry Drill Regulations.” “How may the Effectiveness of the Enlisted Men be Increased.” “An Instructive Practice March.”

## NOTICES OF BOOKS.

*The American Civil War. A Concise History of its Causes, Progress and Results.* By JOHN FORMBY. With sixty-six maps and plans. London: John Murray, 1910. 520 pp. Price, 18s. net.

“The American Civil War seems at first such a tangle of disconnected details, spread over so vast an extent of country, that the reader soon gets bewildered, and is apt to study one part to the neglect of another. Moreover, the accounts of it are too long for ordinary use. It seems, therefore, that there is room for a short synopsis, from which details of battles, especially, will be carefully eliminated. . . . The war itself proceeded by regular, well-defined steps throughout in the really vital part, between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River, where a successful blow by either side could strike at the heart of the other in a military and practical sense. . . . Attention has been unduly concentrated on the eastern theatre of war on account of the political importance of the capitals, and because the best commanders and armies were there. For tactical study this is correct enough, but by such limitations the real history and general grasp of the war as a whole are apt to be lost sight of, since only secondary notice would be given to the regular stages by which it progressed in the central district, or, as it was then called, in the west.”

Such are the principles on which this history has been framed, and Mr. Formby’s book is a welcomed contribution to the somewhat sparse but valuable literature, such as that of Wood-Edmonds and a few others already published, in connection with the war as a whole.

Nearly the whole of the maps have been “standardized,” being on one or two standard scales or on factors of them, the campaign maps being based on the scale of about 60 miles to an inch, those of battles on a scale of  $\frac{1}{100,000}$ , approximately forty-eight times as large.

*Historical Records of the 76th “Hindoostan” Regiment.* By Lieut.-Colonel F. A. HAYDEN, D.S.O.

There are few regiments in the British Army whose history is not worth the telling, and the 76th “Hindoostan” Regiment is certainly not one of them. The very name “Hindoostan” is almost a history in itself, and must set the least imaginative reader thinking of the great feats of arms

that a hundred years ago did so much towards the creation of the Empire of British India and earned for the 76th this most glorious and picturesque title.

In consequence of the re-organisation of the Army in 1881, the old 76th, it is true, no longer bears that number as its principal name. It is to-day the Second Battalion of the Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment), and cannot but be proud of being thus identified with the only British subject whose title has been conferred on a regiment; but if historical associations counted for a little more with us, the name of Lord Lake would surely be still connected in some way with that of the 76th.

The 76th (Hindoostan) Regiment was raised for service in India in the year 1787, a measure for which we have to thank the wisdom of William Pitt. Two regiments had already borne this number, but had no connection with one another nor with the "Hindoostan" Regiment. The second of these earlier 76ths was a Highland Corps, which did good service in the American War of Independence until it had the misfortune to share in the surrender of Yorktown, and it has been more than once stated that the 76th of Lake's wars was a Highland Corps. The statement is, however, erroneous, the regiment having been recruited principally in the counties of Nottingham and Leicester.

After an existence of no more than five months the 76th embarked for India, and after a quick voyage arrived at Madras in July, 1788. It shared in the uneventful operations against Mysore in 1790, and, considering that it had been formed so recently, was probably fortunate in having an easy initiation to warfare. The 76th also took part in the operations against Seringapatam in 1791-92, and though, by the fortune of war, it was accorded no opportunity of special distinction, it gained invaluable experience of Indian warfare, and hardened into a corps of veterans such as were in former days produced by the joint action of long service and nearly incessant warfare. The ten years, 1798 to 1802, may be briefly passed over, though doubtless they seemed long enough to the 76th, but the latter year witnessed the desultory operations in Oudh, in which the 76th Regiment (which had moved to Cawnpore in 1800) took some part. General Lake was now commander-in-chief in India, and war against the Maratha Confederation, which had long been imminent, was now clearly within sight. The story of Lake's extraordinary campaigns, beginning with the triumphs of Aligarh, Delhi, Agra, Laswari, and Dfg, and chequered by the reverses sustained by Colonel Monson's detachment and by the four repulses at Bharatpur, is one that should be studied by all soldiers. In these campaigns the 76th bore the foremost part, earning the highest possible distinction, and maintaining their efficiency under losses that have hardly been borne by the soldiers of any other nation, the Japanese alone being a possible exception. Still, among students of war, the fame of Lake's victories remain as glorious examples of aggressive warfare, and whatever fame the 76th "Hindoostan" Regiment may earn in future wars, they can never hope to excel the distinction of their predecessors, styled by Lake himself "a handful of heroes."

There are few more moving descriptions to be found in the annals of war than that given by John Shipp, one of the worthies of the 76th, of the draft of invalids of the regiment taken to England by him at the end of the Maratha War, and we should have welcomed this passage and

many others of Shipp's stirring descriptions, in the record of the Regiment to which he belonged.

Lieutenant-Colonel Hayden tells the story of his regiment competently and clearly, and may be congratulated on having so good a story to tell. We regret, however, that he did not make more use of two books, which devote much space to the doings of the 76th, the first being the memoir of John Shipp, referred to above, and the second, the memoir of Lord Lake himself, in which the extraordinary sufferings and achievements of the regiment are fully detailed.

It need only be added that the 76th saw some service in the Peninsular War, being present at Corunna and the battle of the Nile, and that it was represented in the South African war by a mounted infantry company which did excellent service.

The "Historical Record," which was printed at "The Johnson's Head," Lichfield, is well produced and well illustrated.

*The Rifleman.* The Organ of the Society of Miniature Rifle Clubs. New Series. Monthly, 1d.

*The Rifleman*, the official organ of the Society of Miniature Rifle Clubs, was first started some four years ago, the Society at that time only numbering 300 affiliated clubs, a number which has now been increased to 2,000, with a membership of about a quarter of a million. This is gratifying progress, and *The Rifleman* marks the occasion by starting a new series, the first number of which appeared on the 15th July. To this number Lord Roberts, who takes a great interest in the Miniature Rifle Club's movement, has contributed a vigorous "Foreword," in which he recalls that he contributed a short preface to the original first number. After referring to the gratifying progress made by the Society, Lord Roberts briefly recapitulates the object and scope of the Society's aims. Established by the late Major-General Luard in 1901, the Society, he points out, aims at forming in every town and village of the United Kingdom miniature rifle ranges, by means of which, in default of full-sized or service ranges, those wishing to fit themselves to take their place in the defence of their country might at least learn the use of the rifle and the rudiments of rifle shooting. Lord Roberts repeats his agreement with the dictum of the American authorities, who, in the preamble to the recently published rules for "The Promotion of Rifle Practice," give it as their opinion that "in estimating the military efficiency of a soldier, if we consider ten points as a standard of perfection, at least eight of these points are skill in rifle shooting."

"I should like," in conclusion he writes, "to say a few words of direct advice and encouragement to riflemen. By perfecting themselves in the use of the rifle, they are performing one of the most important duties that pertain to patriotism. It should come as natural to a man to shoot as to walk or to run, and as congenial as to play games. Rifle shooting is in itself a pleasant pastime—an interesting form of sport; it is a healthy pursuit, and good training for the eye, and for the hand. It leads to good comradeship and friendly rivalry, and teaches many a valuable lesson in order, regularity, discipline, fair play and consideration for others."

These are words which should appeal to everyone. Among other contributors to the first number were Mr. Owen Seaman, the editor of *Punch*,

who has written a clever little poem for it, "The New Ordeal by Fire," and Mr. Rudyard Kipling. It may be added that the paper is full of interesting information, and it is clear that the movement is now well established, and has a very considerable amount of practical support and encouragement. Queen Alexandra graciously presents a valuable Challenge Cup to be shot for annually. The *Daily Graphic* and *Daily Express* both give cups, and other trophies are offered for competition by many donors. In conclusion we can only say that we hope the *Rifleman* will meet with the support which it deserves, and its price, 1d., brings it within the reach of most people.

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PRINCIPAL ADDITIONS TO LIBRARY FOR JULY, 1910.

*History of South Africa since 1795.* By GEORGE M'CALL THEAL. 5 vols. 8vo. 30s. (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.) London, 1908.

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*History and Ethnography of South Africa before 1795.* By GEORGE M'CALL THEAL. 3 vols. 8vo. 22s. 6d. (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd.) London, 1909-10.

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*La Guerre de 1870—Causes et Responsabilités.* By HENRI WELSCHINGER. 2 vols. 8vo. 10s. (Plon-Nourrit et Cie.) Paris, 1910.

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*Egyptian Yearly Army List, 1910.* Fc. 4to. 6s. 6d. Cairo, 1910.

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*The Diary of a Soldier of Fortune.* By STANLEY PORTAL HYATT. 8vo. 12s. 6d. (T. Werner Laurie.) London, 1910.

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*The Russian Road to China.* By LINDON BATES, junr. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (Constable & Co., Ltd.) London, 1910.

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*In the Foreign Legion.* By ERWIN ROSEN. 8vo. 7s. 6d. (Duckworth & Co.) London, 1910.

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*General Gatacre, 1843-1906.* By BEATRIX GATACRE. 8vo. 10s. 6d. (John Murray.) London, 1910.

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*The Campaign of Trafalgar.* By JULIAN S. CORBETT. 8vo. 16s. (Presented.) (Longmans, Green & Co.) London, 1910.

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*Records of the Cape Mounted Riflemen.* By BASIL WILLIAMS. 8vo. (Presented.) (Sir Joseph Causton & Sons, Ltd.) London, 1909.

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# RECENT PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY INTEREST.

COMPILED BY THE GENERAL STAFF, WAR OFFICE.

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## PREFATORY NOTE.

This Pamphlet will be issued quarterly, in April, July, October and January. Its purpose is to draw the attention of Officers to British and Foreign publications of Military interest which are likely to assist them in their professional work. Copies of the pamphlet will be distributed to the Headquarters of Commands, Educational Establishments, Units and Reference Libraries.

*The Articles, &c., in Part I. are selected by the General Staff for publication on account of their general military interest. Their contents are not official.*

## PART I.

### MAGAZINE ARTICLES.

*The Tactical and Moral Importance of the Depth of Dispersion of the Cone of Infantry Fire in War.* By Major von Immanuel, Battalion Commander in 158th (Lorraine) Infantry Regiment. (Translated from the *Militär-Wochenblatt* by kind permission of the publishers, Messrs. E. Mittler and Son, Berlin.)

The new Musketry Regulations for the German Infantry which have recently appeared afford us an occasion for turning our attention to the appreciation of infantry fire under service conditions. Here we are met by a question of which

sufficient account is not taken either in peace training or in estimating the results of field firing in peace. Though it is a true saying that the effect of fire in war is only a very small fraction of that obtained under peace conditions, still it is an axiom that the better the fire control, the steadier the men and the stricter their fire discipline, the greater will be the effect of fire in battle. From this fundamental statement we must deduce the requirements which peace training should fulfil. A rifle which is equal to modern requirements certainly assures us that the flatness of the trajectory and the ever-increasing depth of the beaten zone will compensate to a certain extent for the errors of the firers, and that at the more important battle ranges, that is to say, at the so-called close and medium ranges (up to 1,300 yards), the characteristics of the rifle will produce some result provided the performances of the firers are moderately satisfactory. It is well known that, particularly in Russia, the opinion has for some time been held that the natural depth of dispersion of fire of a rifle with a very flat trajectory must give sufficiently satisfactory results if the fire commanders succeed in finding the correct elevation, and if the men bring their rifles in to the shoulder horizontally, and pointing in the required direction with the sights correctly adjusted. It has even been believed, on this hypothesis, that it was possible to do away with firing at field targets on the classification ranges as a preliminary to field firing, since more reliance was placed upon the rifle than upon the man who handled it. The lessons of the war of 1877-78 appeared to corroborate this conclusion, and to give force to the old saying that the soldier who, under the influence of battle, brought his rifle to the shoulder and fired with his sights correctly adjusted was efficient, even if he did not aim at any particular target. The lessons of the most recent wars have shown that this "distribution of fire" was fundamentally fallacious. It is true that battle fire which shakes the nerves will show results, even when the troops are efficient, which involuntarily recall this "distribution of fire" theory. But is it not a great error to take such results as the starting point for peace training? Certainly it is. They must rather be combated by reasoning, training and habit, so that they have as little influence as possible in battle. Musketry training will then have as its object the manipulation of a rifle which is technically perfect by men who are physically and morally trained to make the greatest possible use of it. Mieg teaches "the rifle by itself does nothing, but it is trained intelligence and steady work which show how the rifle is to be used effectually." Freiherr von Lichtenstein adds that "the existence of the cone of fire should have no meaning to the men but only to the fire commander." The absolute determination of the man, which must never allow him to fail to hit a definite target with every round, at every distance for which elevation is ordered, even in the loudest roar of battle and under the depressing influence of ever present danger, is the only antidote to that nervous, uncontrolled and unaimed fire which, in battle, is the mark of wavering troops. That is the fundamental truth to which the question may be reduced.

The German Musketry Regulations are based on these principles, and maintain them in the latest edition. Paragraph 26 gives a table showing the depth of the cone of fire (the so-called depth of dispersion) for 50 per cent. of rounds fired. In this table it has been assumed that average shots have fired in favourable weather and on level ground. The depth of dispersion for 52 per cent. of rounds fired is, as the Musketry Regulations remark, about double that for 50 per cent. But the Regulations take no account of figures which, though they make a fine show under peace conditions, are unreliable as a criterion of results under the strain of active service. With reference to this point, it is explained that exact estimates of the depth of dispersion at the different ranges cannot be given; it is shown in paragraph 30 that the extent of the depth of dispersion is affected, not only by the quality of the rifle and of the ammunition, but even more by other influences. Besides the effect of weather (light and direction of wind) and the technical conditions which affect shooting (visibility of target, number of rifles, duration of fire, rate of fire, range, nature of target, facilities for observation), by far the most important considerations are fire control and the performances of the firers. These performances depend upon the degree of musketry training and of self-control and upon the moral and physical condition of the men, that is to say, on those fundamental attributes without which success is impossible. The best rifle is useless in the hands of unsteady and unreliable troops.

The Musketry Regulations take all these considerations into account and show us how steadfast troops capable of enduring the effect of fire must be trained and led, and how such training and leading conduce to the security both of leaders and men. It is added in paragraph 131 that, in field firing under peace conditions, a much greater number of hits is nearly always obtained than would be the case in corresponding conditions in war. "These points must be thoroughly explained both to leaders and men, in order that false inferences as to fire effect may not be drawn."

What, we would ask, does the experience of actual fighting teach as to the effect of the depth of dispersion? All armies at the present day have accepted the principles of training and instruction which the German Musketry Regulations advocate, with certain natural exceptions as to details, such as descriptions of fire and choice of elevation. Aimed fire is therefore everywhere the basis of fire in peace, for the object of all musketry regulation is to make the necessity for the careful aiming of each shot an instinct both with the leader and the man. But the conditions are altered under the disturbing influences of battle. The following short episode from the war of 1870-71, which is taken from

\* *Ein Sommernachts Traum*, page 41. Berlin, 1888. E. S. Mittler and Son. (Understood to have been written by the late Major-General Meckel.)

that well-known pamphlet, "A Summer Night's Dream,"\* shows more clearly what goes on in battle than would a long explanation. The extract has been somewhat shortened:—"Lance-Corporal Arnold was one of the best men of my company, he was absolutely reliable and touchingly subordinate. He was a pattern soldier, a good shot, and an admirable patrol leader. . . .

"We were opposite to and about 500 paces from an extended position of the enemy, and under a brisk fire. My whole company had been extended. I marked with dismay the growing uneasiness of my men, without being able to do anything to stop it. Everyone was lying down and firing. I could see rifles, the butts of which never left the ground; the upward direction of the muzzles was particularly noticeable in one part of the line; on looking closer I could see that there was a general rise in the ground in front of these men which prevented them from seeing the enemy; in spite of this they were firing as heavily as the others and sending all their shots over the rise into space. To my great astonishment I saw Corporal Arnold among those who were firing wildly. Full of anger I rushed at him and shouted "What are you shooting at? You can't see the enemy!" Not feeling certain that my words would be understood amidst the noise, I accompanied them with lively and unmistakable gestures. Arnold looked round, but his gaze was vacant. Clearly he did not recognise his Captain. Then hearing a few shots whistle close by as he threw himself down to fire harder than ever. My anger got the better of me. I hit him with my sword so hard over the helmet as to make a great dent in it and to knock it back on his neck in spite of the chin chain. That had an effect. The man sprang on to his knee as if struck by lightning. His face was deadly pale and every limb was quivering. I could not understand what he said, but from his face I saw that he now recognised me. Then he jumped quickly up, grasped the arms of the men nearest him and encouraged them to advance with him to the place I had indicated. As his comrades did not understand him at once he crept forward alone, and, although endangered by the wild fire of the men who remained behind, commenced a steady well-aimed fire from the rising ground. After having with trouble and by forcible means induced the other men to move up to where Arnold was I went off to the other flank of the company. I never saw Arnold again; he fell in this fight."

In actual battle it will happen that a portion of the men, let us hope the larger portion, will preserve their self-control and fire steadily. They will, as the Regulations direct, consider the target quietly and intelligently before each shot, aim and press the trigger correctly and husband their ammunition, that is to say, they will only fire when a target or a portion of a position is clear enough to be recognised. But let us not deceive ourselves. The remaining position, under the disturbing influences of the hail of fire rained upon them by rifles, machine guns, and artillery, of the roar of battle, of the groans of the wounded and of the sight of the killed, will be seized by no small degree of excitement, and will lose their nerve and steadiness. These men will forget everything that they have learnt in peace. In brief, they cannot be depended upon to deliver a steady, well-aimed fire, they will shoot badly, there will be no question of aiming, and the result will be a volume of unaimed fire. This will result in firing high and in waste of ammunition, that is to say, the depth of the cone of fire will be unduly increased. The results of this upon the effect of the fire as a whole are evident. The steadier the troops are, the higher their moral, the better their fire discipline and self-control, the greater the influence of the leaders and of the intelligent men, the better will such troops shoot, and the more will the effect of their fire approximate to that obtained under peace conditions. The average fire effect obtained by the Germans in 1870-71, the Boers and the Japanese, has shown that such conditions can be obtained, though, of course, the results are only a mere fraction of those obtained under peace conditions. Eye witnesses have given us some interesting impressions from the Russo-Japanese war. Major Broussart von Schellendorff reports, in his personal observations of the last day of the battle of Mukden,\* that "the greatest steadiness and alertness were prevalent in the Japanese firing lines. Orders were given by signal and not by word of command; the subordinate leaders controlled the fire." General Sir Ian Hamilton, speaking of the Japanese firing lines in the battle of Sha Ho, says, "There was no shouting, no nervousness, no loud words of command; orders were given by signal, or passed in a whisper, everything went smoothly and with the steadiness and regularity of clockwork." Observers on the Russian side tell us of the certainty and accuracy of the Japanese fire; C. von B. K. says, "The bearing of the infantry was steady and correct; if a crisis in the fight occurred they acted at once with great promptness, but without loss of order."

The effect produced by a firing line depends upon the proportion between the number of men who fire in a normal, or approximately normal, manner and of those who, under the influence of battle, become unsteady and nervous, and fire too high, so high in some cases that their shots even attain the extreme range of the rifle. Let us suppose that a chain of skirmishers is firing at an enemy 1,100 yards away with their sights adjusted to 1,100 yards. According to the example given in paragraph 26 of the German Musketry Regulations, the depth of the cone of dispersion for 82 per cent. of rounds fired is 180 yards; 18 per cent. are too far short of, or beyond the target to be considered. Those men who fire steadily will keep their shots within that 180 yards, and thereby obtain a certain percentage of hits. But a proportion of men will fire wildly, nervously and unsteadily. Now, since, according to paragraph 23 of the German Musketry Regulations, it is possible to attain an extreme range of 4,400 yards with a rifle held at an elevation of about 31 degrees, there will be more or less long range fire according to the degree of unsteadiness and want of supervision by the

\**Sechs Monate beim Japanischen Feldheer*. Berlin, 1906. Mittler and Son.

subordinate leaders. The ground behind the target will be covered by a hail of fire the exact position and extent of which can only be guessed. This long range fire, of course, has no influence on the decision of the fire fight, for the attainment of fire—and moral—superiority, and therefore of victory, will fall to that side which is able to overwhelm its opponent with a more concentrated and, therefore, more destructive cone of fire.

At the same time, "the zone of long-range fire" must be considered in appreciating the situation on the battlefield and the action of those troops who, either as supports or reserves, have to halt or move in the area behind the firing line. Military history provides many instructive examples of this, and we should study these the more carefully because peace training affords us no guide as to the effect of long range fire, i.e., fire which passes over the target. Such fire has often exercised very considerable influence. Observers with the Japanese in almost all the battles of the recent war have borne witness to the fact that, when the Russians were firing, say, at 1,000 paces, they attained a very small number of hits in proportion to the ammunition expended. On the other hand, "the mean trajectory" of the wild long range fire often lay between 2,000 and 2,500 paces, and the whistle and buzz of bullets was heard as far as 5,000 paces behind the target. This made it dangerous to halt in the open even at these extreme ranges. These factors in the situation must be taken into account, if we wish to avoid loss, in arranging for the position of reserves, ammunition columns, dressing stations and field hospitals. Experience teaches us that such conditions invariably prevail when badly trained or untrained troops have come into action, where individual men have thrown themselves down and contented themselves with firing without bringing their rifles to the "present" and aiming. The Turks in the trenches round Plevna frequently had beside them boxes containing 1,000 rounds each, and had no need, or considered they had no need, to economise ammunition. They often confined themselves to resting their rifles on the crest of a parapet and snatching at the trigger from the trench beneath without aiming. This resulted in exceptionally heavy long range fire which fell among the masses of the Russian Reserves and caused severe losses. At Gorni-Dubniak the Russian Guards lost as much as 10 per cent. of their number from infantry fire at 2,500 paces. It is well known that a German cavalry regiment at Wörth suffered heavily from the effects of the unaimed long range fire of the French. The regiment was halted in the valley of the Sauer, east of Wörth, at least 2,700 yards behind the German firing line, which had worked through Wörth and was engaged with French infantry on the far side of the village. Such was the intensity of the fire to which it found itself subjected, that the regiment thought it was being fired on from Wörth, either by the inhabitants, or by a party of French which had been cut off. The commander, therefore, determined to withdraw out of range and to direct the fire of dismounted troopers against the edge of the village until the situation was cleared up. At Gravelotte German reserves, which were in formed bodies 1,450 yards from the enemy, and more than 600 yards behind their own firing line, came under heavy long range fire. These reserves were, in fact, in the centre of the cone of dispersion of unaimed fire, though on the French side there had been no intention of firing on them. It spared the German firing line, it is true, but it swept the ground far beyond the target, and brought the rear of the battlefield, and the reserves who were moving about there, into the danger zone.

The Boers have often been quoted as models of steady and intelligent shooting, and it has been asserted that the cone of their fire was highly concentrated on the target at which they were firing. But there are other opinions as to the value of the fire of the Boers, and in particular the statements of eye-witnesses who observed the very considerable amount of unaimed long range fire from the Boer positions. "What caused the breakdown of the English infantry attacks?" asks Braun (*Tactical Impressions of the South African War*). "The reason cannot be the heavy losses from rifle fire, for, in comparison with other wars, the losses were not heavy; nor was it due to lack of boldness, for the boldness of the English infantry was admirable, nor to any great extent to wrong attack formations; the only explanation which I as an eye-witness can give is that the Boers, who had an almost unlimited supply of ammunition, and began to use it at ranges which often far exceeded 1,100 yards, created a zone of unaimed fire which the English firing lines as they advanced one behind the other had to traverse, and the hail of whistling bullets in it eventually broke their moral. In the future we shall have to reckon with this phenomenon of long range fire." This supposition is undoubtedly correct; we must have clear ideas as to the moral and physical effect of such long range fire even if it cannot be considered as aimed fire, but we must not neglect to take account of the fact that good troops must have sufficient moral to be able to cross the zone of long range fire unshaken, and that they must be taught to endure the unavoidable losses of such fire. The German Infantry Regulations speak clearly and confidently on the point, "formed bodies cannot move under effective infantry fire" (paragraph 342). The meaning of the term effective fire is very elastic. It may happen that a zone will be created by unaimed long range fire which can only be passed in open order if heavy loss is to be avoided. On the other hand, it will often be necessary, in order to have the troops well in hand, to keep them closed, even within the zone of this fire, until the zone of really effective fire is reached and open order becomes a necessity. Paragraph 326 of our drill book is applicable to this point. "The country, the effect of the enemy's fire, and, last but not least, the efficiency of the troops will decide when they must extend." We might add, in amplification of the drill book, that we must expect that well trained infantry will be able to stand the effect of long range fire, and to pass through its zone into the front line of battle without diminution of moral force or of nervous power. Major Bromart von Schellendorff's valuable personal impressions, collected during the Russo-Japanese War, are very clear on this point. He describes the difference

between the influence of artillery and infantry fire. "In the spaces between the areas covered by the bursts of single shrapnel shell, one may move forward comparatively free from danger, but with the infantry bullets it is quite different; they come in countless swarms, invisible, almost noiseless, and seem permanently to fill the whole air, and only betray their presence by a weird low hiss and the number of puffs of dust which they make as they strike the ground. It is a most unpleasant feeling to know that one has to advance over ground which is alive with hundreds of these puffs of dust." In conclusion, we will sum up our ideas of the tactical and moral importance of the cone of dispersion of infantry fire in war, and of the value of long range fire, as follows:—

- (1) With good fire control a cone of dispersion which is as concentrated as possible is the surest guarantee of success. The size of this cone is a testimony to the instruction, training, nerve and self-control of the troops and is therefore the mark of their moral value.
- (2) This fact touches the fundamental principles of the training of the troops. It shows us the road which peace instruction and training must follow, i.e., strengthening of hand, nerve and heart against the disturbing influences of the battlefield. This process must be founded upon the spirit and devotion of the troops, and above all supported by strict and thorough discipline and trained instinct. The qualities produced by such training, taken together, give us the assurance that battle will bring with it no surprises and disappointments, or at any rate no exceptional surprises and disappointments in regard to the anticipations which we have formed in the quiet and orderly school of peace training.
- (3) We must certainly take into account the long range fire, which results from unsteady and nervous men firing too high, both as regards the effect of our own fire and as regards the effect which the enemy's fire will have upon the organization of the rear of our line of battle.
- (4) There is no doubt that such fire will cause losses, and we must therefore adopt measures to reduce these losses to a minimum. But the chief means of overcoming the physical and moral effect of such losses lies in the steadiness and the quality of the troops. Only good troops will come through these first impressions without loss of efficiency, and will look upon this long range fire as "wasp bites" which are not of much account. Moral force, discipline based on training, and firm conviction of the necessity for self sacrifice are the surest guarantees of success.

"Staff Rides" in Russia. (A translation of an order issued in the Vilna Military District,\* published in the *Razvyedchik* of the 10th May, 1910.)

Army Corps "rides" are a new institution, and the "Instructions for the Training of Officers" contain only general indications as to the lines upon which they are to be conducted. The following instructions are issued with a view to securing uniformity of work or method (but without any desire to dogmatize in mere matters of detail).

It is becoming more and more difficult in war to obtain adequate intelligence concerning the enemy and the ground occupied by him. Commanding officers must, therefore, be practised at staff rides in appreciating the situation from very small indications, so as to be able to draw their own conclusions from a comparison of what intelligence is available with what is known of the ground, of the enemy's tactics and methods, and of the probable objective of his operations.

The ground should be studied and appreciated, not only by personal observation but also by means of maps, the results of reconnaissances, &c. Personal inspection of the ground will seldom be practicable in the field.

General written orders and dispositions are often unduly diffuse and deal with superfluous detail which might, with advantage, be communicated direct to the few who are directly concerned. Practice in writing orders as short as possible is therefore desirable.

The same remark applies to reports and memoranda. Brevity, clearness and accuracy are essential and can only be attained by practice.

All orders, reports and memoranda must be marked showing to whom, when and by what means they are sent out and also with the hour of receipt in order to enable the Director to arrive at a decision as to their expediency. Owing to the absence of such indications at manoeuvres and on service, it is often impossible to assign responsibility for delay.

In some cases, on service, it may be convenient to issue verbal orders. This method may save time, and it affords an opportunity for full explanation of the commander's intentions, and so may prevent mistakes on the part of subordinates. With this view, it is necessary that senior officers should have practice in this method of issuing their orders in the field.

In view of the long duration of modern battles, lasting several days and nights, with the consequent strain on both moral and physical powers, it is desirable that, in the course of "staff rides," practice shall be given to officers of working under similar conditions by day and night. Such practice will teach staffs how to arrange for necessary hours of rest, and will enable them to arrive at some idea of the best method of organizing their work to meet the continuous strain.

In future wars a great development of night operations is to be expected, with the object of avoiding loss from modern fire, of effecting surprise or of transferring

\* The Vilna Military District contains the IInd, IIId, IVth, XVth and XXth Army Corps.—(General Staff.)



troops from one part of the field to another. Practice must therefore be given both in appreciation of the situation and in handling troops by night.

The general tendency, observed in almost all first class armies, towards offensive operations will result in the increased frequency in any future war of the encounter battle. The tactics of such unpremeditated battles have as yet received comparatively little attention in the Russian army. The chief difference between these engagements and deliberate attacks lies in the troop-leading prior to the arrival on the field of the main body. Senior officers must therefore be practised in handling their troops during the march to the field of battle, in bringing them into action and in deploying the main body.

The late war drew attention to shortcomings in the service of communication both as regards the selection and application of the various methods as required by the changing phases of the battle, and also in the absence of a precise idea as to what, or how, or to whom information or orders should be sent. As it is impossible to handle troops in the field without proper communication this question must be studied constantly and with the utmost attention at all staff rides, and all technical means of communications such as telephones, signalling equipment and cycles should be provided.

Care must be taken that officers in command shall have adequate practice not only in the technical organization of the services of communication but also in its tactics.

The question of the command of troops in the field is indissolubly connected with that of the co-operation of all to achieve one common object. Both in manoeuvres and in war, the absence of combination and the liability of the individual to become engrossed in his own special task have been noticed, whereas success can only be achieved by friendly co-operation. Officers must therefore be practised in handling troops under conditions of close communication with others. This will give them practice in maintaining tactical connection and touch.

The absence of personal initiative was frequently noticed during the recent war. With a view to the eradication of this fault, fresh conditions must be introduced from time to time in the course of the exercises so as to modify the situation in such a way as to demand independent decision and personal initiative. In this connection, all the dispositions of the officer who makes the decision must be actually carried out, including the despatch of all necessary reports and instructions to the proper quarter.

The conference at corps staff rides, in which officers of all arms will take part, will be based chiefly on officers' personal knowledge and experience of the characteristics and tactics of the several arms under various conditions of ground.

In conclusion, the following exercises are suggested as being suitable for inclusion in the general programme for army corps "rides"—though not necessarily all of them in one year, for that would be obviously impossible in view of the comparatively short duration of such "rides": (a) Normal march; (b) night march; (c) night march preparatory to an attack; (d) encounter battle; (e) attack; (f) outposts, reconnaissance and night fighting; (g) cavalry reconnaissance to front and flanks; (h) seizing and holding a defensive line, pending deployment of the main body; (i) cavalry tactics in action.

Maintenance of communications will be practised during all exercises.

At the conclusion of the "rides" general officers commanding army corps will report the results achieved in the conduct of the work in accordance with the "Regulations for the Training of Officers" and these instructions, and will offer suggestions for the future.

*Spies and the Press.\** (A sketch of the working of the Japanese Intelligence Department during the Russo-Japanese War. Translated from the *Razvyedchik* of the 23rd May, 1910.)

It was after the Battle of Mukden, when the hostile forces were facing each other like two wrestlers who have loosened their grip for a moment to get their breath. The troops were resting while the staff were busy collecting information concerning the enemy.

A non-commissioned officer reported the arrival of a Russian prisoner to Lieutenant Ishikawa, assistant intelligence officer with the 2nd Japanese Army, and added that two spies (Nos. 8 and 18) were waiting to see him. Ishikawa ordered the prisoner to be detained pending the arrival of his chief, Major Akasagawa, who knew the Russian language better and also possessed a unique knowledge of the Russian soldier, having been attached for a time previous to the war to a regiment of the Russian Guard Corps. Ishikawa was a specialist in Chinese, though he had also learnt some Russian during the six months he had spent in Vladivostok disguised as a hairdresser.

The spies were brought in. No. 8 was a brisk and intelligent Chinaman. He handed to the officer a small sheet of cigarette paper, on which the following diagram was drawn in Indian ink:—

"How did you get these numbers?" asked the officer, after closely scrutinising the diagram. The spy replied that the Russians still continued to wear them on their shoulder straps. In one of the squares only (i.e., the country round Hsi-chia-tzu) had it been impossible to get any information, for a Russian "Captain" of gigantic stature, who was quartered there, had expelled all the inhabitants and

\* This piece of fiction is so instructive that it has been considered worthy of translation.—(General Staff.)

† The diagram is not reproduced. It represented a paper divided into four squares, each with a central point, and labelled respectively Hsi-ping-kai, Hsiao-shan-tai, Hsi-chia-tzu and Pan-ta-sha-mien. In the squares, except that marked Hsi-chia-tzu, were drawn representations of Russian shoulder straps with the numbers and colours indicated.

would not permit any Chinaman to approach his men. He added that he had tried to pass through the lines at night but had been captured and beaten.

This small bit of paper represented the results of the reconnaissance for which the spy had been sent out. The squares represented certain areas within which it was desired to ascertain the disposition of the Russian troops. They formed part of a series which covered the map of the whole country in Russian occupation. In each square only a single central point was marked. The position of Russian units was indicated with reference to that point—to the north, south, east, or west, as the case might be. The spies' business was to fill in the numbers observed on the shoulder-straps of troops met in the area, and to give a rough estimate of the distance of the units from the central point.

The Chinese are generally good at picking out colours, figures, and letters, which last are simple enough compared with their own hieroglyphics. Moreover, a school for secret service agents had been established by the Japanese, in which they were taught the organisation of the Russian army in the theatre of war, and the uniforms, badges, &c., by which units could be identified. The teaching of this school had put an end to vague native reports of the type:—"At such and such a village there are many soldiers and horses; there are also some tubes on wheels, drawn by horses."

Still, during the great battles trained agents were not always available, and the Japanese had to take what they could get, often employing local inhabitants against their will, under threat of destroying their homes. Reports brought in by these untrained agents were rarely of any value, very often containing mere common-places without the number of a unit or a single fact of military value. In this way, during the fighting round Mukden, Akasagawa was much irritated by the impossibility of locating the 6th East Siberian Division. Spies were sent out with this special object, but no trained agents were available and the men employed were unsuccessful. Hence, after Mukden, trained spies only were employed, and schools were established not only at the headquarters of armies, but also of divisions.

Ishikawa dismissed the spy and became engrossed in thought. There was no doubt as to the value of the information. It was clear that units of the 1st Brigade 14th Division (red shoulder-straps), and of the 2nd Brigade (blue shoulder-straps), were to the north of Hai-ping-kai. Those to the south were probably the 2nd and 3rd Rifle Brigades from Europe (crimson shoulder-straps). Did these brigades still form a separate army corps? Or were they attached to the XVIIIth Army Corps? Was the Russian army in the field still organized as before? Spies cannot ascertain a point like that. If the press does not give the secret away, the solution must be groped for by speculative inference.

Not long before, spies had reported that fresh troops had arrived by train at Kun-chu-ling, and the numbers of various divisions were given which, according to previous information in the press, were not to proceed to the Far East. The Intelligence Department had been nonplussed, but it was soon enlightened by a telegram from the Japanese agent at Berlin:—

"The *Novoe Vremya* states that drafts are arriving in Manchuria; the despatch of fresh units has been stopped."

So the arrivals at Kun-chu-ling were drafts who had received their clothing from regiments belonging to various divisions in European Russia, and it only remained to count the trains in order to arrive at an estimate of their strength.

Still, those odds and ends of numbers scattered about in various units continued—until the men donned the proper shoulder-straps of their new units—to cause considerable trouble to the Japanese Intelligence Department. For instance, in the diagram just brought in, what did the shoulder-strap with "39" on it betoken? Was it only one of those drafts, or was it some newly-arrived unit, belonging to the 39th Division? Or, again, was it merely a mistake on the part of the Chinese spy?

Mukden, during the Russian occupation, had been alive with Japanese spies. Their reports were very numerous, and therefore all the harder to collate. The Japanese lieutenant remembered how one of his best agents, who kept a photographer's shop and was known to the Russians by the name of "Mishi," had reported, in July, that the Russian Guards had begun to arrive in Mukden.

The other Chinese spy (No. 15) went about among the Russian troops as a juggler. His assistant, a small urchin, turned somersaults and walked on his head, and afterwards collected money in a tescup. The juggler himself used to ask officers to write testimonials in his note-book, to the effect that "Lichubo does interesting tricks." Good-natured officers of all ranks would sign their names with their regiments or appointments after them! Needless to say, when such a note-book found its way to the Intelligence Department there was jubilation there. Many a dubious point would be solved thereby.

No. 18 brought with him a note-book on this occasion. On the first page there was an "authorization to the Chiuaman Lichubo to give performances to the troops under my command," signed by Major-General Jukov, Commanding, Fan-chia-tun, 21st June, 1906.\* In addition to the signature, there was the official stamp of the headquarters of an infantry division.

After this came the signatures of commanding and other officers, the majority of whom had added their official designations, and even stamps. One officer only had sufficient imagination or sense of humour to sign himself as "Major of Koloma Fire Brigade." From the note-book, as a whole, it was possible to infer the general disposition of the reserve—in echelon in rear of the Russian right flank. Chinese agents had long ago reported first the presence of 50,000 and then of 30,000 troops, echeloned in rear, and the "juggler" had been sent specially with a view to clearing up these vague reports. He had succeeded in doing so, and the Japanese officer was now able to rearrange his little flags on the map.

So units of the 3rd Division had been discovered. It was probable, therefore, that the whole of the XVIIIth Army Corps (of which undoubtedly there were no units on the flank) was in reserve.

\* Names are fictitious.

It was already known from a copy of the *Russian Army Gazette* (issued in Manchuria), that the Commander-in-Chief had inspected the IVth Army Corps on its arrival in the vicinity of Kou-chia-tan. The inference, therefore, was that both those army corps were in reserve. It was probable that they formed a distinct army.

Lieutenant Ishikawa's meditations were here interrupted by the arrival of his chief—Major Akasagawa.

"Anything fresh about the Russians?"

"Their XVIIth Army Corps is in reserve, in rear of their right flank. Our juggler has turned up."

"Ah! That means that the information is reliable. By the way, I've got a letter from our friend Tanaka, at Copenhagen," said the Major, as he unfolded a thick budget of flimsy paper, closely written in *Katakana*,\* "and I want to read you some extracts from it"—

"My dear Friend,

"Though I have been a year in Copenhagen, to-day is the first opportunity I have had of sending you a letter through absolutely trustworthy hands.

"If you were in the same close connection as I with the Russian press and with talkative Europeans in general, you would understand what great advantages we possess in a struggle against these white-faced chattering.

"I get the Russian newspapers here from St. Petersburg within three days of publication. They contain all the latest news concerning the Russian forces in the Far East, so that the information you receive through me is not more than five or six days old at most.

"The *Russki Invalid* and the *Voenni Sbornik* are my best friends, as they publish accurate, concise and authoritative information of the utmost importance. The army orders, circulars, instructions of the Senate regarding mobilization, finally the Imperial edicts explain themselves without commentary. In these I find information that no field intelligence could supply—concerning the arrival of reinforcements, the movement of troops and material to the Far East, important changes in organization and the appointment of new commanders.

"And in case of an oversight or omission I find the monthly summaries in the *Voenni Sbornik* simply invaluable as a check on other papers. You will remember the telegrams I sent to correct the inaccuracies. After the battle of Hei-kou-tai, I was unable to estimate the exact strength of the armies in Manchuria simply because some of the details were not published in the usual up-to-date manner in the *Invalid*. The mistakes made were as follows:—Kutnevich's composite rifle corps, the composition of which had not yet appeared in the papers, was estimated to consist of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Rifle Brigades. It was imagined that Mau was still in command of the 31st Infantry Division, and Samsonov of the Siberian Cossack Division, though both of them had left for Russia. Kutnevich and Solivanov were supposed to be still divisional commanders, for their promotion in the field to corps commanders had not yet been reported in the *Invalid*. For the necessary corrections you have the *Voenni Sbornik* to thank.

"The other newspapers, too, are just the same; so much so, indeed, that somebody started the 'shave' that we Japanese had bought the Russian press! The Russians do not understand, in the least, what they are doing. They cater for the public's eagerness for the latest news, and put that before the interests of the army—oblivious of the fact that the interests of the army are now those of the nation. If the press at large is not always accurate, what could be better or more reliable than the army orders published by the *Russki Invalid*?

"They talk a great deal here about our wonderful system of espionage. But however well you may manage your spies, my dear Akasagawa, I know that they cannot fill in the whole of the picture required of the general situation in the theatre of war. The accuracy of a spy's work is exposed to so many chances and its verification is always a difficult matter. You must often be at a loss when confronted with a large number of contradictory reports, and even when your exceptional talent has enabled you to penetrate the fog of war and to collate these reports, how can you feel confident as to their reliability?

"Meanwhile, here I sit, over 3,000 miles from the theatre of war and study the condition of Lenevich's army day by day, with the greatest exactitude with the help of Russian newspapers!

"I see the grouping of the Russian forces in the Manchurian and Korean theatres of war, the organization of the defences of Sakhalin. I see their lines of communication from Hsi-ping-kai to Harbin, the activity at Harbin, its rising fortifications, the works on the Sungari. I see the Trans-Siberian Railway carrying reinforcements to Lenevich; the leading trains of the XIXth Corps have reached Lake Baikal; the IXth Corps is being mobilized in Russia. From Baikal to Kun-chu-ling there is a long stream of reinforcements; the 53rd Division will soon detrain in Manchuria.

"Of value, too, are the telegrams from fond fathers and loving sons reporting the crossing of the Urals—or greetings from the shores of Lake Baikal or the frontier of Manchuria.

\* *Katakana* is a kind of shorthand, in which the ordinary Japanese hieroglyphics are considerably abbreviated. It is much used in the Japanese Intelligence Department.

"Each day I correct my notes and hasten to telegraph you my deductions in the firm conviction that you will use them as the base which will enable you to estimate the reliability of your other reports almost as if you were in receipt of an official report from Lenevich himself."

"Spies are a broken reed to depend upon as compared with the Russian press, which is seldom inaccurate and never publishes false information with intent to mislead."

"By all means let the enemy continue to believe that we owe our information to our 'wonderful system of espionage'; let us make the most of it, and boast of it, but don't breathe a word about the newspapers! Let us hope that it will not occur to the Russian Government to bring in rules hampering the liberty of the press!"

Akasagawa had scarcely finished reading this letter, when two telegrams were handed to him.

"Ah! From our friend Tanaka! Let's see what he says."

"*Novoe Vremya* No. 10551 reports strength of XIXth Army Corps. Also that detachments at Khun-chun and Novo-Kievsk have been formed into 3-battalion regiments."

The second telegram runs:—

"*Novoe Vremya* No. 10528.—Nursing Sister Maria Kisliakova informs her friends that her address is:—1st Army, 53rd Division, Hospital No. 116, at Kai-lung-cheng."

"So we've found the 53rd Division, at last," exclaimed Akasagawa. "Well done, Tanaka, and bravo the Press, and all good nursing sisters!"

A non-commissioned officer appeared and paused on the threshold of the hut.

"What is it?" asked the Major.

"A Chinaman has brought the Russian paper."

"Yes, let us look at last night's *Manchurian Army Gazette*,† starting as usual, at the end, with the advertisements."

(1) Advertiser requests the 19th East Siberian Rifle Regiment to inform him as to the fate of his relative—Captain Bikov—of that Regiment. Address Lieutenant Ivanenko, 2nd Army, XVIIth Army Corps, 97th Infantry Regiment.

(2) Corporal N. A. Sereda requests his cousin, E. P. Juru, to communicate his address to the 4th Rifle Brigade, 16th Rifle Regiment, 15th Company.

(3) Corporal E. I. Lyutenko requests his brother, F. Lyutenko, to communicate his address to the 3rd Manchurian Army, 5th Rifle Division, 18th Rifle Regiment, 9th Company.‡

(4) Private S. Galushka having arrived with echelon No. 660, seeks his friend and neighbour, V. Zarubku. Address: VIIth Siberian Corps, 71st Infantry Division, the Bugulmański Regiment.

The same evening the following memorandum was issued by the Japanese Intelligence Department:—

## I.

Secret.

*Digest of Intelligence concerning the Enemy.*

From information received to-day, the following facts have been established:—

1. The presence of units of the XVIIth Army Corps (i.e., 3rd Infantry Division) in reserve, in rear of the Russian right flank.

2. The arrival in Manchuria of the 53rd Infantry Division, and its inclusion in the strength of the 1st Army, at Kai-lung-cheng (N. *Vremya*).

Comparing this report with another to the effect that the 71st Infantry Division now forms part of a VIIth Siberian Army Corps—till now not known to exist (*Manchurian Army Gazette*, No. 276)—it may be confidently inferred:—

(a) That the 53rd Division, on arriving at Kai-lung-cheng, joined the force under the command of General Rennenkampf.

(b) That the 53rd Division and the 71st Division (which was previously part of that force) together form the VIIth Siberian Army Corps, very probably under the command of General Rennenkampf.

## II.

It is observed, from an examination of the advertisements in the *Manchurian Army Gazette* (No. 276):—

(a) That there is a 15th Company in the 16th Rifle Regiment.

(b) That there is a 9th Company in the 18th Rifle Regiment.

It was previously known that rifle regiments from European Russia contained only two battalions.

\* This is by no means an isolated case of the appearance of such information in the Press.

† The Russian official journal issued in Manchuria during the war.

‡ All these advertisements actually appeared in the *Manchurian Army Gazette*.

Collating the above important information with the notifications contained in the *Gazette* to the effect that the 18th Rifle Regiment belongs to the 5th Rifle Division (not Brigade), and also with the reports of spies concerning the arrival of strong reinforcements, apparently drafts, we arrive at the following deductions, viz.:-

- (1) The Russians have expanded their European rifle brigades into divisions.
- (2) The rifle regiments have been brought up to a strength of four battalions (15th Company and 9th Company).
- (3) Some, at least, of the drafts which have arrived since the battle of Mukden have been used for these expansions.

The extent to which this reorganisation has been completed will no doubt appear from subsequent numbers of the *Manchurian Army Gazette*. So far we only know definitely that the expansion is complete in the case of the 5th and 4th Rifle Brigades (now Divisions).

## PART II.\*

### SECTION I.

#### AERIAL NAVIGATION.

*Airships of the World, 1910* (Die internationalen Luftschiffe, 1910). By Captain Neumann. 102 pp., with numerous illustrations. 8vo. Oldenburg, 1910. Gerhard Stelling. 4/6.

The author is the Director of the new School of Aeronautics founded by the German Aeronautical Society at Friedrichshafen in October, 1909, and the information contained in the book concerning the details of construction of the airships of the various States up to February, 1910, may be taken as reliable. Aviation is not dealt with.

Many interesting details, hitherto not published, are given regarding German airships. The Parseval airships have received a nomenclature (A-G) according to the type of construction. A-II and B-I, for instance, are the P-I and P-III owned by the State.

The following table shows, according to the author, the number of airships built, building and projected throughout the world:--

State.	Built.	Building.	Projected.	Total.
Germany ... ..	14	7	3	24
Belgium ... ..	1	1	—	2
England ... ..	1	1	2	4
France ... ..	5	1	3	9
Italy ... ..	2	—	—	2
Austria ... ..	1	1	2	4
Russia ... ..	1	1	—	2
United States ... ..	1	—	—	1

Readers are warned that pages 2 to 15 are not bound in chronological order and must not be confused when reading the accounts of the "Belgique II" and the "Parseval A-I," the details of which are mixed up together.

*Military Aviation* (L'aviation militaire). By C. Ader. 160 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Berger-Levrault. 2/-.

The author is an enthusiastic believer in the military future of aerial navigation, and puts forward his theories in an interesting manner. After dealing with the various descriptions of airships recommended by him, he discusses the strategical position of France, Great Britain, and Germany, with special reference to the future conquest of the air.

\* The titles of all books are given in English; this does not indicate that the books have been translated. The original title in the language in which a work is written, if not in English, is given in brackets.



*Aeroplanes (Les aéroplanes).* By F. Roux. 46 pp. 8vo. Paris, 1910. Berger-Levrault. 10d.

A short treatise describing the power and limitations of aeroplanes, and dealing with some of the unknown factors in the problem of aerial navigation.

#### ARTILLERY.

*The Mechanical Part and Technique of Field Artillery Fire (Le Mécanisme du Tir de l'Artillerie de Campagne).* By Captain Maillard. 543 pp., with 177 diagrams. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 5/-

This book is a theoretical treatise on the principles of direct and indirect laying, ranging, correcting fuse and conduct of fire. The theoretical portion is preceded by a non-technical description of the French field gun; this is described in general terms, no details being given. Chapter I deals with preparation for opening fire, including determination of the range, line of fire, angle of sight and angles of convergence. Chapter II contains the theory of the use of the aiming point. Chapter III describes the method of switching on to a fresh target. Part II contains the theory of ranging as deduced from the theory of probabilities, and as applied both to percussion and timed shrapnel ranging at visible and concealed targets. The author next analyzes the elements of the shrapnel bullet-cone, and deduces formulae for the height and distance of burst. The results obtained by firing with a single elevation and with two or more elevations are compared. Chapter IV, Part II, describes the method of dividing the battlefield into sections and allotting these to the batteries. The artillery are divided into infantry batteries which accompany the infantry brigades, and counter-batteries which engage the artillery. Part III of the book is devoted to the reconnaissance and occupation of positions. The author prefers the covered position, provided that the guns can be run up to the crest.

The Appendix contains some mathematical problems in parallax or displacement and similar matters, and a code of signals for commanding the battery from a distance.

*Field Artillery (L'Artillerie de Campagne).* By Captain J. Campana. 510 pp. 8vo., with 132 diagrams. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 6/-

This book deals with material, organization and tactics.

The first chapter contains a brief history of the development of the Q.F. gun. Chapter II contains the history of the shrapnel shell, as regards its construction and exterior shape; the angle of descent and angle of opening of the French 75 mm. shrapnel are then considered. The author assumes that the velocity of rotation remains constant to the end of the trajectory; this assumption reduces the value of his deductions. The vulnerable surface of targets is considered at great length, and illustrated by curves.

Chapter III deals with the chemistry and dynamics of the explosion of a powder charge. Sarrau's method of calculating velocities from the rate of combustion is given; this is similar to Mansell's. Hence the author deduces the interior dimensions of the gun. The method of determining tensions in the metal is stated; the author considers that the firing stress should not exceed two-fifths of the elastic limit for the A tube and four-fifths for the jacket.

Chapter IV gives the theory of construction of the Q.F. carriage and buffer. The recoil is treated mathematically at great length. The calculations for determining the dimensions and thickness of metal of the principal parts of the carriage are given. Differential recoil is briefly referred to.

Chapter V deals with the French methods of indirect laying. The principal types of sight used by foreign armies, including the panorama telescope, are described. The French system of ranging and finding fuse is explained.

Chapter VI is an interesting analysis of the artillery tactics of the Manchurian war, showing how both sides were forced to adopt shields and concealed positions. The latter method was at one period carried to excess by the Russians.

Chapter VII deals with fire-effect, which is divided into destruction, neutralization and protection.

Chapter VIII contains the author's ideas as to the use of artillery on a large scale. The corps artillery is to be divided between the two divisions of the army corps; the general officer commanding the artillery of the army corps will command the artillery of one division, the officer commanding the artillery of the other division will command his own artillery. When the attack is launched the general officer commanding the artillery will take command of the artillery detailed for the attack. Guns are not to be massed, but to be extended along a wide front, telephones, &c., being used to enable fire to be concentrated on any point.

Chapter IX deals with the use of ground and choice of a position, and Chapters X and XI with artillery in the combat. The author considers that this will take the shape of an artillery duel, in which the whole of the batteries on both sides will be engaged: the side which obtains superiority of fire will then be able to spare batteries to engage the enemy's infantry.

Chapter XIII contains some details of foreign equipments; these are scanty and in places inaccurate; e.g., it is stated that the British horse artillery fires high-explosive shell.

Chapter XIV is devoted to the German field artillery, which is described in great detail. But the information given is somewhat out of date, being taken from the German manuals of 1907.

*The Spanish Regulations for Field Artillery Fire* (Instructions para el Tiro de las Baterías de Campaña). Spanish General Staff. 290 pp., with numerous diagrams. 8vo. Madrid, 1909. Bernardo Rodriguez.

These regulations are of interest in that they are based on the French and German systems and constitute a combination of both.

Ranging is normally by salvoes (a salvo corresponds to our "one round rapid fire") of four guns at the same elevation, firing percussion shrapnel or H.E. shell. A bracket of 400 or 200 metres is formed, subdivided to 100 metres, and time shrapnel fire opened at the lower elevation of the 100 metres bracket.

Time shrapnel ranging is not used except at balloons, and in special cases where percussion shell are difficult or impossible to observe.

The fuse is adjusted by the corrector as in our service.

Ranging is always carried out with the nature of shell which is to be used in fire for effect.

At fleeting targets progressive fire is used. A 200 metres bracket is found and is searched by salvoes of time shrapnel, commencing at an elevation 50 metres less than the lower limit of the bracket, and increasing by 50 metres at a time till the higher limit of the bracket is reached.

If the enemy's fire has been wholly or partly silenced by progressive fire, advantage is taken of the pause to range accurately.

Sweeping is executed by giving each gun 5/1000 more deflection at each of three successive rounds, and taking off 5/1000 at each subsequent round till the original direction is regained.

Searching and sweeping may be combined as in the French *tir progressif et fauchant*.

Moving targets are ordinarily attacked by ranging on a point which the target is expected to pass and opening rapid fire when it reaches this point. An alternative method is to form a long bracket and search it by salvoes at 100 metres interval till an effective salvo is observed, and then to order rapid fire.

At balloons, a long bracket is found with salvoes of time shrapnel and is searched by gun fire at intervals of 100 metres.

Night firing is usually a continuation of day firing; when fire is opened at night on a fresh target, a long bracket is found and searched with progressive fire.

Indirect laying is on the French system. The guns are laid on an auxiliary mark, with such deflection that the lines of fire converge on a point in the target. The lines of fire are afterwards opened out till the fire is distributed over the front of the target.

**Determination of the Line of Fire.**—The battery commander aligns his director on the target, reverses it, lays his sights on the first gun, and reads off the battery angle, which is given to the first gun; this gun then picks up an aiming point, and the remaining guns lay on the aiming point at the same angle as the first gun, less a correction for convergence.

The line may also be given to the guns by the Numbers 1 if the target is visible from high ground in front or in rear of the battery. In the former case the Number 1 takes one gunner with him on to the crest, and the two men align each other on the target and on the gun till the line is obtained.

It is assumed throughout that the battery commander is within speaking distance of the battery, and there is no reference to the use of telephone or flag.

When firing from behind cover, the battery commander himself keeps a record of the battery angle, &c., and of all orders given by him; the section commanders and Numbers 1 also write down all orders received by them.

**Preparatory Training (Part II).**—This includes:—Reconnaissance of positions and approaches, and of the enemy's position; execution of maps and panorama sketches; judging distance; observation of fire (puffs and flashes); indoor exercises in fire discipline. (The last is a sort of ranging game; the officer acting as battery commander is given the initial range, &c., and the observation of each salvo, and he and the section commanders have to give and to write down the proper orders. A similar exercise is prescribed for the Numbers 1.) Battery and brigade gun drill. Skeleton gun drill. (These are executed under a tactical idea and followed by a conference. At skeleton gun drill each gun is represented by the Number 1 and the layer, who go out mounted.)

**Practice (Part III).**—This is divided into elementary, instructional and service practice. It is conducted under the orders of the colonel commanding the regiment of artillery.

Elementary practice is conducted deliberately, all mistakes being corrected on the spot, and ammunition strictly economized. Easy targets at short ranges are employed.

Instructional practice is conducted more quickly, and at targets arranged with a view to instruction in fire discipline. Only a few rounds for effect are allowed.

Service practice is conducted principally with a view to tactical training. Service conditions are observed as far as possible. For creating casualties, the directing officer has a bag of tickets, one for each officer and man of the battery or brigade, from which he draws a number of tickets corresponding to the supposed effect of the enemy's fire.

Each practice is followed by a conference over which the colonel presides.

Full instructions for the construction and use of targets are given. The targets comprise ordinary dummies, dummies which fall when struck, surprise targets on horizontal pivots, pull-up targets and moving targets on sleighs and on wheeled trucks. Reflectors are used to simulate flashes. Smokeless and black powder puffs are fired electrically.

The Appendix contains a description of various accessories:—Wooden fuse scale; officers' rule for measuring angles; the Goers panorama sight; the Schneider dial sight; the battery telescope and director stand. (Two patterns are in use; the new pattern is simply a panorama sight on a tripod; the old pattern has a straight telescope with graticule in the field on a tripod with horizontal circular scale and

micrometer attachment. All instruments are graduated in thousandths of the range.) The arc clinometer; apparatus for imitating the appearance of shrapnel fire. (The last-named is an appliance for throwing a puff or petard into the air; the petard has a piece of quick-match attached to it which is ignited when it is thrown up; the height at which the petard bursts depends on the length to which the match is cut.)

#### FORTIFICATION AND MILITARY ENGINEERING.

*The Organisation of Ground on the Field of Battle (L'organisation du terrain sur le champ de bataille).* By Captain G. Bastien. 172 pp., with diagrams. 8vo. Paris, 1909. Lavauzelle. 2/6.

The leading idea of this book is the defensive-offensive to check the attack in such a manner as to enable an effective counter-stroke to be delivered.

The defending troops are divided into the advanced guard, occupying detached entrenched positions in front and the main body, entrenched in rear. The advanced guard is to check and, if possible, immobilise the enemy; the main body is to counter-attack him.

The general officer commanding decides as to the tactical organisation of the defence. He then divides the ground and the troops into sections, and the commanders of sections ride forward to reconnoitre and report as to the entrenchments which will have to be constructed. On receiving these reports the general officer commanding distributes the technical troops, tools, &c., to the sections, and he and the Chief Engineer ride round to see that touch is maintained between the defences of the sections.

In the meantime the troops march straight to their sections and commence work with the 181 portable tools carried by each company. If the time available is short, the tools, &c., are distributed without waiting for section reports.

The tactical organisation of the defence is based on the lines of attack open to the enemy. Each such line is guarded by a separate section of the advanced guard. The main body is stationed in the offensive section, that is, the section most favourably situated for delivering a counter-attack.

The entrenchments of each section consist of natural or artificial supporting points connected by successive lines of detached trenches or works. Dummy entrenchments are freely used.

Each individual position is defended at first by long-range fire from advanced posts and from guns under cover behind the position. The main line of defence is not disclosed till the attack advances to short range.

Dead ground in front of the position must be held, unless it can be swept by flanking fire.

Natural parapets are to be used as far as possible; failing these, shelter trenches with low inconspicuous parapets must be dug.

In arranging entrenchments, the guiding principle is: "Do everything which, if you were attacking, you would wish the defender not to do." An example illustrating this principle, with a sketch map, is given.

It is probable that the men and tools available will not suffice to execute all the necessary works; they must be carried out successively rather than progressively, in order of importance. Reliefs must not exceed two hours. Ploughs are of great assistance in making trenches.

In Part II. the theoretical propositions laid down in Part I. are applied to a concrete case, that of a division defending the valley of the Oise. The example is worked out in great detail, and includes general and special ideas, appreciation of the situation, orders and reports. The reconnaissance of the section held by one battalion is described, and the distribution of the companies and tools is given. The works to be constructed are discussed. A specimen of battalion orders for the execution of the defences is given; this is very elaborate, and would take an hour to write.

A second example, based on the same situation, deals with the entrenchment of the main body of the force; this is treated in the same way as the first example, but the tactical situation is discussed at much greater length.

A feature of the book is the amount of written work, including reports, returns, orders and distribution tables which the author expects the officers to execute. The author requires the commander of a section to decide every detail of the works to be executed, and leaves nothing to the initiative of subordinate commanders on the spot.

*Engineers in Combination with the other Arms (L'Emploi des Troupes du Génie en liaison avec les autres Armes).* By Captain Camut. 72 pp., with 1 map. 8vo. Paris, 1910. Chapelot et Cie. 1/6.

This is a useful book for the young Royal Engineer officer. The author takes the tactical problems set in the *Journal des Sciences Militaires* (see page 303 of this No.), and shows what part the divisional and Army Corps engineer companies ought to play in the solution. Especially interesting is his insistence on the necessity of the officer commanding a company reconnoitring the country in advance of his unit, and thus seeing what are likely tasks it will have to perform and what are the available local resources.

*Field Fortification. Part I. Technical* [Réglement pour l'instruction spéciale des troupes du génie dans l'armée Russe. Fortification de campagne Partie I<sup>re</sup>. Technique.] (Translated into French by Captain G. Wehrlin and Captain J. Virlet). Published by the French General Staff. 272 pp., with 204 plates and illustrations. 8vo. Paris. Chapelot et Cie. 3/4.

The Russian Manual of Field Fortification gives evidence of the changes which have been introduced into field engineering methods by the experience gained in the Russo-Japanese War. Field works of all kinds played a prominent part in that war; and the deliberate nature of the operations led to a development of works which differed little from those formerly admissible only in siege warfare. This development does not detract from the value of the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, but discretion must be exercised in their application. The necessity for the concealment of works, and for ample means of communication within and to them are key-notes of the book. The entrenchment of machine guns and of field artillery is dealt with exhaustively, 66 pages and 56 plates being devoted to artillery alone. The sections relating to the organisation of defences and redoubts, the preparation of villages and woods for defence, and the use of ground are of peculiar interest. The illustrations, though small, are clear; dimensions are given in metres. The translation is well worth study, and should prove of particular interest to artillery officers.

Features of the book.—Chapter I. deals with fire trenches, shelters, communications, cover for machine guns. The machine-gun emplacements are usually designed in pairs. An example is given of an entrenchment for four machine guns, placed in front of the main firing line so as to flank its whole length. Chapter II. treats of the entrenchment of field artillery. The tactical siting of gun positions is considered; many varieties of gun and howitzer emplacements are illustrated, observation posts, telephone and battery commanders' shelters and facilities for ammunition supply are dealt with in detail. Chapter III. is concerned with closed field works and redoubts. The necessity for traverses and blindages is emphasised. A thickness of 7 feet of earth is the protection proposed to resist the fire of field howitzers. Chapter IV. is devoted to the organisation of field entrenchments, both as regards development of fire and for the convenience of the troops. It includes matters such as the supply of ammunition, ranging, rifle rests, provision of latrines and water supply for the fighting troops. Chapter V. discusses the tactical organisation of defences, the special treatment of roads, railways, houses, villages and woods for defence. Examples are given showing defences proposed for typical Russian, German and Chinese villages. Special attention is drawn to the preparation of a second position, and to the delivery of counter-attacks in such cases. Chapter VII. deals with obstacles of all kinds. Chapter VIII. refers to methods of concealment, the use of dummy trenches and masks of smoke. Ten appendices contain tables of tools, calculations of labour and materials, range tables, penetration data, &c.

*The Tactical Employment of Field Fortifications* (Essai sur l'emploi tactique de la fortification de campagne). By Colonel L. Piarron de Mondesir. 132 pp., with 9 maps and diagrams. 8vo. Paris, 1910. Berger-Levrault. 2/6.

This is the fourth edition of a well-known work first published in 1904. The author, formerly a professor at the French Staff College, is a great authority on all matters connected with military engineering, and the theories advanced by him in this volume are of considerable interest.

Colonel de Mondesir has divided his book into three parts; the first deals with temporary field fortifications pure and simple, the second with semi-permanent defences, and the third with a concrete example of the works to be executed in the occupation of a position. Parts I. and III. are the most interesting, and the author has stated his opinions and theories with much ability. Perhaps the most important of his contentions is that troops acting on the defensive should generally occupy the rear edge of a plateau, where they are less exposed to the fire of the hostile artillery. Colonel de Mondesir says that the forward slopes of such a position can be swept by oblique fire whilst the direct fire of the defenders should be reserved for the moment when the attacking infantry has reached the forward crest. He insists that the adoption of a defensive attitude must be only temporary, and that the offensive must be assumed as early as possible with all the available strength, a principle which is in accordance with our own regulations.

*The Fortress in Modern War* (Die Festung in der heutigen Kriegführung). Vol. I. By Colonel Schroeter. 173 pp., with 12 maps. 8vo. Berlin, 1910. Mittler. 4/6.

This is the third edition of Colonel Schroeter's work, and contains much that is new. It is divided into two portions, the first of which deals with the science of fortification generally under such headings as: the relation between the construction of fortresses and fortress warfare; the *raison d'être* of a fortress and its self-defence; field operations and fortress warfare; the strength, cost and garrison

of a fortress. The last chapter deals with modern fortification and military history, and gives many examples of the objects fulfilled or unfulfilled by the best known fortresses in wars of fairly recent date.

Part II. is devoted to Land Defences. The author discusses the influence of land defences on policy and preparation for war, and their importance in the higher branches of troop leading. This latter point is illustrated by many examples, ranging from Prague in 1757 to Port Arthur in 1904-05. The various modern systems of fortifications are also discussed, and coast defences are very briefly treated. The book closes with a chapter devoted to a general survey of the fortifications of every State in Europe. This survey is necessarily brief, but it gives a good idea of the methods employed by various countries. It is illustrated by a map of Europe 1/5,000,000, on which the various fortresses are clearly shown.

*(To be continued.)*



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